

1/7/42

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

*File
Book
(back cover)*

a60a01

1/7/42

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

*File
Book
(back cover)*

a60a01

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FILED 0510/7

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RADIOGRAM

EXACT COPY

AG 381 (1-7-42) MSC

FROM: FORT MILLS

ESN-1705

TO: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL WAR DEPT

JANUARY 7 1942

3:51 AM

NO. 20 JANUARY 7TH (PRIORITY)

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED YOUR NINE ONE THREE STOP IN ORDER TO PREPARE FOR ARRIVAL OF EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OPERATION IN MINDANAO I ORDERED BRIGADIER GENERAL SHARP COMDG VISAYAN MINDANAO FORCE ON THIRTIETH TO MOVE EQUIVALENT OF ONE OF HIS TWO VISAYAN DIVISIONS TO MINDANAO AND TO TRANSFER HIS OWN HEADQUARTERS THERE STOP NO REPORT OF EXECUTION YET FROM SHARP BUT MOVEMENT OFFERS NO DIFFICULTY STOP NINE P DASH FORTY AIRPLANES SENT TO DEL MONTE STOP ALSO DISPATCHED SIX HUNDRED FIFTY OFFICERS AND MEN OF NINETEENTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP TO DEL MONTE FROM HERE THROUGH ENEMY BLOCKADE STOP TROOP SHIP ARRIVED BUT ACCOMPANYING SHIP WITH AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES WAS SUNK STOP FORCE IN MINDANAO WILL CHECK HOSTILE DRIVE IF MADE FROM DAVAO AREA COMMA PLACE COVERING FORCES IN COTABATO PARANG REPEAT COTABATO PARANG AREA AND COVER POINTS OF ENTRY AT CAGAYEN MISAMIS REPEAT CAGAYEN MISAMIS AREA STOP WILL KEEP ME INFORMED ON AIRDROMES AND BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE AND SERVICE AIRPLANES STOP WILL DEVELOP ADDITIONAL LANDING FIELDS STOP ESSENTIAL THAT BLOCAGE RUNNING SHIPS BE FORCED THROUGH TO MINDANAO WITH GROUND AND AIR OPERATING SUPPLIES STOP GROUND FORCE HAS VERY LITTLE AMMUNITION STOP OUR AIR FORCE BOMBARDMENT MISSIONS FROM SOUTH SHOULD QUICKLY ELIMINATE HOSTILE AIR FROM DAVAO AND OUR PURSUIT SHOULD GO INTO DEL MONTE WITHOUT DELAY STOP ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR FORCE WILL PERMIT IMMEDIATE EXTENSION INTO VISAYAN AND ATTACKS ON ENEMY FORCES IN LUZON STOP HAVE SEVERAL AIRDROMES IN OPERATION ON BATAAN SUBJECT TO

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INTERMITTENT INTERRUPTION BUT ONLY VERY LIMITED GASOLINE STOP WILL
KEEP AIR FORCE ADVISED THEREON STOP AN ARMY CORPS SHOULD BE LANDED
IN MINDANAO AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE STOP ESSENTIAL THAT BLOCKADE
RUNNERS BRING VITAL ITEMS STOP NUMEROUS SMALL VESSELS SHOULD BE USED
AND THOUGH LOSSES MAY BE HIGH A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE WILL GET THROUGH AND
A FEW WILL RELIEVE THE SITUATION STOP ENEMY APPEARS TO HAVE TENDENCY
TO BECOME OVERCONFIDENT AND TIME IS RIPE FOR BRILLIANT THRUST WITH
AIR CARRIERS end

MACARTHUR

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~~SECRET~~

put

*P-1
safe - Philippines*

February 26, 1942

FROM: Ft. Mills

TO: Adj. Gen.

No. 371 Feb. 26

With light forces I swept through the enemy's screen before my battle position and am now in command of the terrain to my front. The enemy has definitely recoiled. He has reversed his flank in front of my right six to ten kilometers and in other sectors by varying distances. I am pressing to locate and fix his position. His attitude is so passive as to discount any immediate threat of attack. There are periodical attempts of enemy destroyers and occasionally a cruiser in and out of Subic Bay. This has possibly become an intermediate base for naval convoy to the south as well as for local supply of the enemy in Bataan. In the mountain province and Abra our guerilla activities have become so harassing and deadly that the enemy will shortly be forced either to evacuate or rebuild his forces. Indications are the former. Patrol activities increasing in Mindanao but with no indication of enemy becoming seriously aggressive.

MACARTHUR

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DD FORM 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature-

Carl S. Spicer

a60a201

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file *ASF* *Safe - Philippine*
~~SECRET~~

COPY

JANUARY 11, 1942
8:38 PM

AG 381 (1-12-42) MSC
FROM FORT MILLS
TO ADJUTANT GENERAL

NO. 36 JANUARY 12

GROUND ACTIVITY CONFINED TO ARTILLERY DUELLING AND PATROLLING stop
ENEMY AIR ACTION LIMITED stop I HAVE PLACED THE COMMAND ON HALF RATIONS

MACARTHUR

SENT 10:55 PM
1/11/42 CDM

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

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~~SECRET~~

INTERMITTENT INTERRUPTION BUT ONLY VERY LIMITED GASOLINE STOP WILL
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AIR CARRIERS end

MACARTHUR

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*MF
Safe - Philippines*

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From Ft. Mills

To The Adjutant General

No. 382, Feb. 28

The enemy contour has now been definitely fixed as a semicircular defensive position buttressed on the slopes of Mt. Natib. He blocks firmly to the north the Moron-Bagac Road on the west and patrols weakly the Abucay-Oranien Road on the east. In North Luzon he has evacuated the Abra Valley from Cervantes to Bengued. He begins to show signs of exhaustion. Every indication that we are entering upon a phase of positional warfare of indecisive character. No other changes.

MacArthur

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CDD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

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1918

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ASF
RADIOGRAM

Safe File: Philippines
AC-5

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

U R G E N T.

JANUARY 13 1942

246AM M.

From FT. SILL PI

To PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WASHN DC.

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 7 JANUARY 13TH.

IT IS WITH UTMOST DIFFIDENCE THAT I AM SUBMITTING TO YOU THESE THOUGHTS BUT I AM SENDING THEM FOR WHAT THEY MAY BE WORTH. IT IS MY FIRM CONVICTION THAT AT THIS TIME IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO BRING TO AN END THE WAR WITH JAPAN IF AMERICA AND ENGLAND OR EVEN IF AMERICA ALONE DECIDED TO USE ALL THE MATERIALS AT HER DISPOSAL TO CRUSH THE JAPANESE FORCES AT THIS TIME. RADIO REPORTS RECEIVED HERE INDICATE THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF HITLER IS TO BE AMERICAS FIRST OBJECTIVE. I REALIZE THAT THESE REPORTS MAY BE BRITISH PROPAGANDA INTENDED TO INFLUENCE ACTION IN THAT DIRECTION BUT THEY HAVE NEVER BEEN REFUTED IN ANY WAY AND IT IS REMARKABLE THAT NO ASSISTANCE BY SEA OR BY AIR HAS BEEN AFFORDED THE PHILIPPINES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. THIS APPARENT INACTIVITY IS A MATTER OF GRAVE CONCERN TO ME AND MY PEOPLE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF HITLER MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE IN LESS THAN TWO OR THREE YEARS; THAT THIS PERIOD OF TIME WILL GIVE JAPAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYA AND THE DUTCH EAST INDIES AND CONSOLIDATE ITS FORCES BY THE USE OF PRIME WAR MATERIALS THAT ARE TO BE FOUND IN THESE COUNTRIES AND

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1-5 F Philippines
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From Ft. Mills

To The Adjutant General

No. 383, Feb. 28:

President Quezon today issued a proclamation in which he cited the valiant defense of Philippine territory and the steadfast loyalty of the civilian population. He announced the allocation of funds for civilian relief and urged every Filipino to trust America. The proclamation closed with the following: "The United Nations will win this war. America is too great and too powerful to be vanquished in this conflict. I know she will not fail us." I am transmitting proclamation in clear to Public Relations.

MacArthur

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

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TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

T-5 F
Safe - Philippines

The White House

February 4 1942

FOR THE PRESIDENT

MacArthur repulsed enemy night attacks on his left. No new land attacks at Singapore. Air attacks continue. Our aircraft sank two transports in Balikpapan area.

Halsey arrives fifth Fletcher on sixth. British are making ten new vorvettes available to us and we are despatching crews for same to U.K., in February.

Combined chiefs of staff are urging British and Wavell to accept Chiang's offer of more Chinese troops.

Indications are that three subs destroyed yesterday in Atlantic.

Leary is flying to Anzac area. Comish feels we are moving too fast reference Hart.

Comish sent message to Hart and has reply thereto which he feels President should see on his return.

McCrea.

11:45am/d

a60d01

COPY
PSF Safe File

Philippines

March 1, 1942.

From: Ft. Mills, P.I.

To: Gen. G.C. Marshall

The following message has been received from the Lanao Moros:

"We the undersigned leaders of Lanao Moros request you to inform General MacArthur, Commanding General of all military forces in the Philippines and through him the President of the United States that we have consulted together and agreed without any exception that we will fight with all our strength against the Japanese and other enemies of the United States and Philippine Government; that we recognize that the present conflict is a great emergency where all men of character must stand together united, so we agree to avoid politics or struggle for personal advantage, to stop personal quarrels which disrupt the unity of Moro Community, that we will disregard differences in religion between Christian, Filipino, Mohammedan or Paga, but will fight together as one people for a greater purpose to destroy the enemy of good government, that we place ourselves under command of the military commander and will obey his orders; to all of this we have sworn upon the Koran to hold our lives forfeit in the fulfilment of this purpose to fight the Japanese and enemies of the United States, and we have prepared our bladed weapons because we lack fire arms and with sharp kris, barong, campilan, tabas, and spear, we will attack or defend as ordered.

"We have over 10,000 already sworn upon the Koran and additional fighting men are being sworn every day. We Lanao Moros have fought for many generations, we know how to fight, and when we swear upon the Koran we know what it means; which General Wood, our good friend, would know means all out fight and no mercy asked.

"We want you to know and the President of the United States to know that we Lanao Moros are loyal and will fight all enemies of the United States. All fighting men of Lanao would like to sign their names but they are too many so we signed for them:

Senator Sultan S.A. Ramlain Alonto
All Sultans Lanao,
Deputy Governors,
Municipal Mayors and other District
officials."

I have transmitted to the Moros the following message:

"Please tell the Lanao Moros that no more inspiring or significant incident has occurred in the mighty struggle that now engulfs the world than the magnificent stand they have taken. It covers them with immortal

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Doc. ID: 8000.9 (9/27/88)

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*PSF - Safe - Philippines
Box*

REC'D BY PHONE AT 0236

From: COMICNH CODE ROOM

FROM RADIO CAVITE:

EIGHT TO TEN TRANSPORTS LANDING TROOPS AT CEBU
CITY SUPPORTED BY FIVE WARSHIPS. LANDING BEING MADE
AT TOLEDO. ALL LANDINGS HAVE AIR SUPPORT. HAVE DIRECTED
DESTRUCTION TORPEDOES AT CEBU CITY.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~

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glory and elevates the Moro race to the highest pinnacle of spiritual grandeur. However hard the road, ultimate victory is certain. I have transmitted this message of superb fidelity to the President of the United States."

MacArthur.

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Date- JAN 20 1992

Signature- RHP

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

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RADIOGRAM

Safe - Philippines
~~SECRET~~

Date- 4-6-59

Signature-

Carl L. Spicer

From Ft. Mills, P.I.

February 4, 1942.

6:49 P.M.

To General Marshall

201 No. Feb. 4th

In compliance with your previous directive that from time to time I present my strategic conception of the situation I take this opportunity of presenting what I believe is a fatal mistake on the part of the Democratic Allies. The Japanese are sweeping southward in a great offensive and the Allies are attempting merely to stop them by building up forces in their front. This method, as has almost universally been the case in war, will fail. Such movements can only be negated by thrusts not at the enemy's strength but at his weakness. The lines of weakness from time immemorial have been the lines of communication. In this case they are stretched out over two thousand miles of sea with the whole line subject to American sea thrust. This line is not defended by enemy bombers but is held by scattered Naval elements.

A sea threat would immediately relieve the pressure on the South and is the only way that pressure can be relieved. A great naval victory on our part is not necessary to accomplish this mission; the threat alone would go far toward the desired end. The enemy would probably not engage his entire Fleet in actual combat. If he did and lost, the war would be over. If he did and won, the losses he would sustain would still cripple his advance and take from him the initiative.

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You must be prepared to take heavy losses, just so heavy losses are inflicted in return. I wish to reiterate that his bomber strength is practically entirely engaged on his southern front and represents little menace to such a naval thrust. With only minor threat from the fleets of Germany and Italy, the American and British Navies can assemble without serious jeopardy the force to make this thrust.

I unhesitatingly predict that if this is not done the plan upon which we are now working, based upon the building up of air supremacy in the Southwest Pacific, will fail, the war will be indefinitely prolonged and its final outcome will be jeopardized. Counsels of timidity based upon theories of safety first will not win against such an aggressive and audacious adversary as Japan. No building program, no matter of what proportions, will be able to overtake the initial advantages the enemy with every chance of success is trying to gain. The only way to beat him is to fight him incessantly. Combat must not be avoided but must be sought so that the ultimate policy of attrition can at once become effective. No matter what the theoretical odds may be against us, if we fight him we will beat him. We have shown that here.

In submitting these views I may be exceeding the proper scope of my office and therefore do so with great hesitancy. My excuse, if excuse is necessary, is that from my present point of vantage I can see the whole strategy of the Pacific perhaps clearer than anyone else. If agreeable to you I would appreciate greatly the presentation of this view to the highest authority.

a60f02

MacArthur.

~~SECRET~~

PSF
~~SECRET~~

Take - Philippines

*file
page*

From Ft. Mills

To The Adjutant General

No. 413, March 4

We made a surprise air attack on Olongapo and Subic Bay, destroying the following vessels: one of 12,000 tons, one of 10,000 tons, one of 8,000 tons and two motor launches. Inflicted much damage on smaller craft. Large fires were started at shore installations on Grande Island and Olongapo.

MacArthur

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

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Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

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Phil
RADIOGRAM

Safe-Philippines
But PSF
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February 8, 1942.

9:04 A.M.

From Ft. Mills, P.I.

To General Marshall, Chief of Staff.

No. 2265-February 8.

The following message has just been received by me from President Quezon for President Roosevelt. "The situation of my country has become so desperate that I feel that positive action is demanded. Militarily it is evident that no help will reach us from the United States in time either to rescue the beleaguered garrison now fighting so gallantly or to prevent the complete overrunning of the entire Philippine Archipelago.

My people entered the war with the confidence that the United States would bring such assistance to us as would make it possible to sustain the conflict with some chance of success. All our soldiers in the field were animated by the belief that help would be forthcoming. This help has not and evidently will not be realized. Our people have suffered death, misery, devastation. After two months of war not the slightest assistance has been forthcoming from the United States. Aid and succour have been dispatched to other warring nations such as England, Ireland, Australia, the N.E.I. and perhaps others, but not only has nothing come here, but apparently no effort has been made to bring anything here. The American Fleet and the British Fleet, the two most powerful navies in the world, have apparently adopted an attitude which precludes any effort to reach these islands with assistance.

As a result, while enjoying security itself, the United States has in effect condemned the sixteen millions of Filipinos to practical destruction in order to effect a certain delay. You have promised redemption, but what we need is immediate assistance and protection. We are concerned with what is to transpire during the next few months and years as well as with our ultimate destiny. There is not the slightest doubt in our minds that victory will rest with the United States, but the question before us now is: Shall we further sacrifice our country and our people in a hopeless fight? I voice the unanimous opinion of my War Cabinet and I am sure the unanimous opinion of all Filipinos that under the circumstances we should take steps to preserve the Philippines and the Filipinos from further destruction.

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Published in "Foreign
Relations of the U. S. 1942,
General, British Commonwealth,
The Far East"

4-27-60

Carl S. Spicer

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[PSF, Safe, Philippines]

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RADIOGRAM

Safe-Philippines
But PSF
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The Far East"

4-27-60

Carl S. Spicer

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[PSF, Safe, Philippines]

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Thanks to wise generalship two-thirds of my country is as yet untouched. We do not propose to do this by a betrayal of the United States. It appears to us that our mission is only to fight as a sacrifice force here as long as possible in order to help the defense of the Dutch and British in this area of the World. But you do not need to sacrifice the people of the Philippines to win this war. Members of your Government here repeatedly said that the action against Hitler would determine the outcome of the entire war.

I feel at this moment that our military resistance here can no longer hold the enemy when he sees fit to launch a serious attack. I feel that the elements of the situation here can be composed into a solution that will not reduce the delaying effect of our resistance here but which will save my country from further devastation as the battleground of two great powers.

I deem it my duty to propose my solution. The Government of the United States under the McDuffie Tydings law is committed to grant independence to the Philippines in 1946, and the same law authorized the President to open negotiations for the neutralization of the Philippines. On the other hand, the Japanese Government has publicly announced its willingness to grant the Philippines her independence. In view of the foregoing I propose the following:

- That the United States immediately grant the Philippines complete and absolute independence;
- That the Philippines be at once neutralized;
- That all occupying troops, both American and Japanese, be withdrawn by mutual agreement with the Philippine Government within a reasonable length of time;
- That neither country maintain bases in the Philippines;
- That the Philippine Army be immediately disbanded, the only armed forces being maintained here to be a constabulary of modest size;
- That immediately upon granting independence the trade relations of the Philippines with foreign countries be a matter to be determined entirely by the Philippines and the foreign countries concerned;
- That American and Japanese civilians who so desire be withdrawn with their respective troops under mutual and proper safeguards. It is my proposal to make this suggestion publicly to you and to the Japanese authorities without delay and upon acceptance in general principle by those two countries that an immediate armistice be entered into here pending the withdrawal of their respective garrisons.

(signed) Manuel L. Quezon."

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REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

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260902

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I took the liberty of presenting this message to High Commissioner Sayre for a general expression of his views. States as follows:

"If the premise of President Quezon is correct, that American help cannot or will not arrive here in time to be availing, I believe his proposal for immediate independence and neutralization of Philippines is the sound course to follow."

My estimate of the military situation here is as follows:

The troops have sustained practically 50% percent casualties from their original strength. Divisions are reduced to the size of regiments, regiments to battalions, battalions to companies. Some units have entirely disappeared. The men have been in constant action and are badly battleworn. They are desperately in need of rest and refitting. Their spirit is good but they are capable now of nothing but fighting in place on a fixed position. All our supplies are scant and the command has been on half rations for the past month.

It is possible for the time being that the present enemy force might temporarily be held, but any addition to his present strength will insure the destruction of our Gonzale force. We have pulled through a number of menacing situations but there is no denying the fact that we are near done. Corregidor itself is extremely vulnerable. This type of fortress, built prior to the days of air power, when isolated is impossible of prolonged defense. Any heavy air bombardment or the location of siege guns on Bataan or even on the Cavite side, would definitely limit the life of the fortress. My water supply is extremely vulnerable and may go at any time. Every other vital installation can be readily taken out.

Since I have no air or sea protection you must be prepared at any time to figure on the complete destruction of this command. You must determine whether the (mission?) Misegon of delay would be better furthered by the temporizing plan of Quezon or by my continued battle effort. The temper of the Filipinos is one of almost violent resentment against the United States. Everyone of them expected help and when it has not been forthcoming they believe they have been betrayed in favor of others. It must be remembered they are hostile to Great Britain on account of the latter's colonial policy. In spite of my great prestige with them, I have had the utmost difficulty during the last few days in keeping them in line. If help does not arrive shortly nothing, in my opinion, can prevent their utter collapse and their complete absorption by the enemy. The Japanese made a powerful impression upon Philippine public imagination in promising independence.

So far as the military angle is concerned, the problem presents itself as to whether the plan of President Quezon might offer

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the best possible solution of what is about to be a disastrous debacle. It would not affect the ultimate situation in the Philippines for that would be determined by the results in other theatres. If the Japanese Government rejects President Quezon's proposition it would psychologically strengthen our hold because of their Prime Minister's public statement offering independence. If it accepts it, we lose no military advantage because we would still secure at least equal delay. Please instruct me.

MacArthur

UNCLASSIFIED

a 60904

SECRET

SECRET

the best possible solution of what is about to be a disastrous debacle. It would not affect the ultimate situation in the Philippines for that would be determined by the results in other theatres. If the Japanese Government rejects President Quezon's proposition it would psychologically strengthen our hold because of their Prime Minister's public statement offering independence. If it accepts it, we lose no military advantage because we would still secure at least equal delay. Please instruct me.

MacArthur

UNCLASSIFIED

a 60904

SECRET

EH
NPM 555
0239/4TH TIME FILED

~~SECRET~~
RADIOGRAM

AC-4

MARCH 4, 1942

5:20 AM.

From FORT MILLS

To GENERAL GEORGE C MARSHALL

NO 414 MARCH FOURTH

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS FOR PRESIDENT
ROOSEVELT FROM PRESIDENT QUEZON QUOTE HAVE VISITED
SOME PROVINCES VISAYAN GROUP STOP PEOPLE LOYAL TO
THE END AND MORALE FINE UNQUOTE

MACARTHUR

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
EOD ERM 5500.9 (2/27/58)

Date- JAN 20 1972

Signature- *AKH*

~~SECRET~~
abogg01

EH
NPM 555
0239/4TH TIME FILED

~~SECRET~~
RADIOGRAM

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Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
EOD ERM 5500.9 (2/27/58)

Date- JAN 20 1972

Signature- *AKH*

~~SECRET~~
aboggoi

~~SECRET~~

Safe: Philippines
PSF

10-26-66

February 8, 1942.

Carl S. Spicer

Message from General Marshall to General MacArthur

The fundamental strategy outlined in your No. 201 has been under most careful study. From the moment the enemy began his southward drive the decisive effect of a successful flank attack against his communications has been recognized. Two factors have stood in the way of initiating such operations. The first is that, as a feature of his opening operations in early December, the enemy provided for naval flank security by seizing Guam and Wake and establishing there as well as in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands heavy protective forces principally air. The second factor has been naval weakness due to the initial elimination at Pearl Harbor of virtually the entire heavy striking elements of the Pacific Fleet. This weakness is now rapidly being corrected by repairs and transfers but very heavy convoy duties to Hawaii and Australia and the submarining of one of our few Pacific air carriers has seriously limited aggressive naval operations. From now on aggressive tactics are becoming possible. It has been necessary to convoy and set up garrisons on Canton, Christmas, Palmyra Islands, Boré Boré and Samoa and Fiji and a garrison for New Caledonia now enroute—all to cover communications with Far East. On January 30 the Navy carried out an offensive against the hostile flank, striking the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. A great deal of damage was inflicted upon Japanese shipping and local installations but the reaction, particularly by air, was such as to preclude deeper penetration with the limited forces available.

More recently United States and Dutch Naval Forces in the N.E.I., conducting an offensive against an isolated portion of the enemy's extended position, were met by formations of land based bombers. All cruisers participating in this attack were heavily damaged and were compelled to proceed to naval bases for repair. Similar results have been experienced in the Mediterranean, in the North Sea and in the South China Sea. It is obvious that surface vessels cannot operate in regions where they are subjected to heavy attack by hostile land based aircraft. Nevertheless, a second offensive is now underway to strike at the flank of the hostile advance on New Britain. But Army heavy bombers from Hawaii have to be moved into position to support this distant action. These facts and considerations have forced us to oppose the Japanese aggression in the only areas in which the required air bases and fields remain in our possession, namely, northern Australia and the N.E.I. It is clearly recognized that the decisive effects that would follow successful flanking operations as suggested in your radio cannot be accomplished through the methods we are now employing. However, these methods were adopted simply because there appeared to be no alternative except complete inaction.

a60h01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Safe: Philippines
PSF

10-26-66

February 8, 1942.

Carl S. Spicer

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a60h01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Due to unannounced losses the number of aircraft carriers presently available to the Allies is not sufficient to permit the substitution of this type of air power for land based craft in a general offensive westward from Hawaii. Similarly, the number of capital ships that could conceivably be made available in the Pacific is not sufficient to permit an advance toward Japan, northward of the Mandated Islands, in an effort either to destroy his communications at their base or to force his main fleet into action on the high seas. The basis of all current effort is to accumulate through every possible means sufficient strength to initiate operations along the lines you suggest, building up behind the effort the forces required to push home a deep attack. More is under way than I dare risk reference to in this communication. In the meanwhile we are endeavoring to limit the hostile advance so as to deny him free access to land and sea areas that will immeasurably strengthen his war making powers or which will be valuable to us as jump off positions when we can start a general counteroffensive. There is always the possibility, as the Russians complete their highly successful winter campaign of tremendous counter attacks along the entire front, which are having a serious effect on German arms and morale, that Stalin will feel more free to consider action in his Pacific theatre. He has stated his expectation of an eventual Japanese attack on Siberia. He realizes the enemy's great advantage if that attack should follow rather than coincide with their present tremendous thrust southward. If we have an early success in checking Japanese progression and secure air superiority through employment of masses of heavy bombers which they lack, there is the strong probability that at that moment Stalin will strike against Japan. His eastern submarine force and bomber force should permit devastating action against Japanese shipping and industry.

I welcome and appreciate your strategical views and invariably submit them to the President.

alcohol 02

10-96-66

Carl L. Spicer

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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alcohol 02

10-96-66

Carl L. Spicer

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

8
NPM 1372
9/1150

RADIOGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

FEBRUARY 9 1942

10:06 A.M.

From FORT MILLS

To GEN GEORGE C MARSHALL

Copies furnished as noted:

NO 234 FEBRUARY NINTH


YOUR ONE ZERO TWO FOUR MOST ENLIGHTENING STOP
WOULD APPRECIATE GREATLY YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE
SITUATION FROM TIME TO TIME

MACARTHUR

10-16-66

Carl L. Spicer

FEB 9 1942



MESSAGE CENTER
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

8

Action Copy

a60h03

8
NPM 1372
9/1150

RADIOGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
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
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SITUATION FROM TIME TO TIME

MACARTHUR

10-16-66

Carl L. Spicer

FEB 9 1942



MESSAGE CENTER
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

8

a60h03

Action Copy

PSF ~~SECRET~~ State File: Philippines B.I.

Copy

Secret Radiogram

From: Ft. Mills, P. I.

March 16, 1942
1:59 P.M.

To: AGO

No. 498, March 16, 1942.

For General Marshall. Request that the following message from President Quezon be transmitted to President Roosevelt: "Your messages always lighten our burden and encourage us to still greater efforts and sacrifice."

MacArthur

Secret Radiogram

~~SECRET~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DDO BY: [illegible] (2/27/58)

Date- JAN 20 1972

Signature- [illegible]

Date-

Signature-

(2/27/58)

a60hho1

PSF ~~SECRET~~ State File: Philippines B.I.

Copy

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Secret Radiogram

~~SECRET~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DDO BR 10000 (2/27/58)

Date- JAN 20 1972

Signature- RHP

Date-

Signature-

60hho1

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED DRAFT

Safe File : Philippines

President Quezon:

I have the deepest sympathy and understanding of the point of view you submit in your message. You may put it down as an absolute purpose from which there will be no deviation: we shall drive the Japanese out of the Philippines and preserve the independence of your people come what may. How soon we shall be able to achieve this purpose you will understand it is impossible for me to say now. We are bending every possible energy to supply the air power which is vitally essential before any effective and resultful move can be made.

You should know that the British have been more than generous in the diversion of air power designed to go to them - and they need it badly - to our use in reinforcing the American air power in the Southwest Pacific. Both British and American reinforcements are now arriving there. A very large number of four engine bomber planes are enroute. Some of them have already arrived. As you will recognize maximum and effective use of these heavy bombers can only be made when they are adequately protected by fighter craft. The only way of conveying the latter is by means of fast freighters or converted passenger ships. These means of transportation are now being used to the utmost and already some fighter planes have arrived and are now being put into action. In addition to air forces, ground forces are being transported as fast as convoys can carry them.

You will also understand that due to the damage done to some of our capital ships at Pearl Harbor our original plans for fighting Japan have had to be temporarily suspended.

I know you want me to make no promises which I cannot fulfill

By Deputy

By W. A.

- 1 -

a60101

FEB 7 1942

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

but upon this you can completely rely - We shall bend every energy to support the Philippines.

BY D.

BY W.

FEB 1942

260102

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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BY D
BY W.

FEB 1942

260102

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a message received yesterday from General MacArthur. You will see that prior to his departure from Fort Mills he created four separate commands in the Philippines, to be controlled by him at Melbourne through a deputy at Fort Mills. He left the command of Manila Bay and Fort Mills independent of General Wainwright who is in command of the nearby forces on the Bataan Peninsula. The coordination of these two intimately related garrisons was to be handled from Australia, through a Deputy Chief of Staff at Fort Mills--General Beebe, promoted to the grade of Brigadier General just prior to General MacArthur's departure.

Prior to the receipt of General MacArthur's message, of March 21st just referred to, instructions had been sent to General Wainwright as follows:

- (a) The message signed by you personally, stating your confidence in his leadership and advancing him to the grade of Lieutenant General.

The following message from me:

- (b) "Upon the departure of General MacArthur you became Commanding General of United States Forces in the Philippines. You are to communicate directly with the War Department in rendering daily operation reports which are to be dispatched over your name."

I am sending General MacArthur a message that General Wainwright has taken over command of all forces in the Philippines and so reported himself yesterday. In other words, the subdivided command as created by General MacArthur prior to his departure has been consolidated as a result of the fact that we had no information from MacArthur of the unexpected action he had taken. However, control of these subdivisions from Australia would appear to be an impracticable proposition, whatever the reasons were for such an arrangement. Furthermore, as Supreme Commander of the Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, he is barred from exercising direct command over national forces, under the terms of such agreements for combined commands. You will remember that this last proviso was insisted upon by us

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

ab01101

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1942

PSF - Safe Philippines
File Box

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

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DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

ab01101

to avoid the possibility or rather the natural tendency for General Wavell to so involve himself personally in the affairs of Singapore and Burma that he might fail to give due weight to the problems of the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines.


Chief of Staff

a 601102

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Chief of Staff

a 601102

C O P Y

~~SECRET~~

March 21, 1942.

2:43 A.M.

From Australia

To General George C. Marshall

No. NR 3 - 21st

Upon my departure and based upon the special problems involved I set upon the following organization in the Philippines:

Luzon Force comprising all units on Bataan and elsewhere in Luzon under General Wainwright; Visayan Force comprising all units in those islands under General Chynoweth; Mindanao Force under General Sharp; Harbor defenses of Manila Bay under General Moore. I left at Fort Mills an advance echelon of my headquarters under General Beebe who was designated Deputy Chief of Staff, USAFFE, and who will effect necessary coordination under my direct supervision. Due to intangibles of situation in Philippines the foregoing organization is deemed most advantageous.

In Australia I have found the Air Corps in a most disorganized condition and it is most essential as a fundamental and primary step that General Brett be relieved of his other duties in order properly to command and direct our air effort. His headquarters in Melbourne is too far from the scene of air activity to perform most effectively the functions of organization, training and combat. I propose to relieve him immediately of all duties pertaining to ground forces and to have him establish his headquarters in the forward area in some locality he may select. I propose to assign General Barnes to command U.S. Army Ground Forces. Coordination with Australian Forces for the present in accordance with your radio will be secured through cooperation. Task forces will be created to meet tactical requirements.

Request immediate approval of this organization as a fundamental step in order to bring some order into what is at present a most uncoordinated and ineffective system which is a menace to the safety of this country. I will later and in more detail inform you of glaring deficiencies and make recommendations for their rectification.

My relationship with the naval elements in this zone is not clear to me and I request further information in this regard.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

MacArthur.

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~

a601103

C O P Y

~~SECRET~~

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2:43 A.M.

From Australia

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Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

MacArthur.

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~

a601103

By HRS

12/1/41

Safe File: 12/1/41

I am much distressed that you should have received radio reports giving you the impression that it was our intention to await the destruction of Hitler before we endeavored to defeat the aggression of Japan in the southwestern Pacific. On the contrary from the very day of the attack on Pearl Harbor and in full cooperation with the British government we have been marshaling our forces for an immediate aggressive attack upon Japan in that area. The difficulties and time required for the full effect of this effort must be manifest to you and these difficulties have been somewhat accentuated by the losses at Pearl Harbor. But our air and ground forces are already beginning to reach that area and we have every hope of making our effort effective before Japan has time to complete her conquest of the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies let alone to consolidate any such conquest. The British have been most cooperative in this program and we are encouraged by our mutual progress. But our plans are comprehensive and must not be jeopardized by reckless or hasty steps which would imperil the whole ultimate result. You ^{may} ~~must~~ rest assured that we shall proceed continuously and with all possible speed and that we shall not deviate from our purpose until the Japanese have been driven out of the Philippines and the independence of your people preserved.

a60j01

~~Secret~~

Boyd.

Phil.
Philippines

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: MacArthur's command status.

Attached hereto is a radiogram received last night from General MacArthur on the above subject. Our radiogram #810 to which he refers, informed him as follows:

"That as Supreme Commander he is ineligible to retain direct command of any national forces, including those in the Philippines; that it is considered necessary that command of all Philippine forces be consolidated under Wainwright; approves his proposal that Brett command Australian and United States air forces and that Barnes command United States ground forces; suggests that with the arrival of the headquarters of an Australian Corps, command of the ground forces should pass to an Australian general; informs him that his relationship with the Navy will be clarified in a later directive; and tells him that efforts are being made to have him operate under the President and the United States Chiefs of Staff rather than the Combined Chiefs of Staff."


Chief of Staff.

Incl.

a60jj01

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

CABLEGRAM

March 24, 1942
3:41 P.M.

From: Australia

To : General George C. Marshall

NR 19 March 24, 1942

I understand thoroughly the difficulties outlined in your eight one zero of the twenty-second and you can count upon my accommodating myself completely to any arrangement that is made. I am heartily in accord with Wainwright's promotion to Lieutenant General which I intended myself to recommend. His assignment to the Philippine Command is appropriate.

In view of your radio and of my further survey of the situation I propose to establish the following organization here modifying somewhat that outlined in my number three: ground combat forces under the command of the appropriate Australian General, having the local zone of the interior function under the present Australian authorities; a U. S. service command under General Barnes comprising all administration and supply functions; the Air Force under General Brett. American and Australian units will be assigned to the ground or air echelons as required and strategic control and intimate cooperation exercised through directives to the respective commanders. The U. S. Service Command will operate under policies established by me while requirements to be met by the corresponding Australian establishment will be presented to the Prime Minister for action through his normal channels. I shall thus free the combat echelons of all administrative, supply and political considerations permitting uninterrupted concentration on combat missions and at the same time avoid any interference with the Australian military and governmental organization. I am confident that complete and enthusiastic cooperation can be secured through my contact with the Prime Minister.

MacArthur.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

a60jj02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
Draft of Radio to U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

PSF

Safe File: /

I am making through you an immediate reply to President Quezon's proposals of February 8th. My reply must emphatically deny the possibility of this government's agreement to the political aspects of President Quezon's proposal. ~~Nevertheless, I am conceding to him the right to surrender, separately, his country and the Filipino elements of the defending forces to Japan.~~ The details of all necessary arrangements will be left in your hands, including plans for segregation of forces ~~into national elements~~ and the withdrawal, if your judgment so dictates, of American elements to Fort Mills. The timing also will be left to you.

American forces will continue to keep our flag flying in the Philippines so long as there remains any possibility of resistance. I have made these decisions in complete understanding

By ~~1st Lt. J. J. Stewart~~ ~~into~~ ~~U.S.~~ ~~FEB 7 1972~~

a60K01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of your military estimate that accompanied President Quezon's message to me. The duty and the necessity of resisting Japanese aggression to the last transcends in importance any other obligation now facing us in the Philippines.

There has been gradually welded into a common front a powerful opposition to the predatory powers that are seeking the destruction of individual liberty and freedom of government. As the most powerful member of this coalition we cannot display weakness in spirit no matter how physically weak we may now be at the moment in any particular theatre. It is mandatory that there be established once and for all in the minds of all peoples complete evidence that the American determination and indomitable will to win carries on down to the last unit.

I therefore give you this most difficult mission in full understanding of the desperate situation to which you may shortly be reduced. The service that you and the American members of your command can now render to your country in the titanic struggle now developing is beyond all possibility of appraisal. ~~Assuming therefore that President Quezon will choose to exercise the privilege of separate capitulation.~~ I particularly request that you proceed rapidly to the organization of your forces and your defenses so as to make your resistance as effective as circumstances will permit and as prolonged as humanly possible.

Submit by radio the essentials of your plans in accordance with these instructions.

a60K02

Franklin D. Roosevelt.

~~SECRET~~

Philippines

BSF

Life - P. Philippines
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

BY AUTHORITY OF A. C. OF S. WPD.
4/5/42 *CUY*
Date Initials

April 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Congratulatory Message.

The Chief of Staff directs that a message be sent as follows in the most expeditious manner consistent with secrecy, to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in the Philippines; WDOPD:

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL WAINWRIGHT PERIOD
CONGRATULATIONS ON KNOCKING OUT ANOTHER WHOLESALE JAP
ASSAULT PERIOD PLEASE INFORM OUR FILIPINO AND AMERICAN
SOLDIERS FOR ME THAT THEIR FIGHTING EXAMPLE IS AN
INSPIRATION TO ALL OF US



FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

McNARNEY,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

Dwight D. Eisenhower
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

a60KK01

SECRET

SECRET

RADIOGRAM

February 10, 1942.

9:51 A.M.

COPY
Ft. Mills, P.I.

To General George C. Marshall.
No. 3, Feb. 10th.

The following communication is from President Quezon to President Roosevelt:

"The following is the letter I propose to address to you and to the Emperor of Japan if my recent proposal meets with your approval:

Two great nations are now at war in the Western Pacific. The Commonwealth of the Philippines is still a possession of one of those nations, although through legislative processes it was about to attain complete independence which would have insured its neutrality in any conflict. The Philippines has therefore become a battleground between the warring powers and it is being visited with death, famine and destruction, despite the fact that occupation of the country will not influence in any way the final outcome of the war, nor have a bearing upon the conflicting principles over which the war is being waged.

Under the Tydings-McDuffie Law the United States has promised to recognize the independence of the Philippines in 1946 and the same law gave authority to the President of the United States to begin parleys for the neutralization of the Philippines. On the other hand, the Premier of the Imperial Government of Japan, addressing the Diet, stated that the Imperial Government of Japan was ready to offer the Filipino people independence with honor. On the strength of these commitments and impelled by a sincere desire to put an end to the sufferings and sacrifices of our people, and to safeguard their liberty and welfare, I propose the following program of action:

That the Government of the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan recognize the independence of the Philippines; that within a reasonable period of time both armies, American and Japanese, be withdrawn, previous arrangements having been negotiated with the Philippine Government; that neither nation maintain bases in the Philippines; that the Philippine Army be at once demobilized, the remaining force to be a Constabulary of moderate size; that at once upon the granting of freedom that trade agreement with

Published in "Foreign
Relations of the U. S., 1942,
General, British Commonwealth,
The Far East"

SECRET

4-27-60

Carl T. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

other countries become solely a matter to be settled by the Philippines and the nation concerned; that American and Japanese noncombatants who so desire be evacuated with their own armies under reciprocal and appropriate stipulations.

It is my earnest hope that, moved by the highest considerations of justice and humanity, the two great powers which now exercise control over the Philippines will give their approval in general principle to my proposal. If this is done I further propose, in order to accomplish the details thereof, that an Armistice be declared in the Philippines and that I proceed to Manila at once for necessary consultations with the two governments concerned.

(signed) Manuel L. Quezon."

MacArthur.

RECEIVED
UNCLASSIFIED

260602

~~SECRET~~

February 11, 1942.

From Ft. Mills,

To General George C. Marshall

S.162 - For President Roosevelt:

After witnessing our burying of about 400 dead
Japs whom we had just mopped up, the Governor of Bataan has reported:

"I am having a little difficulty collecting
the taxes because of some trouble in my province."

I assured him that you were broadminded and
would understand.

MacArthur.

260603

PSF Safe-Philippines

pat

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached message has just been received
from General MacArthur.

Joyce S. McNamee
Acting Chief of Staff.

a604401

C
O
P
Y

RAA 53
0030/10
AEL

~~SECRET~~

CABLEGRAM

Safe - Philippines

April 9, 1942

PRIORITY

FROM Australia
TO Agwar (for Gen. Marshall)

Nr. 83 April 9, 1942.

Simultaneously with the receipt of the President's contemplated message to Wainwright I received the following message from him: "At 6 o'clock this morning General King Commanding Luzon Force without my knowledge or approval sent a flag of truce to Japanese Commander. The minute I heard of it I disapproved of his action and directed that there would be no surrender. I was informed it was too late to make any change that the action had already been taken. Enemy on east had enveloped both flanks of the small groups of what was left of the Second Corps and was firing with artillery into the hospital area which undoubtedly prompted King's action. In order to relieve the pressure on the right, last night I ordered the First Corps to attack to the North with its ultimate objective Olongapo but the attack did not repeat not get off. Physical exhaustion and sickness due to a long period of insufficient food is the real cause of this terrible disaster. When I get word what terms have been arranged I will advise you. Fearing just what happened, I endeavored last night to withdraw some of the Philippine Division and other regular units but only succeeded in getting out some scattered mixtures of individuals. I will endeavor to hold Corregidor. Enemy yesterday landed on Guimaras repeat Guimaras Island so it is very probable that he will be in Iloilo repeat Iloilo today. Please send bombers as contemplated. We will still inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy and attempt to bring through ships from Visayan Island signed Wainwright." As the action taken on Bataan anticipated the authority conveyed in the message I do not repeat not believe it advisable to transmit now its contents to General Wainwright. The air attack from here will be made as planned on Saturday morning. As Corregidor has supply which Wainwright estimates will last until June 1, I strongly recommend that all supply ships now en route be diverted as safety dictates. I am taking safety measures with regard to submarines engaged in ferry supplies from Visayas.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl F. Spicer*

MacArthur.

a60LL02

~~SECRET~~

State File: Philippines

Phil.

Bot

~~SECRET~~
BY AUTHORITY OF A. O. OF S., WPD

.....
Don Initials

February 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that a secret message, as follows, be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces in the Far East:

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL MACARTHUR STOP TRANSMIT
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO PRESIDENT QUESON OOLON QUOTE
YOUR MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY TENTH EVIDENTLY CROSSED MINE TO
YOU OF FEBRUARY NINTH STOP UNDER OUR CONSTITUTIONAL *authority*
LIMITATIONS THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS NOT
EMPOWERED TO CEDE OR ALIENATE ANY TERRITORY TO ANOTHER
NATION STOP FURTHERMORE CONSIDER THE UNITED STATES HAS JUST
BOUND ITSELF IN AGREEMENT WITH TWENTY ^{five} SIX OTHER NATIONS TO
UNITED ACTION IN DEALING WITH THE AXIS POWERS AND HAS
SPECIFICALLY ENGAGED ITSELF NOT TO ENTER INTO ANY NEGOTIA-
TIONS FOR A SEPARATE PEACE STOP PARA YOU HAVE NO AUTHORITY
TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE
EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STOP PARA
I WILL MAKE NO FURTHER COMMENTS REGARDING YOUR LAST MESSAGE
DATED FEBRUARY TENTH PENDING YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF MINE TO
YOU OF FEBRUARY NINTH THROUGH GENERAL MACARTHUR RMD

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

~~SECRET~~

L. T. ORSON,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

Safe File: Philippines
~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a radiogram just received from General Wainwright, who wrote it in response to my request for a completely frank and confidential estimate of his situation.

General Wainwright has performed a marvelous job and without ever uttering a word of complaint. I feel he has earned a commendation from you in the highest terms.

The enclosed draft is my suggestion for such a message, and if you approve it, I will dispatch it at once.

W. L. Harrison
Chief of Staff.

OK
FW

a 60mm01

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.0 (8/27/80)

Date- 8-10-71

Signature- *PKP*

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

Date May 5, 1942 Initials

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation

The Chief of Staff directs that the following secret message in code be transmitted to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces in the Philippine Islands, Fort Mills, by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy: WDWPD:

PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL WAINWRIGHT
PERIOD DURING RECENT WEEKS COMMA WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING WITH
GROWING ADMIRATION THE DAY BY DAY ACCOUNTS OF YOUR HEROIC STAND
AGAINST THE MOUNTING INTENSITY OF BOMBARDMENT BY ENEMY PLANES
AND HEAVY SEIGE GUNS PERIOD IN SPITE OF ALL THE HANDICAPS OF
COMPLETE ISOLATION COMMA LACK OF FOOD AND AMMUNITION YOU HAVE
GIVEN THE WORLD A SHINING EXAMPLE OF PATRIOTIC FORTITUDE AND
SELF-SACRIFICE PERIOD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ASK NO FINER EXAMPLE
OF TENACITY COMMA RESOURCEFULNESS COMMA AND STEADFAST COURAGE
PERIOD THE CALM DETERMINATION OF YOUR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP IN
A DESPERATE SITUATION SETS A STANDARD OF DUTY FOR OUR SOLDIERS
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD PERIOD IN EVERY CAMP AND ON EVERY NAVAL
VESSEL SOLDIERS SAILORS AND MARINES ARE INSPIRED BY THE GALLANT
STRUGGLE OF THEIR COMRADES IN THE PHILIPPINES PERIOD THE WORKMEN
IN OUR SHIPYARDS AND MUNITIONS PLANTS REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS
BECAUSE OF YOUR EXAMPLE PERIOD YOU AND YOUR DEVOTED FOLLOWERS
HAVE BECOME THE LIVING SYMBOLS OF OUR WAR AIMS AND THE GUARANTEE
OF VICTORY PERIOD

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT



a60mm02

[Handwritten signature]

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.2 (2/27/68)

Safe File: *Philippine*

Messages received from General MacArthur during night
February 11 - 12, 1942.

For President Roosevelt:

I have delivered your message to President Quezon and have shown your 11029 to High Commissioner Sayre. If opportunity presents and can be done with reasonable safety and of course with their own consent, I will evacuate the members of the Commonwealth Government, the High Commissioner, Mrs. Sayre and their son. I am deeply appreciative of the inclusion of my own family in this list but they and I have decided that they will share the fate of the garrison.

My plans have already been outlined in previous radios; they consist in fighting my present battle position in Bataan to destruction and then holding Corregidor in a similar manner. I have not the slightest intention in the world of surrendering or capitulating the Filipino elements of my command. Apparently my message gave a false impression or was garbled with reference to Filipinos. My statements regarding collapse applied only to the civilian population, including Commonwealth officials, the puppet government and the general populace. There has never been the slightest wavering among the troops. I count upon them equally with the Americans to hold steadfast to the end.

MacArthur

For the War Department:

President Quezon's suggested proposal was entirely contingent upon prior approval by President Roosevelt. Replying to your 1031. He has no intention whatsoever so far as I know to do anything which does not meet with President Roosevelt's complete acquiescence. I will however take every possible precaution that nothing of this nature goes out. President Quezon has several times declined to accept a trip by submarine. His physical condition is such that his medical advisors do not believe he could survive it.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

MacArthur

RECEIVED

APR 11 1942 (1/11/58)

Date-

Signature

RAH

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52
Filed 4th 1910

Radiogram ~~SECRET~~

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message
Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg. Washington, D.C.

May 4, 1942

818PM

From Ft. Mills
to General George C. Marshall

No. 907 May 4th

To be seen only by decoding clerk and General Marshall.

Reurad 1411. Hostile Air Corps has been bombing Corregidor relentlessly since March 24. Following fall of Bataan on 9 April, enemy immediately emplaced artillery on south shore of peninsula and has since then subjected our defenses to artillery fire. Beginning 29 April (Emperor's birthday) the fire of hostile artillery increased in intensity and has continued at that tempo to present date. The hostile bombing has been relatively ineffective but artillery fire from large caliber guns (240 MM) has resulted in destruction of large percentage of coast defense and beach defense artillery and small arms. Continued bombardment has resulted in about 600 casualties since April 9, and has lowered morale of troops. Morale difficult to maintain at best because troops have been constantly under or subject to air or artillery attack since December 29 and have been receiving half of poorly balanced ration since January 8. However, morale amazingly good considering conditions under which troops are now operating. Persistent reports from our operatives indicate that enemy is planning to launch an assault against Corregidor. He has prepared a large number of motor boats on which weapons are

a60nn01

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~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIS. 5200.0 (9/27/58)

~~SECRET~~
Page 2, No. 907 May 4th

mounted, and has also constructed a large number of smaller boats to be used in transporting troops. I have nothing on which to base an estimate of present hostile troops strength on Luzon. However, enemy has recently taken Cebu and Panay, using about ten thousand men in each operation, and is now engaged in attack on Mindanao. I estimate that at least ten thousand are now engaged in operations on Mindanao. Unless troops have been withdrawn from the Philippines I believe that a sufficient force remains on Luzon to undertake an operation against Corregidor. Enemy forces will soon be in possession of all important areas bordering on coast of Mindanao and our troops will be confined to mountains. Thereafter enemy can clean up Visayan islands and Mindanao at leisure. In my opinion the enemy is capable of making an assault on Corregidor at any time. The success or failure of such an assault will depend entirely on steadfastness of beach defense troops. With morale at present level I estimate that we have something less than an even chance to beat off an assault. In accordance with your request I have given you a very frank and honest opinion on the situation here as I see it.

Wainwright

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 8-10-71

~~SECRET~~ Signature- RNP

260²²⁰² *[Handwritten signature]*

COPY

Jan 1 Safe - Philippines
F
February 12, 1942.

From Fort Mills, P.I.

To General G.C. Marshall

No. 262, Feb. 12.

The following message is from President Quezon:

"The President of the United States:

I wish to thank you for your prompt answer to the proposal which I submitted to you with the unanimous approval of my war cabinet. We fully appreciate the reasons upon which your decision is based and we are abiding by it.

(signed) Quezon."

MacArthur.

RECORDED
UNCLASSIFIED

Published in "Foreign
Relations of the U.S., 1942, Vol. I
General, British Commonwealth,
The Far East"

4-27-60

Carl L. Spicer

al600 Q1

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1942 Vol. I General, British Commonwealth
The Far East

~~SECRET~~

April 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached radio just received.

Boyl

Joseph S. McNamara
Acting Chief of Staff.

a6000 & 1

~~SECRET~~

RADIOGRAM

Safe-Philippines

AEL

96 WTJ
755P/9

April 9, 1942

11:02 PM

Ft. Mills

AGWAR (FOR GEN MARSHALL)

No. 746 April 9, 1942

Shortly after Flag of Truce passed through the front lines this morning hostilities ceased, for the most part, in Bataan. At about 10 o'clock this morning General King was sent for to confer with the Japanese Commander. He has not returned as of 7 P.M. repeat 7 P.M. nor has the result of the conference been disclosed. Japanese Forces are now in control of the Southern End of the Bataan Peninsula and have already placed batteries in position to fire on Corregidor. 1 Battery is located in the vicinity of Cabcaben and others are located farther to the west. I do not at present feel at liberty to return the fire of these batteries as I would be firing into areas occupied by my own troops. Since the fall of Bataan the hostile air force has renewed its attack on Corregidor. This island was heavily bombed this afternoon but suffered no damage of military consequence. For General Marshall.

Wainwright.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

a 600022

~~SECRET~~

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

*Not
Safe - Philippines*

February 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: General Hurley.

General Hurley has reported in a radiogram dated February 12 that his mission of coordinating relief measures for the forces in the Philippines requires that he visit General Wavell's headquarters. He stated that for that purpose he was leaving Australia on the 12th and that upon his return from the trip, which will involve about 10,000 miles of travel by air, he will undertake his duties in New Zealand.

He asked that you be informed of the reason for his delay in engaging himself in the New Zealand situation, to which he will give his undivided attention as soon as he has returned from the Netherlands East Indies.

The Secretary of State is also being informed.

Harry H. Stimson

Secretary of War.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Speer*

a60 p 01

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Philippine
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- *4-6-59*

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

May 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Gen

The following messages were received in the War Department during the night:

Situation in the Philippines:

Message from General MacArthur states that he received a radio from General Sharp, commanding our forces in Mindanao, that because of crumbling defensive lines on Bukidnon Plateau, Mindanao has become indefensible and he has been forced to surrender effective at daylight May 10th. Message from Sharp states that Lanao and Cotabato are held by the enemy and that the small units in Zamboanga and in the Agusan province will be unable to hold out against a superior force. Sharp regrets this action has been forced upon him but states there was no alternative. General MacArthur advises no publicity.

Situation in ~~Burma~~ *Burma*:

One message was received that Stilwell and his party had been located by air reconnaissance fifteen miles east of Homalin; that food had been dropped to them.

A later dispatch says that he and his party had been located by the RAF and food dropped to them late in the afternoon of May 9th about eighteen miles east of Homalin on the Chindwin River. Dispatch says that organized resistance in Burma is about over. Also information indicates that the Generalissimo on May 2d ordered his troops to retire on China; those south of Mandalay to break through via Taunggyo and Kentbung; those northeast via Bhamo to Myitkyina. In this dispatch General Magruder says he does not believe that Stilwell knew about this. He also states that all action on the training project in India has been deferred. He has also established a branch headquarters in New Delhi.



SECRET

Chief of Staff
260pp01

PST Case File: Philippines
C O P Y

From HQ Philippine Dept. in the Field

To Adjutant General

No. 289 Feb.15

For President Roosevelt.

Your message has been transmitted to me and I thank you for your kind words. I think it is wise not to publish my letter to General MacArthur regarding destruction of Philippine silver currency.

(signed) Quezon

MacArthur

RECEIVED LIBRARY

RECEIVED (6/21/53)

Date- JAN 20 1942

Signature: *[Handwritten Signature]*

a 60901

Phil. 15F ~~SECRET~~
3/4 11/11/42

February 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following message be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

The President has approved the plan outlined in your No. 296 for the evacuation of President Quezon and his War Cabinet to unoccupied portions of the Philippines. The Commander in Chief of U.S. Navy has issued instructions which will place the next submarine to arrive at Corregidor under your orders for evacuation of key civil personnel and has directed further that if no submarine is now in that vicinity one will be dispatched to you forthwith. The President desires you to convey his best wishes for success to President Quezon and to say that this Government will support his effort in every practicable way. Means for secret communication between President Quezon and this Government should be arranged.

Marshall

UK
JFK

10-16-66

Carl L. Spicer

260501

~~SECRET~~

ZSM
NPM 2555
0900/16

RADIOGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message
Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

Feb. 16, 1942

6:54 A.M.

From: Ft. Mills.

To: General George C. Marshall

No. 296. Feb. 16th

President Quezon and his War Cabinet desire to establish the seat of the Commonwealth Government in the unoccupied portions of the Philippine Islands initially in the Visayan. They feel certain that their usefulness will be greatly enhanced by contact with the Filipino public which is now impossible to them because of siege conditions existing here. Their purpose, in accordance with President Roosevelt's desires as expressed in his recent directive, is to maintain the cohesion morale of the populace in the unoccupied communities in order to prolong and make more effective resistance to the Japanese. Their usefulness here is over and it is advantageous from every point of view that they do not share the destruction which now faces this garrison. I propose to evacuate them by water travelling only by night proceeding first to Mindoro and thence south to Capiz or Antique on Pana. If pressed they will continue to Mindanao where they could safely exist in the interior indefinitely. I am heartily in favor of the plan and propose to execute it promptly unless you order otherwise. In order to assist in the movement I request be given authority to utilize the submarine which will be in here within the next 3 or 4 days to evacuate them as far as Capiz and then to return here to evacuate the High Commissioner and his family to the far south. Under present plans the High Commissioners party is scheduled to leave here in this submarine immediately upon its arrival. My plan would

10-76-66
Carl S. Spicer
a 60002

~~SECRET~~

No. 296, Feb. 16th

involve the postponement of his departure for 4 days. The available capacity is not sufficient to accommodate both groups at the same time and hence they must be evacuated separately. The Quezon trip being the short one I place it first. If this authority is given the proper instructions should be radioed to the CINC Asiatic Fleet who controls not only the submarine but the allocation of the passengers who are to be transported. If the submarine is not made available to me the Quezon's will attempt the trip in a small surface vessel. The use of the submarine, however, would increase the factor of safety. Request immediate action.

MacArthur

Date- 10 - 26 - 66

Signature- Carl L. Spicir

a60103

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

100-0 (9, 27/38)

100-10-26-66

Signature - Carl D. Spence

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I submit herewith a condensed record of the plan for evacuation of governmental officials from the Philippine Islands.

MacArthur Plan:

Radio No. 296
Feb. 16.

President Quezon and his war cabinet desire to establish the seat of the Commonwealth Government in the unoccupied portions of the Philippine Islands initially in the Visayas. They feel certain that their usefulness will be greatly enhanced by contact with the Filipino public which is now impossible to them because of siege conditions existing here. Their purpose, in accordance with President Roosevelt's desires as expressed in his recent directive, is to maintain the cohesion morale of the populace in the unoccupied communities in order to prolong and make more effective resistance to the Japanese. Their usefulness here is over and it is advantageous from every point of view that they do not share the destruction which now faces this garrison. I propose to evacuate them by water, travelling only by night, proceeding first to Mindoro and thence south to Capiz or Antique or Pana. If pressed they will continue to Mindanao where they could safely exist in the interior indefinitely. I am heartily in favor of the plan and propose to execute it promptly unless you order otherwise. In order to assist in the movement I request be given authority to utilize the submarine which will be in here within the next three or four days to evacuate them as far as Capiz and then to return here to evacuate the High Commissioner and his family to the far South.

Under present plans the High Commissioner's party is scheduled to leave here in this submarine immediately upon its arrival. My plan would involve the postponement of his departure for four days. The available capacity is not sufficient to accommodate both groups at the same time and hence they must be evacuated separately. The Quezon trip being the short one I place it first. If this authority is given the proper instructions should be radioed to the CinC Asiatic Fleet who controls not only the submarine but the allocation of the

ms. Arthur reports

Feb. 23 (No. 349)

"First part of plan successfully accomplished."

Feb. 26

MacArthur reports (374)

"Second part of plan outlined in myrad 296 began several days ago"

260501

SECRET


SECRET

passengers who are to be transported. If the submarine is not made available to me then Quezon will attempt the trip in a small surface vessel. The use of the submarine however would increase the factor of safety. Request immediate action.

Note: It is assumed that the 1st and 2nd parts of plan, mentioned by General MacArthur, refer respectively to the two paragraphs as above quoted. It is possible that he refers only to successive stages of the Quezon evacuation, but the first interpretation is considered the more likely, and that the Sayre family has now left Luzon.

The President's reply to No. 296 was as follows:

The President has approved the plan outlined in your No. 296 for the evacuation of President Quezon and his War Cabinet to unoccupied portions of the Philippines. The Commander in Chief of U.S. Navy has issued instructions which will place the next submarine to arrive at Corregidor under your orders for evacuation of key civil personnel and has directed further that if no submarine is now in that vicinity one will be dispatched to you forthwith. The President desires you to convey his best wishes for success to President Quezon and to say that this Government will support his effort in every practicable way. Means for secret communication between President Quezon and this Government should be arranged.


Chief of Staff.

a60502

10-16-66 (9/27/66)

10-16-66

Call L. Spick

EH
NPM 2556
TIME FILED 0836/16

RADIOGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

Feb. 16, 1942

7:05 a.m.

From : Ft. Mills.

To: General George C. Marshall

No. 297, Feb. 16.

The unexpectedly early capitulation of Singapore emphasizes the fact that the opportunity for a successful attack upon the hostile lines of communication is rapidly vanishing. If this enemy victory is followed by further success in the NEI the sensitiveness of his lines of communication will largely disappear due to consolidation of his positions in the south. A determined effort in force made now would probably attract the assistance of Russia who will unquestionably not move in this area until some evidence is given of concrete effort by the Allies. The opportunities still exist for a complete reversal of the situation. It will soon, however, be too late for such a movement.


MacArthur

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer



260601

pt PSF

Safe File: Philippines

SECRET RADIOGRAM

EH

AC-4

NPM 2757
1325/17

AG 381 (2-17-42) MSC

FEBRUARY 17, 1942

FROM: FORT MILLS

11:01 A

TO: A G O

NO. 307 FEBRUARY SEVENTEENTH

THE FOLLOWING LETTER WITH SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT QUEZON. " FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND FOR PURPOSES OF RECORD AND FUTURE REFERENCE, I AM ENCLOSING HERewith CERTAIN DOCUMENTS SHOWING THAT THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT HAS DELIVERED TO THE UNITED STATES NAVY THE FOLLOWING: ONE SMALL CASE MARKED G-11 CONTAINING 5 SMALL BARS OF GOLD BULLION, 1 BAR OF SILVER BULLION, AND VARIOUS OTHER PIECES OF GOLD AND/OR SILVER BULLION; 264 SMALL BARS OF GOLD BULLION; 630 BAGS CONTAINING 1000 PESOS EACH WITH THE REQUEST THAT THESE ITEMS BE TRANSMITTED TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY WASHINGTON D C FOR SAFE KEEPING. THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN IN ORDER TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF THE GOLD AND SILVER FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY". THE SHIPMENT MENTIONED WAS ACCEPTED BY THE NAVY ON FEB. 4. THE FOREGOING IS FURNISHED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

MACARTHUR. ~~RECEIVED~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

DATE 10/21/53

Date- JAN 20 1942

Signature- RHP

260401

Phil

1304

P5F Safe - Philippines

~~SECRET~~

From Ft. Mills

Feb. 22, 1942.

To The Adjutant General

No. 341, Feb. 22, 1942.

There are indications that the enemy has been so badly mauled during the Bataan fighting that he is unable to set up with his present forces the attack necessary to destroy me. Practically every regiment has consolidated by eliminating one battalion, and a number of regiments themselves have totally disappeared. His artillery groupment may be from weakness rather than strength. I may have gained the respite I so desperately need. Do not publicize in any way any of the above. Little activity yesterday except by enemy air. Our counter-battery temporarily silenced his Cavite shore fire. No Change in south.

MacArthur

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

ODD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spencer*

~~SECRET~~

a60v01

~~SECRET~~

Safe - Presidential Library
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD LHM. 5200.9 (9/27/52)

From Fort Mills

To General Marshall

No. 344, February 22.

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

The Coast Farmer, first surface vessel dispatched to run blockade from Australia, arrived safely in Mindanao February 19. Cargo 2,500 tons balanced rations, 2,000 rounds 81 MM mortar ammunition, 800,000 rounds caliber .30 and 30,000 rounds caliber .50. She had no difficulty in getting through. The thinness of the enemys coverage is such that it can readily be pierced along many routes including direct westward passage from Honolulu. I have secure bases for reception in Mindanao and the Visayas. I suggest that the problem of supplying me should be revised in the above circumstances. This revised effort should center in Washington and not in Australia or the N. E. I. The commanders there, however able they may be, have neither the resources nor the means at their disposal properly to accomplish this mission. Many categories of supply that are required are not available in that area. Moreover, they are so engaged in the actual zone of immediate or threatened conflict that it is impossible for them to concentrate upon my needs. The size of the problem is greater than the means now being used to solve it. The prime requisite is the making available in the United States of the necessary ships and material, especially the former, and their continuous dispatch to destination. Nowhere is the situation more desperate and dangerous than here. The War Department has complete knowledge of our needs which is not true in Australia, the quantities involved are not great but it is imperative that they may be instantly available in the United States and that the entire impulse and organization be reenergized and controlled directly by you. If it is left as a subsidiary effort it will never be accomplished. Careful consideration should also be

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given as to troop replacement by this means; even if losses occur they will be small compared to the loss out here if we do not have success.

MacArthur

Presented to D. Eisenhower Library
L-1 6200.9 (9/27/56)

260402

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT,

FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

Phil

a 60 x 01

~~SECRET~~

135
Submarine
Phil W

From Ft. Mills

To General George C. Marshall

No. 349 - February 23.

First part of plan outlined in myrad 296 successfully accomplished.

MacArthur.

Date - 10-26-66

Signature - Paul L. Spicer

a60x02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(7/17/68)

10-26-66

Carl L. Street

Feb. 16, 1942.

From Ft. Mills

To General George C. Marshall

No. 296, Feb. 16th.

President Quezon and his war cabinet desire to establish the seat of the Commonwealth Government in the unoccupied portions of the Philippines Islands initially in the Visayas. They feel certain that their usefulness will be greatly enhanced by contact with the Filipino public which is now impossible to them because of siege conditions existing here. Their purpose, in accordance with President Roosevelt's desires as expressed in his recent directive, is to maintain the cohesion morale of the populace in the unoccupied communities in order to prolong and make more effective resistance to the Japanese. Their usefulness here is over and it is advantageous from every point of view that they do not share the destruction which now faces this garrison. I propose to evacuate them by water travelling only by night proceeding first to Mindoro and thence south to Capiz or Antique or Pana. If pressed they will continue to Mindanao where they could safely exist in the interior indefinitely. I am heartily in favor of the plan and propose to execute it promptly unless you order otherwise. In order to assist in the movement I request be given authority to utilize the submarine

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

No. 296. Feb. 16th

which will be in here within the next three or four days to evacuate them as far as Capiz and then to return here to evacuate the High Commissioner and his family to the far South. Under present plans the High Commissioner's party is scheduled to leave here in this submarine immediately upon its arrival. My plan would involve the postponement of his departure for four days. The available capacity is not sufficient to accomodate both groups at the same time and hence they must be evacuated separately. The Quezon trip being the short one I place it first. If this authority is given the proper instructions should be radioed to the CinC Asiatic Fleet who controls not only the submarine but the allocation of the passengers who are to be transported. If the submarine is not made available to me then Quezon will attempt the trip in a small surface vessel. The use of the submarine however would increase the factor of safety. Request immediate action.

MacArthur

67-127(2/27/58)

10-26-66

~~SECRET~~

Case L. Spicer
a60x04

Bar

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~
15F
Safe - Philippines

February 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Apropos of your direction Sunday night for the organization of a blockade-running effort towards the Philippines via Hawaii, I have the following to report:

The Army has three Naval destroyers under conversion. Diesel engines are being installed and a cargo-going capacity of 1500 tons made possible.

The first of these three will be ready for service in a few days, at the port of New Orleans. The other two should be ready by the first week in March, also at New Orleans. We are going ahead with the loading of the first of the three and will dispatch it through the Canal to Hawaii and from there to be routed by the Navy. The others will follow.

Further, we find that three more of this type of converted destroyers are being operated commercially in the Caribbean. Arrangements are being made to take them over and add them to the three boats referred to above.

Admiral King states that though these converted boats only have a rate of speed of $14\frac{1}{2}$ knots an hour, they are suited to the purpose. They will have a cruising capacity of 10,000 miles.

A radio has been sent to General MacArthur notifying him accordingly of this, we hope, cheering possibility.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature-

Carl S. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

a60y01

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Box
The Confidential
papers

PSF
Safe
Philippines

260201

C O P Y

File: Philippines

February 25, 1942.

10:30 A.M.

From: USAFFE

To: Adjutant General

No. 363 February 25

The following messages dated February 22, indicative of the loyalty of the Moros of Mindanao, are transmitted:

"Colonel Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, Washington, D.C.,
through General MacArthur:

"Am son of your friend the late Datu Piang of Mindanao and as war leader of the Moros I wish to reiterate to the great American President, through you, my people's pledge of loyalty to the Government of the United States. The 20,000 Moros enlisted as Bolomen of the United States Army whom I command will fight to the last and die for America and their country.

Captain Datu Gumbay Piang"

"General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East:

"The old friendship of our families remain unshaken. Your great father's saber is used in our war against the enemy and picture is in my headquarters. The 20,000 Moros enlisted as Bolomen and I greet their great Commanding General and join their brave comrades of Bataan in celebrating the birthday of the father of American nation.

Captain Datu Gumbay Piang."

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOJ DIR 5500.2 (9/27/58)

Date: JAN 1972

Signature: R/H

a60202

SAFE FILE: Russia: 1939-1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

PSF
Safe
Russia

October 17, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As of possible interest, I
send the attached memorandum re-
garding the arrival of the
Russian tanker DOMBASS at San
Pedro on October eighteenth.

CH

ablaa01

15F Safe: Russia

October 17, 1939.

Mr. Harrington, Visa Division, called at 3:30 to state that the Visa Division had been requested to give a waiver with respect to the necessity of a crew list visa for the Russian tanker DOMBASS to visit San Pedro October 18 on the grounds that there was no American Consul at the last port of call, Petropavlosk.

Mr. Harrington stated that he saw no reason for refusing the request which seemed reasonable in the circumstances, but that it was so unusual for a Russian tanker to visit San Pedro that he felt the Navy Department would be greatly interested.

I immediately telephoned Commander Struble and communicated that information to him. He said he would notify the Commander-in-Chief immediately so that any necessary precautions could be taken in San Pedro.

U#L:Chapin:BAE

Inc. by [unclear]

261a02

Memorandum for the President.

Subject: Transportation of Defense Aid Aircraft for the USSR.

1. The monthly average of Defense Aid airplanes for the USSR which must be transported from U.S. ports to Basra, or possibly alternate ports such as Karachi or Bombay, is approximately 100 P-40E, 100 A-20 and, after January, 12 B-25's. The distances involved are: Hampton Roads to Basra, 12,452 miles, or San Diego to Basra via Torres Strait, 12,830 miles.

2. The following comments have resulted from conferences with representatives of the Army, the Navy and the Maritime Commission.

3. The Army plans to send officers and men to Basra for assembly of planes. The Maritime Commission is prepared to furnish transportation for personnel to meet the Army's requirements. Thus the use of a carrier for this purpose does not appear to be necessary, since it is estimated that a carrier with accompanying cruiser escort would not average over 18 kts, whereas the ship selected by the Maritime Commission would probably not be appreciably less.

A carrier could transport about 33 assembled P-40 planes. However, since Basra is some distance up river, the carrier would have to fly off planes and discharge personnel, spare parts, etc. at sea some 90 miles from Basra, which would involve a difficult lightering problem.

With allowances for refueling en route, unloading and recovering pilots, it is estimated that about 67 days would be required for the round trip.

The use of the Navy's ex-Sea Train ships which are completing their conversion was also studied. The combined capacity of these two ships would be only 64 P-40's or 20 P-40's plus 20 A-20's per month. These ships are sorely needed to transport both Army and Navy planes to outlying stations.

4. The Maritime Commission, however, is prepared to undertake the delivery of planes. There are many cargo ships which can carry 60 to 120 P-40 planes since these are crated. The B-25's are to be uncrated and, due to their size, must thus be carried on the upper decks, but since there are so few of these, it presents no problem. The original plan in the case of the A-20's was to transport these in an assembled condition. These are large planes and thus it presented a difficult problem, if a total of 100 per month were to be delivered. The Maritime Commission's studies indicated that using all available ships, including the Navy's two ex-Sea Train ships and two large ore carriers, no more than 65 A-20's could be delivered per month in an assembled condition. As a result of this the Army is now making plans to permit most of these planes (A-20's) to be shipped in a disassembled condition, with assembly to be undertaken at or near the unloading port which must in any event be done with the P-40 type. Under these conditions the shipment of the 100 A-20 planes can be handled by the Maritime Commission each month.

5. Any merchant ships which are used to deliver airplanes to the Middle East can on their return voyage bring to the United States critical and strategic materials.

6. Since the Maritime Commission is prepared to deliver the planes in the quantities and within the time limits desired, and is also able to furnish transportation for the necessary Army personnel required for assembly and piloting, it is recommended that this be done.

Army concurs -

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

9/10/48

100-27-66

10-27-66

Carl L. Spicer

H. R. Stark
H. R. Stark.

ablaa02

~~SECRET~~

P-40 Delivery Rates per month.

Various Vessels

	<u>Capacity (each)</u>	<u>Turn around</u>	<u>Rate</u>
Seatrains (2)	102	95	64
Carrier (1)	83	81	30

Merchant ships controlled by Maritime Commission will have capacities of 60 to 120 P-40's in crates. Since they will return via ports at which they load other materials, their turn around will vary widely. Their rate of delivery will be adequate.

NRS.

• 10-27-66

Carl L. Spicer

a61aa03

1-35 Safe: Russia Pres.

JR

GRAY

Moscow

Dated October 30, 1939

Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

RUSH.

837, October 30, 8 p.m.

I have just been informed that the British broadcast from London at 7 p.m., Moscow time in reporting the expected departure tomorrow of the Finnish delegation for Moscow stated that a Finnish newspaper this evening had published a report alleging "when Paasikivi was in Moscow a high official of the American Embassy handed him a personal message of sympathy from President Roosevelt asking to be kept informed of the progress of the negotiations". I need hardly assure the Department that this report, assuming it to have been published in a Finnish newspaper, is completely without foundation. Neither I nor any member of the Embassy staff saw Paasikivi during his visits to Moscow.

Repeated to Helsinki.

STEINHARDT

HPD

261601

True

HSM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone. (Br).

Moscow

Dated October 30, 1939

Rec'd 2:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

838, October 30, 9 p. m.

My telegram No. 827, October 28, 6 p. m.

I am informed by the Finnish Legation here that
the Finnish delegation is not expected here before
Thursday morning.

STEINHARDT

PEG

a61602

TELEGRAM SENT

JT
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

March 7, 1940

9 p.m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

MOSCOW (U.S.S.R.)

150

TRIPLE PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

The Finnish Foreign Minister has informed Sterling at Stockholm that the Finnish Government has accepted Russian invitation to send envoys to Moscow and that a delegation including Tanner and Passikivi flew from Stockholm to Moscow early this morning. It is believed that the Russian terms are drastic.

Kindly arrange to see Molotov immediately, putting the conference on as personal a basis as possible. Please state to him that this government has no purpose of intervening in the negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union, but the American people are vividly interested. Our public opinion would be deeply impressed were the Soviet government to take a generous attitude towards Finland.

In your discretion you might further intimate that you are informed that there has been increasing popular demand here for measures affecting economic relations with certain areas,

ablc01

-2- #150, March 7 to Moscow

areas, and that some of such movements would be slowed down, depending on the degree of moderation and generosity arrived at in the Finnish settlement.

The substance of this telegram has been transmitted to Stockholm and Helsinki.

HULL
(AAB)

A-B AAB:ES

EA

PA/D

ablc02

Pres.

Safe: Russia

TELEGRAM SENT

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

March 8, 1940

11 a.m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

MOSCOW

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

151.

Your 253, March 8, 11 a.m.

We believe it inadvisable for the Finnish delegates to stay with you. You may, however, in your discretion call upon them and render them such courtesies as may seem appropriate. We feel that in such contacts as you may have with them you should take care to avoid creating the impression that they are obtaining advice from you, in view of Russian assertions that their real grievance against Finland was the use of Finland by non-Baltic powers in a manner disliked by Russia.

HULL

760D61

EU:LWH:RMB PA/D A-B

abldoi

Pills

V.F. Safe: Russia

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Moscow

Dated March 8, 1940

Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

255, March 8, 2 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

A Swedish plane arrived yesterday evening bearing Ryyti, Paasikivi, General Wallin, Wuomanen, two minor Finnish officials, and a secretary. The omission of Tanner from the delegation is in my opinion wise.

The visit has been veiled in the utmost secrecy, the delegates having been provided with Swedish passports bearing fictitious names, and the plane having landed at an obscure airport. The presence of the delegation in Moscow is in consequence thus far known only to the Kremlin the Swedish Legation and this Embassy.

I have just had a talk with the Swedish Minister who has not yet seen any of the delegates.. He assured me that notwithstanding press despatches to the contrary the Germans have had no connection of any kind with the negotiations leading to the presence in Moscow of the Finnish delegation. He also said that the suggestion of an immediate armistice has thus far not met with the approval of

ableOl

-2- #255, March 8, 2 p.m., from Moscow.

of Kremlin which apparently wished first to explore the possibility of a final peace.

The Minister intimated very clearly that he and his Government hoped for the cooperation of the United States in strengthening the position of the Finnish delegates during the negotiations. He stated that he believed that once the presence of the Finnish delegation in Moscow became known it would be helpful if the interests of the United States in the successful outcome of the negotiations were to be publicly disclosed as this would have a material effect on the Soviet position since it is common knowledge that the Soviet Government is seriously concerned about its relations with the United States particularly in respect of purchases in the United States.

STEINHARDT

HPD

ab1e02

Safe: R...
~~SECRET~~

Paraphrase of Codo Cablegram
Received at the War Department
at 9:02, June 24, 1941.

By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date JUN 25 1941 (16)
Initials

London, filed 15:10, June 24, 1941.

The following is the distribution of the Russian divisions
along the German border at the commencement of hostilities:

<u>Military Districts</u>	<u>Infantry Divisions</u>	<u>Cavalry Divisions</u>	<u>Tank Divisions</u>	<u>Tank Brigades</u>
Western*	14	2	-	7
Pri Baltir	25	10	-	16
Trans Caucasian	7	1	-	2
North Caucasian	3	4	-	1
South Leningrad	8	-	2	7
North Leningrad	18	-	-	6
Odessa	16	3	-	3
Kiev	31	9	-	16
Reserve in European Russia	8	1	-	4
TOTALS	130	30	2	62

* It is felt by authorities at the British War Office that the number
of divisions shown for the Western Military District is small but no other
identifications have as yet been made.

LKE

Distribution:

THE PRESIDENT
Secretary of War
State Department
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
GHQ
G-3

Date - 10-27-66

Signature - Carl L. Spitzer

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION COPY

a61f01

Safe! Per... B1
SECRET

By authority A. C. of S., G

Date **JUL 10 1941** Initial *BP10*

Post
Paraphrase of Code Cablegram
Received at the War Department
at 09:41, July 9, 1941.

London, filed 14:38, July 9, 1941.

The report on the situation in Soviet given below has as
its source the Intelligence Division of the British Royal Air Force.

1. The General Staff of the U.S.S.R., together with the
Commander of the Air Force, appear to be full of confidence and the
impression given out is that the situation is completely under
control.

2. The British Military Mission in the Soviet believe
that the initial stages of the German offensive have ended. Officers
of the Soviet General Staff imply that large counterattacks may be
launched in the near future.

3. Around Leningrad the counterattack staged by the Soviet
troops has been successful. The claim that Murmansk had fallen to
the Germans is false. Rear supply and communication lines of the
Soviet Army are functioning very well.

4. German prisoners exhibit lower morale than they did
ten days ago.

Distribution:

THE PRESIDENT
Secretary of War
State Department
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
G.H.Q.

LEE

100-10-27-66
Carl L. Spicer
SIGNATURE INFORMATION COPY

SECRET

a61901

Conference held on 31st July, 1941, between M. Stalin,
Mr. Hopkins, and the interpreter M. Litvinov, at the
Kremlin in Moscow - 6.30 p.m. to 9.30 p.m.

I told Mr. Stalin that the President was anxious to have his - Stalin's - appreciation and analysis of the war between Germany and Russia. Mr. Stalin outlined the situation as follows:-

He stated that in his opinion the German Army had 175 divisions on Russia's western front at the outbreak of the war, and that since the outbreak of the war, this has been increased to 232 divisions; he believes that Germany can mobilise divisions.

He stated that Russia had 180 divisions at the outbreak of the war, but many of these were well back of the line of combat, and could not be quickly mobilised, so that when the Germans struck it was impossible to offer adequate resistance. The line which is now held is a far more propitious one than the more advanced line which they might have taken up had their divisions been prepared. Since war began, however, divisions have been placed in their appropriate positions, and at the present time he believes that Russia has a few more divisions than Germany, and places the number of Russian divisions at 240 in the front, with 20 in reserve. Stalin said that about one third of these divisions had not as yet been under fire.

Mr. Stalin stated that he can mobilise 350 divisions and will have that many divisions under arms by the time the spring campaign begins in May, 1942.

He is anxious to have as many of his divisions as possible in contact with the enemy, because then the troops learn that Germans can be killed and are not supermen. This gives his divisions the same kind of confidence that a pilot gets after his first combat in the air. Stalin said that "nothing in warfare can take the place of actual combat", and

.....

ab1h01

he wants to have as many seasoned troops as possible for the great campaign which will come next Spring. He stated that the German troops seemed to be tired, and the officers and men that they had captured had indicated they are "sick of war".

The German reserves are as much as 400 kilometres back of the front, and the communications between the reserves and the front line are extremely difficult. These supply lines require many thousands of German troops to guard and protect them from Russian raids.

He said that in the battle now in progress, very many Russian and German troops are fighting far forward from their respective lines because of the advances made by both sides with their mechanised forces. Stalin said that his soldiers did not consider the battle lost merely because the Germans at one point and another broke through with their mechanised forces. The Russian mechanised forces would attack at another point often moving many miles behind the German line. Merely because German forces pierce the Russian line does not mean the Russians are lost. They fight behind the Germans, are adept at the use of cover and fight their way out in the night. He said "Even the German tanks run out of petrol", This is merely a phase of modern warfare, and accounts for the fact that there have been no mass surrenders of troops on either side. The Russians therefore have many "insurgent" troops which operate behind Germany's so-called front line. They constantly attack German aerodromes and lines of communications. The Russians are more familiar with the terrain and know how to use the natural cover which nature has provided better than the Germans. These "insurgent" troops are proving a great menace to the German offensive.

He believes that Germany underestimated the strength of the Russian Army, and have not now enough troops on the whole front to carry on a successful offensive war and at the same time guard their extended lines of communications. He repeatedly emphasised the large number

of men Germany was forced to use for this purpose, and believes that the Germans will have to go on the defensive themselves. There is considerable evidence that they are already doing this. They are burying many of their large tanks in the ground for defensive purposes. The Russians have already found 50 such defensive positions. Mr. Stalin stated that in his opinion Hitler fears that he has too many men on the Russian front, which may account for their preparing some defensive positions so that some of their divisions might be returned to the German western areas of actual or potential operation.

He thinks the Germans have now on his front about 70 tank and motorised divisions. He also states that the Russo-German war has already changed the character of divisional organisation; that the Germans had broken up their large armoured divisions and dispersed this equipment through what Stalin called their tank and motorised divisions. Stalin stated that the war had already shown their infantry divisions must include substantial amounts of mechanised equipment. While Russia had a large number of tank and motorised divisions - none of them were a match for the German 'Panzer' division, but were far stronger than other German divisions. Hence the great pressure on the German infantry divisions which caused the diversion of German armoured equipment all along the line.

Stalin believes that Germany had 30,000 tanks at the outbreak of the Russian war. Russia herself had 24,000 tanks and 60 tank divisions with about 400 tanks in each division. They have always had about 50 tanks in each infantry division. Stalin believes that the large divisions are being broken up by the German Staff and as the war progresses the number of men in the divisions will be decreased in both Armies.

He states that the pressure on his army in the last ten days had become considerably less, and the only reason he could give for it was that he thought Germany had been unable

to supply their mechanised divisions and air forces with adequate fuel. He stressed the great difficulty the German armies had encountered in moving vast quantities of fuel to the front, and believes these difficulties are going to increase. He does not think this is because Germany has any lack of fuel, but rather because of transportation difficulties, the lack of good roads and more particularly the effective interference of the Russians with the German communications.

Stalin says that even though the war has been going on only six weeks, his troops are meeting brand new divisions at the front, and some of the original divisions seem to have been withdrawn. He believes that the morale of his own troops is extremely high, and realises that this is partly due to the fact that they are fighting for their homes and in familiar territory. He said that Germany has already found that "moving mechanised forces through Russia was very different than moving them over the boulevards of Belgium and France",

Stalin said that the Russian Army had been confronted with a surprise attack; he himself believed they would not strike but he took all precautions possible to mobilize his army effectively. Hitler made no demands on Russia, hence they were forced to organise a defensive line of battle. Now the Russians were counter-attacking at many points.

He said the Russian Army had met few of the 70-ton German tanks but that this was probably due to the inability of the Russian bridges to hold the tanks. He believes the terrain too difficult to manoeuvre these giant tanks. Where the 70-ton tanks were encountered, they were pierced by the Russian 75 mm. guns. He does not think that the very large German tank will play an important part in the war in Russia, although there are some parts of the front where these tanks can manoeuvre. The roads are very bad for the big tanks to operate over.

He believes that his largest tanks are better than the other German tanks, and that they have repeatedly shown their superiority in the war to date. He stated that the two largest Russian tanks were of 48 and 52 tons respectively, with 75 mm. armour and 85 mm. guns. They have approximately 4000 of these tanks at present. The Russian medium tank of just over 20 tons has 45 mm. armour and 75 mm. guns. The infantry tank is 13 tons and has 37 mm. armour and 45 mm. guns. They have approximately 8000 medium (30 ton) tanks at present and 12000 light tanks (13 tons). He stated their present production of tanks was 1000 per month. He stated that his production was equally divided between medium and heavy tanks on the one hand, and light tanks on the other. He stated they would be short of steel for tank manufacture and urged that orders for this steel be placed at once. He later said it would be much better if his tanks could be manufactured in the U.S. He also wished to purchase as many of our tanks as possible to be ready for the Spring campaign. Stalin said the all-important thing was the production of tanks during the winter - the tank losses on both sides were very great but that Germany could produce more tanks per month this winter than Russia. Hence the aid of the U.S. in supplying steel and tanks is essential. He would like to send a tank expert to the U.S.A. He stated that he would give the U.S. his tank designs.

He emphasised the fact that Germany has a strong and powerful air force, and that their present production of planes was probably 2,500 fighters and bombers per month, but not more than 3,000 a month. Germany has more planes than the Russians at the front at this time but the quality of many of the German planes is not first-class - they are rough, plain machines, in which pilots fly without a long training. Some pilots they have captured indicated that their training was short and consisted of only a "practical course". He realises that Germany moved to

the Russian front a great many aircraft which types are no longer being built in German factories. He thinks that Germany under-rated the ability of the Russian Air Force and thought that these second-rate planes could operate successfully against them. The Russians have experienced no trouble in destroying these planes. The Henkel plane was faster than the new Messerschmitt. On the whole the most useful plane the Germans have against the Russians is the Junkers 88, which is as good or better than anything of that type that the Russians have.

He states that the Germans are putting 20 mm. cannon in their fighters; some have 12 mm. machine guns. Stalin said that all fighters must have cannon in modern warfare. He has equipped all his fighters with cannon or heavy calibre machine guns, and stated the Russians proposed to have no fighters without cannon or the heaviest calibre machine guns.

The Russians put their old fighter planes on the front, and these have a speed of only 440 kilometres per hour, but they have been very useful and successful against many of the planes that the Germans put on Russia's western front. They have *7 to 8* thousand of these older type fighters.

The new fighters are of three types. They have approximately 2000 of these at the front, and are producing 1200 a month. The speediest of these newer one motor fighters is the M.I.G.3, with heavy armour and cannon, and a speed of 650 kilometres per hour. The second fighter is the L.A.G.3, which carries a cannon, has heavy machine guns and a speed of 590 k.p.h. The third is the J.K.1; this carries a cannon, and has a speed of 590 k.p.h.

Stalin said the Russians have three new medium bomber types. First, a single-motor bomber, flying at 510 k.p.h., for close range bombing. Second, the 2-motor dive bomber, flying at 540 k.p.h. with a flying range of 800 kilometres. The third bomber, which is only just being

produced in quantity, is a 2-motor dive bomber with a range of 2,200 kilometres and a speed of 610 k.p.h., and carries one ton of bombs on its full flight range, but double that amount of bombs on more than half range. It has 7 heavy machine guns. Stalin speaks of it as "a very good bomber".

He said he has three types of long range bomber. One, a 2-motor bomber which is quite slow, doing 440 k.p.h. with a range of 3,000 kilometres. Second, a 2-motor bomber, just in production, with a Diesel engine; range 5,000 kilometres, carrying one ton bomb load=, 2 tons at 4,000 kilometres range; speed 500 k.p.h. Third, a 4-engine bomber, just now getting into production; range 3,500 kilometres, carrying 3 tons of bombs. He said they had at present about 600 heavy long range bombers.

He said that his total production of planes at present was 1800 per month; by January 1st, this would increase to 2500 per month. 60% of these would be fighter planes, and 40% bombers. This was exclusive of training planes, now being produced at 15 per day. The Russians had approximately 3500 training planes. Stalin said the training course for pilots was 8 months.

He expressed considerable interest in training pilots in America and left me the impression there would soon be a shortage of pilots. Stalin said the German claims of Russian air losses were absurd. The Russians lost more planes than the Germans at first, but he thinks the advantage is the other way now. He would not indicate the number of losses other than there were a "good many on both sides".

He stated there had been some damage to aircraft factories but that there had been considerable disbursement of the machinery before the destruction took place. (I saw two factories, which I was told by our Ambassador were aircraft factories, just outside Moscow completely destroyed).

Stalin repeatedly stated that he did not under-rate the German Army. He stated that their organisation was of the very best and that he believed that they had large

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reserves of food, men, supplies and fuel. He thinks that we may be under-estimating Germany's oil supplies, and he bases this on the fact that under the two-year agreement they had with Germany, the Germans asked for less fuel than the agreement provided for during the year 1940-41. He thought one weakness the British had was under-rating their enemy; he did not propose to do this. He ~~therefore~~ thinks that so far as men, supplies, food and fuel are concerned, the German Army is capable of taking part in a Winter campaign in Russia. He thinks however, that it would be difficult for the Germans to operate offensively much after the 1st September, when the heavy rains will begin, and after October 1st the ground would be so bad that they would have to go on the defensive. He expressed great confidence that the line during the Winter months would be in front of Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad - probably not more than 100 kilometres away from where it is now. He thinks that one of the great advantages the Russian Army has at the moment is that the Germans "are tired" and have no stomach for an offensive. He realises that Germany can still bring up about 40 divisions, making 275 divisions in all at the Russian front, but these divisions probably cannot get there before the hard weather sets in.

He told me that the first need of the Russian Army was light anti-aircraft guns, 20 mm., 25 mm., 37 mm., and 50 mm., and that they need vast quantities of these guns to give protection to their lines of communications against low flying planes.

His second great need was aluminium needed in the construction of airplanes.

The third was machine guns of approximately 50 calibre, and the fourth rifles of approximately 30 calibre. He stated that he needed large anti-aircraft guns for the defence of cities. In his opinion the Russian supply of ammunition was satisfactory. He stated the outcome of the war in Russia would largely depend on the ability to enter

the Spring campaign with adequate equipment, particularly in aircraft, tanks and A.A. guns.

He expressed an urgent desire that the British send large planes as soon as possible to bomb the Rumanian oilfields, and made a point of urging that pilots and crews be sent with the planes. He told me one of the great problems was to determine the ports of entry which were to be used for supplies; and that Archangel was difficult but not impossible; he was sure his icebreakers could keep the port free all winter. He stated that Vladivostok was dangerous because it would be cut off by Japan at any time, and he feared the railroads and roads in Persia were inadequate. But all would have to be used for the present.

Mr. Stalin expressed repeatedly his confidence that the Russian lines would hold.

No information given above was confirmed by any other source.

261409

Russia is safe. Russia with us

RS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

MOSCOW

Dated August 1, 1941

Rec'd 8:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1430, August 1, 3 p.m.

~~NOT SECRET~~, PERSONAL AND ~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~
FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY
ONLY FROM HARRY HOPKINS.

FEEL UNCOMFORTED

"I have had two long and satisfactory talks with Stalin and will communicate personally to you the messages he is sending. I would like to tell you now, however, that I feel ever so confident about this front. The morale of the population is exceptionally good. There is unbounded determination to win. Stalin is anxious that the final negotiations for the loan from the R.F.C., be handled in Washington and is anxious that it be agreed upon at the earliest possible moment. I have had satisfactory conferences with Molotov, Steinhardt and Cripps. My mission here is nearly complete, and I shall be leaving soon. I am well and looking forward to seeing you. Harry"

STEINHARDT

CSB

261101

State Dept. copy
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941, Vol. I, General, The Soviet Union

page 815.

a61j01

RLS 1/30/59

one
AF

GRAY

Moscow

Dated August 1, 1941

Rec'd 9 p.m.

*file to be
Safe: Russia*

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1431, August 1, 5 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY, AND UNDER
SECRETARY

The reception accorded Harry Hopkins by the Soviet Government and the unusual attention which has been devoted to him by the Soviet press clearly indicate that extreme importance has been attached to his visit by this Government. He was met at the port of entry by a number of high ranking Army and Naval officials and by the Acting Chief of Protocol who flew with him to Moscow where an unusually large delegation headed by Lozovski had been assembled to await his arrival. He was received promptly by Stalin who granted him very extended interviews and discussed with a frankness unparalleled in my knowledge in recent Soviet history the subject of his mission and the Soviet position. All Soviet newspapers have published photographs and items concerning his visit on their front pages - a position

a61j02

-2- 1431, August 1, 5 p.m. - from Moscow.

position of much greater significance here than in any other country.

I am certain that the visit has been extremely gratifying to the Soviet Government and that it will prove to have exercised a most beneficial effect upon Soviet-American relations in general and in particular to have greatly encouraged the Soviet war effort.

STEINHARDT

HPD

ablj03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Safe: Russia
File Person*

Bot

August 4, 1941.

10-27-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Situation in Ukraine.

1. On August 4th, the situation in the Ukraine along the southern portion of the German-Russian front is believed to be approximately as follows:

a. The Russians hold a deep wedge extending westward from the Dnieper on both sides of the Pripet river. This wedge corresponds approximately to the Pripet marsh area.

b. Immediately south of the marshes, German forces have advanced to the area between Korosten and the Dnieper river. The depth of this German advance to the east of Korosten is unknown.

c. Russian forces hold Kiev and an extensive bridgehead around Kiev on the west bank of the Dnieper.

d. The main German effort has been made in the past two weeks in a southeasterly direction along the axis: Zhitomir, Dnepropetrovsk. The left flank of this drive has been protected by the German High Command against the Kiev bridgehead by strong defensive formations of German infantry. Most of the armored divisions of the southern front appear to be concentrated in this "main effort" enveloping drive pushing southeastward from Belaja Zerkow towards Dnepropetrovsk.

e. This German armored army attained the area of Sveni-gorodka about July 25th and was close to Zinoviesk on July 31st. It is, apparently, on August 4th continuing to gain ground in the directions of Dnepropetrovsk and Krivoi Rog.

f. Strong Russian forces are fighting with determination in a half circle to the northwest, west and southwest of Zinoviesk. These Russian forces have still an open line of retreat to the east Ukraine over Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporzha. A further line of retreat is open to them to the southeast into the Crimea. However, the Russians' area for retreat between Zinoviesk and the lower Dnieper is being further compressed daily.

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g. The Russian armies west and southwest of Zinoviesk, probably amounting to between fifteen and twenty-five divisions, are being attacked by the Axis armies along a semi-circular front extending from Cetatea Alba at the mouth of the Dniester through Balta to Uman. Two large bridges have been built by German pioneers across the middle Dniester near Dubossary.

h. On July 31st the German High Command reports that these half-enclosed Russian forces launched a major counterattack in a northerly direction from Perwomaisk. Very fierce fighting occurred on this day near Novoarchangelsk.

i. The fate of the Russian armies fighting to the west and southwest of Zinoviesk now hangs in the balance.

Sherman Miles

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:


✓ THE PRESIDENT
Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
General Embick

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DIR 520.9 (7/21/58)

Date - 10 - 27 - 66

Signature - *Carl L. Spitzer*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



261401

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Safe: Russia

Lock/Box

August 20, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of Part I and Part II of the report of my trip to Moscow.

I am enclosing copies for the State, War and Navy Departments, with a proposed note from you.

Very sincerely yours,


HARRY L. HOPKINS

Enclosures.

The President,
The White House.

Parts I and II published from State Dept copy
Part III published from FDR copy

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

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pages 805-814

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RLJ 1/30/59

RECORDED
UNCLASIFIED

~~CONFERENCE~~
CONFERENCE HELD ON JULY 31, 1941, BETWEEN

MR. STALIN, MR. HOPKINS, AND THE
INTERPRETER MR. LITVINOV, AT THE
KREMLIN IN MOSCOW - 6:30 p.m. TO

9:30 p.m.

PART I

I told Mr. Stalin that the President was anxious to have his - Stalin's - appreciation and analysis of the war between Germany and Russia. Mr. Stalin outlined the situation as follows:

He stated that in his opinion the German Army had 175 divisions on Russia's western front at the outbreak of the war, and that since the outbreak of the war, this has been increased to 232 divisions; he believes that Germany can mobilize 300 divisions.

He stated that Russia had 180 divisions at the outbreak of the war, but many of these were well back of the line of combat, and could not be quickly mobilized, so that when the Germans struck it was impossible to offer adequate resistance. The line which is now held is a far more propitious one than the more advanced line which they might have taken up had their divisions been prepared. Since war began, however, divisions have been placed in their appropriate positions, and at the present time he believes that Russia has a few more divisions than Germany, and places the number of Russian divisions at 240 in the front, with 20 in reserve. Stalin said that about one third of these divisions had not as yet been under fire.

Mr. Stalin stated that he can mobilize 350 divisions and will have that many divisions under arms by the time the spring campaign begins in May 1942.

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He is anxious to have as many of his divisions as possible in contact with the enemy, because then the troops learn that Germans can be killed and are not supermen. This gives his divisions the same kind of confidence that a pilot gets after his first combat in the air. Stalin said that "nothing in warfare can take the place of actual combat", and he wants to have as many seasoned troops as possible for the great campaign which will come next Spring. He stated that the German troops seemed to be tired, and the officers and men that they had captured had indicated they are "sick of war".

The German reserves are as much as 400 kilometres back of the front, and the communications between the reserves and the front line are extremely difficult. These supply lines require many thousands of German troops to guard and protect them from Russian raids.

He said that in the battle now in progress, very many Russian and German troops are fighting far forward from their respective lines because of the advances made by both sides with their mechanized forces. Stalin said that his soldiers did not consider the battle lost merely because the Germans at one point and another broke through with their mechanized forces. The Russian mechanized forces would attack at another point often moving many miles behind the German line. Merely because German forces pierce the Russian line does not mean the Russians are lost. They fight behind the Germans, are adept at the use of cover and fight their way out in the night. He said, "Even the German tanks run out of petrol".

This is merely a phase of modern warfare, and accounts for the fact that there have been no mass surrenders of troops on either side. The Russians therefore have many "insurgent" troops which operate behind Germany's so-called front line. They constantly attack German aerodromes and lines of communications. The Russians are more familiar with the terrain and know how to use the natural cover which nature has provided better than the Germans. These "insurgent" troops are proving a great menace to the German offensive.

He believes that Germany underestimated the strength of the Russian Army, and have not now enough troops on the whole front to carry on a successful offensive war and at the same time guard their extended lines of communications. He repeatedly emphasized the large number of men Germany was forced to use for this purpose, and believes that the Germans will have to go on the defensive themselves. There is considerable evidence that they are already doing this. They are burying many of their large tanks in the ground for defensive purposes. The Russians have already found 50 such defensive positions. Mr. Stalin stated that in his opinion Hitler fears that he has too many men on the Russian front, which may account for their preparing some defensive positions so that some of their divisions might be returned to the German western areas of actual or potential operation.

He thinks the Germans have now on his front about 70 tank and motorized divisions. He also states that the Russo-German war has already changed the character of

divisional organization; that the Germans had broken up their large armoured divisions and dispersed this equipment through what Stalin called their tank and motorized divisions. Stalin stated that the war has already shown that infantry divisions must include a larger number of mechanized units. While Russia had a large number of tank and motorized divisions - none of them were a match for the German "Panzer" division, but were far stronger than other German divisions. Hence the great pressure on the German infantry divisions which caused the diversion of German armoured equipment all along the line.

Stalin believes that Germany had 30,000 tanks at the outbreak of the Russian war. Russia herself had 24,000 tanks and 60 tank divisions with about 350 to 400 tanks in each division. They have always had about 50 tanks in each infantry division. Stalin believes that the large divisions are being broken up by the German Staff and as the war progresses the number of men in the divisions will be decreased in both armies.

He stated that the pressure on his army in the last ten days had become considerably less, and the only reason he could give for it was that he thought Germany had been unable to supply their mechanized divisions and air forces with adequate fuel. He stressed the great difficulty the German armies had encountered in moving vast quantities of fuel to the front, and believes these difficulties are going to increase. He does not think this is because Germany has any lack of fuel, but rather because of transportation difficulties, the lack of good

roads and more particularly the effective interference of the Russians with the German communications.

Stalin says that even though the war has been going on only six weeks, his troops are meeting brand new divisions at the front, and some of the original divisions seem to have been withdrawn. He believes that the morale of his own troops is extremely high, and realizes that this is partly due to the fact that they are fighting for their homes and in familiar territory. He said that Germany has already found that "moving mechanized forces through Russia was very different than moving them over the boulevards of Belgium and France".

Stalin said that the Russian Army had been confronted with a surprise attack; he himself believed that Hitler would not strike but he took all precautions possible to mobilize his army. Hitler made no demands on Russia, hence they were forced to organize a defensive line of battle. Now the Russians were counter-attacking at many points.

He said the Russian Army had met few of the 70-ton German tanks but that this was probably due to the inability of the Russian bridges to hold the tanks. He believes the terrain too difficult to manoeuvre these giant tanks. Where the 70-ton tanks were encountered, they were pierced by the Russian 75 mm. guns. He does not think that the very large German tank will play an important part in the war in Russia, although there are parts of the southern front where these tanks can manoeuvre. The roads are very bad for the big tanks to operate over.

He believes that his largest tanks are better than the other German tanks, and that they have repeatedly shown their superiority in the war to date. He stated that the two largest Russian tanks were of 48 and 52 tons respectively, with 75 mm. armour and 85 mm. guns. They have approximately 4,000 of these tanks at present. The Russian medium tank of just over 30 tons has 45 mm. armour and 75 mm. guns. The infantry tank is 13 tons and has 37 mm. armour and 45 mm. guns. They have approximately 8,000 medium (30-ton) tanks at present and 12,000 light (13-ton) tanks. He stated their present production of tanks was 1,000 per month. He stated that his production was equally divided between medium and heavy tanks on the one hand, and light tanks on the other. He stated they would be short of steel for tank manufacture and urged that orders for this steel be placed at once. He later said it would be much better if his tanks could be manufactured in the United States. He also wished to purchase as many of our tanks as possible to be ready for the Spring campaign. Stalin said the all-important thing was the production of tanks during the winter - the tank losses on both sides were very great but that Germany could produce more tanks per month this winter than Russia. Hence the aid of the United States in supplying steel and tanks is essential. He would like to send a tank expert to the United States. He stated that he would give the United States his tank designs.

He emphasized the fact that Germany has a strong and powerful air force, and that their present production of planes was probably 2,500 fighters and bombers per

month, but not more than 3,000 a month. Germany has more planes than the Russians at the front at this time but the quality of many of the German planes is not first-class - they are rough, plain machines, in which pilots fly without a long training. Some pilots they have captured indicated that their training was short and consisted of only a "practical course". He realizes that Germany moved to the Russian front a great many aircraft, which types are no longer being built in German factories. He thinks that Germany underrated the ability of the Russian Air Force and thought that these second-rate planes could operate successfully against them. The Russians have experienced no trouble in destroying these planes. The Henkel plane was faster than the new Messerschmitt. On the whole the most useful plane the Germans have against the Russians is the Junkers 88, which is as good or better than anything of that type that the Russians have. ,

He stated that the Germans are putting 20 mm. cannon in their fighters; some have 12 mm. machine guns. Stalin said that all fighters must have cannon in modern warfare. He has equipped all his fighters with cannon or heavy calibre machine guns, and he stated the Russians proposed to have no fighters without cannon or the heaviest calibre machine guns.

The Russians put their old fighter planes on the front, and these have a speed of only 440 kilometres per hour, but they have been very useful and successful against many of the planes that the Germans put on Russia's western front. They have seven to eight thousand of these older type fighters.

The new fighters are of three types. They have approximately 2,000 of these at the front, and are producing 1,200 a month. The speediest of these newer one-motor fighters is the M.I.G. 3, with heavy armour and cannon, and a speed of 650 kilometres per hour. The second fighter is the L.A.G. 3, which carries a cannon, has heavy machine guns and a speed of 590 k.p.h. The third is the J.K. 1; this carries a cannon, and has a speed of 590 k.p.h.

Stalin said the Russians have three new medium bomber types. First a single-motor bomber, flying at 510 k.p.h., for close range bombing. Second, the 2-motor dive bomber, flying at 540 k.p.h. with a flying range of 800 kilometres. The third bomber, which is only just being produced in quantity, is a 2-motor dive bomber with a range of 2,200 kilometres and a speed of 610 k.p.h., and carries one ton of bombs on its full flight range, but double that amount of bombs on more than half range. It has 7 heavy machine guns. Stalin spoke of it as "a very good bomber".

He said he has three types of long range bomber. One, a 2-motor bomber which is quite slow, doing 440 kp.h. with a range of 3,000 kilometres. Second, a 2-motor bomber, just in production, with a Diesel engine; range 5,000 kilometres, carrying one ton bomb load, 2 tons at 4,000 kilometres range; speed 500 k.p.h. Third, a 4-engine bomber, just now getting into production; range 3,500 kilometres, carrying 3 tons of bombs. He said they had at present about 600 heavy long range bombers.

He said that his total production of planes at present was 1,800 per month; by January 1st, this would increase to 2,500 per month. 60% of these would be fighter planes, and 40% bombers. This was exclusive of training planes, now being produced at 15 per day. The Russians have approximately 3,500 training planes. Stalin said the training course for pilots was 8 months.

He expressed considerable interest in training pilots in America and left me the impression there would soon be a shortage of pilots. Stalin said the German claims of Russian air losses were absurd. The Russians lost more planes than the Germans at first, but he thinks the advantage is the other way now. He would not indicate the number of losses other than there were a "good many on both sides".

He stated there had been some damage to aircraft factories but that there had been considerable disbursement of the machinery before the destruction took place. (I saw two factories, which I was told by our Ambassador were aircraft factories, just outside Moscow completely destroyed.)

I asked Mr. Stalin about the location of his munitions plants. He did not reply to this in detail but indicated that about 75% of the sum total of his munitions plants, the percentage varying depending on the type of plant, were in the general areas of which Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev were the centers.

I gained the impression from him that if the German army could move some 150 miles east of each of these centers, they would destroy almost 75% of Russia's

industrial capacity.

Stalin said they had dispersed a good many of their larger factories and were moving many machine tools eastward to escape the bombing attacks.

Stalin repeatedly stated that he did not underrate the German Army. He stated that their organization was of the very best and that he believed that they had large reserves of food, men, supplies and fuel. He thinks that we may be under estimating Germany's oil supplies, and he bases this on the fact that under the two-year agreement they had with Germany, the Germans asked for less fuel than the agreement provided for during the year 1940-41. He thought one weakness the British had was underrating their enemy; he did not propose to do this. He, therefore, thinks that so far as men, supplies, food and fuel are concerned, the German Army is capable of taking part in a winter campaign in Russia. He thinks, however, that it would be difficult for the Germans to operate offensively much after the first of September, when the heavy rains will begin, and after October 1st the ground would be so bad that they would have to go on the defensive. He expressed great confidence that the line during the winter months would be in front of Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad - probably not more than 100 kilometres away from where it is now. He thinks that one of the great advantages the Russian Army has at the moment is that the Germans "are tired" and have no stomach for an offensive. He realizes

He told me that the first need of the Russian Army was light anti-aircraft guns, 20 mm., 25 mm., 37 mm., and 50 mm., and that they need vast quantities of these guns to give protection to their lines of communications against low flying planes.

His second great need was aluminum needed in the construction of airplanes.

The third was machine guns of approximately 50 calibre, and the fourth rifles of approximately 30 calibre. He stated that he needed large anti-aircraft guns for the defense of cities. In his opinion the Russian supply of ammunition was satisfactory. He stated the outcome of the war in Russia would largely depend on the ability to enter the spring campaign with adequate equipment, particularly in aircraft, tanks and anti-aircraft guns.

He expressed an urgent desire that the British send large planes as soon as possible to bomb the Rumanian oilfields, and made a point of urging that pilots and crews be sent with the planes.

He told me one of the great problems was to determine the ports of entry which were to be used for supplies; and that Archangel was difficult but not impossible; he was sure his icebreakers could keep the port free all winter. He stated that Vladivostok was dangerous because it could be cut off by Japan at any time, and he feared the railroads and roads in Persia

- 12 -

that the Russian lines would hold within 100 kilometres of their present position.

No information given above was confirmed by any other source.

Henry L. Miller

~~SECRET~~
CONFERENCE HELD ON JULY 31, 1941, BETWEEN

MR. STALIN, MR. HOPKINS, AND THE

INTERPRETER MR. LITVINOV, AT THE

KREMLIN IN MOSCOW - 6:30 p.m. TO

9:30 p.m.

PART II

RECEIVED
UNCLASSIFIED

I told Mr. Stalin at this conference that our Government and the British Government (Churchill having authorized me to say this) were willing to do everything that they possibly could during the succeeding weeks to send materiel to Russia. This materiel, however, must obviously be already manufactured and that he - Stalin - must understand that even this materiel could in all probability not reach his battle lines before the bad weather closes in.

I told him that we believed that plans should be made for a long war; that so far as the United States was concerned we had large supply commitments in relation to our own Army, Navy and Merchant Marine, as well as very substantial responsibilities for supplies to England, China and the Republics of South America.

I told him that the decisions relating to the long range supply problem could only be resolved if our Government had complete knowledge, not only of the military situation in Russia, but of type, number and quality of their military weapons, as well as full

I told him that I knew that our Government, and I believed the British Government, would be unwilling to send any heavy munitions, such as tanks, aircraft and anti-aircraft guns, to the Russian front unless and until a conference had been held between our three Governments, at which the relative strategic interests of each front, as well as the interests of our several countries, was fully and jointly explored.

I suggested that, in as much as he was so fully engaged with the immediate prosecution of the battle now in hand, he could not give the time and attention to such a conference until after this battle is over.

Stalin had previously indicated that the front would be solidified not later than October 1.

I was mindful of the importance that no conference be held in Moscow until we knew the outcome of the battle now in progress. I felt it very unwise to hold a conference while this battle was in the balance. Hence my suggestion to him to hold a conference at as late a date as was possible. Then we would know whether or not there was to be a front and approximately the location of the front during the coming winter months.

Stalin said he would welcome such a conference and said that of course it would be impossible for him to go to a conference anywhere other than in Moscow; that he would be glad to make available to our Government all

- 3 -

I told him that I was not authorized to make this suggestion of a conference to him officially.

Stalin then stated that in case our Government wished to have such a conference he would receive such a proposal sympathetically and would give the conference his personal attention.

Stalin has not given hitherto any information of any kind to any of the Embassies or to any of the Military Attaches of foreign governments. The British Naval Attache has been given information confined to the Russian Navy because of certain joint operations.

There is literally no one in the whole Government who is willing to give any important information other than Mr. Stalin himself. Therefore, it is essential that such a conference be held with Mr. Stalin personally.

I believe he would give this conference his personal attention.

My suggestion is that the conference be not held prior to October 1, but not later than October 15.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. Edgar Hoover", is located at the bottom right of the page. The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "J" and last name "Hoover" clearly distinguishable.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 20, 1941 .

My dear Mr. President:

I have only made one copy of the attached.

My suggestion is that no copy of this be sent to the State Department and that the contents of this be discussed verbally by you with Mr. Hull.

Very sincerely yours,



HARRY L. HOPKINS

Enclosure.

The President,
The White House.

261m17

~~SECRET~~
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CONFERENCE HELD ON JULY 31, 1941, BETWEEN
MR. STALIN, MR. HOPKINS, AND THE
INTERPRETER MR. LITVINOV, AT THE
KREMLIN IN MOSCOW - 6:30 p.m. TO
9:30 p.m.

PART III

RECORDED
UNCLASSIFIED

After Stalin had completed his review of the military situation, he expressed to me his great thanks to the President for the interest he was showing in their fight against Hitler. He stated that he wanted to give the President the following personal message; that he had considered putting the message in writing but believed it would be more desirable to have the message delivered to the President by me.

Stalin said Hitler's greatest weakness was found in the vast numbers of oppressed people who hated Hitler and the immoral ways of his Government. He believed these people and countless other millions in nations still unconquered could receive the kind of encouragement and moral strength they needed to resist Hitler from only one source, and that was the United States. He stated that the world influence of the President and the Government of the United States was enormous.

Contrary wise, he believed that the morale of the

war against Hitler.

Stalin said that he believed it was inevitable that we should finally come to grips with Hitler on some battlefield. The might of Germany was so great that, even though Russia might defend herself, it would be very difficult for Britain and Russia combined to crush the German military machine. He said that the one thing that could defeat Hitler, and perhaps without ever firing a shot, would be the announcement that the United States was going to war with Germany.

Stalin said that he believed, however, that the war would be bitter and perhaps long; that if we did get in the war he believed the American people would insist on their armies coming to grips with German soldiers; and he wanted me to tell the President that he would welcome the American troops on any part of the Russian front under the complete command of the American Army.

I told Stalin that my mission related entirely to matters of supply and that the matter of our joining in the war would be decided largely by Hitler himself and his encroachment upon our fundamental interests. I told him that I doubted that our Government, in event of war would want an American army in Russia but that I would give his message to the President.

He repeatedly said that the President and the United States had more influence with the common people

- 3 -

Finally, he asked me to tell the President that, while he was confident that the Russian army could withstand the German army, the problem of supply by next spring would be a serious one and that he needed our help.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 11, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing two copies of the report of my first conference with Stalin, at which Ambassador Steinhardt was present, and a copy for Secretary Hull with a suggested transmittal letter.

I am also enclosing two copies of the report of my conference with Molotov, with a copy for Secretary Hull with a suggested transmittal letter.

Very sincerely yours,



HARRY L. HOPKINS

Enclosures.

The President
The White House.

State Dept copy

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. I General, The Soviet Union

pages 802-805.

RLS 1/30/59

261n01

MEMORANDUM

CONFERENCE AT THE KREMLIN ON JULY 30, 1941
6:30 TO 8:30 P.M.

BETWEEN HARRY L. HOPKINS AND MR. STALIN

ALSO PRESENT WERE AMBASSADOR STEINHARDT
AND MR. REINHARDT, AMERICAN INTERPRETER

I told Mr. Stalin that I came as personal representative of the President. The President considered Hitler the enemy of mankind and that he therefore wished to aid the Soviet Union in its fight against Germany.

I told him that my mission was not a diplomatic one in the sense that I did not propose any formal understanding of any kind or character.

I expressed to him the President's belief that the most important thing to be done in the world today was to defeat Hitler and Hitlerism. I impressed upon him the determination of the President and our Government to extend all possible aid to the Soviet Union at the earliest possible time.

I told Mr. Stalin that I had certain personal messages from the President and explained my relationship to the Administration in Washington. I told him further that I just left Mr. Churchill in London who wished me to convey to him the sentiments which I had already expressed from the President.

Mr. Stalin said he welcomed me to the Soviet Union; that he had already been informed of my visit.

Describing Hitler and Germany, Mr. Stalin spoke of the necessity of there being a minimum moral standard between all nations and without such a minimum moral

standard nations could not co-exist. He stated that the present leaders of Germany knew no such minimum moral standard and that, therefore, they represented an anti-social force in the present world. The Germans were a people, he said, who without a second's thought would sign a treaty today, break it tomorrow and sign a second one the following day. Nations must fulfill their treaty obligations, he said, or international society could not exist.

When he completed his general summary of the Soviet Union's attitude toward Germany he said "therefore our views coincide".

I told Mr. Stalin that the question of aid to the Soviet Union was divided into two parts. First, what would Russia most require that the United States could deliver immediately and, second, what would be Russia's requirements on the basis of a long war?

Stalin listed in the first category the immediate need of, first, anti-aircraft guns of medium calibre, of from 20 to 37 mm., together with ammunition. He stated that he needed such medium calibre guns because of the rapidity of their fire and their mobility. He stated that all together he needed approximately 20,000 pieces of anti-aircraft artillery, large and small. He believed that if he could acquire such a quantity it would immediately release nearly 2,000 pursuit ships which are today required for the protection of military objectives behind the Soviet lines and such planes, if released, could be used as attacking

forces against the enemy.

Second, he asked for large size machine guns for the defense of his cities.

Third, he said he heard there were many rifles available in the United States and he believed their calibre corresponded to the calibre used in his Army. He stated that he needed one million or more such rifles. I asked Mr. Stalin if he needed ammunition for these rifles and he replied that if the calibre was the same as the one used by the Red Army "we have plenty".

In the second category, namely, the supplies needed for a long range war, he mentioned first high octane aviation gasoline, second, aluminum for the construction of airplanes and, third, the other items already mentioned in the list presented to our Government in Washington.

At this point in the conversation Mr. Stalin suddenly made the remark, "Give us anti-aircraft guns and the aluminum and we can fight for three or four years".

I referred to the 200 Curtiss P-40's which are being delivered to the Soviet Union and, in reply to a question from Mr. Stalin, I confirmed the fact that 140 were being delivered by way of England and 60 from the United States.

In connection with the delivery of these planes I referred to Lt. Alison's presence in Moscow and said he was an outstanding expert in the operation of this type of plane. I asked if he would care to have

Lt. Alison stationed in Archangel in an advisory capacity, to which Mr. Stalin replied affirmatively.

Mr. Stalin stated that he would be glad if we would send any technicians that we could to the Soviet Union to help train his own airmen in the use of these planes. He stated that his own airmen would show us everything about the Russian equipment, which he stated we would find very interesting.

He described at some length, but not in great detail as he did in the conference the next day, the planes which he had available. Mr. Stalin said the plane he needed particularly was the short-range bomber, capable of operating in a radius of 600 to 1100 kilometres, or with a total range of 1200 to 2200 kilometres.

I asked Mr. Stalin what he thought was the best route to ship supplies from the United States to the Soviet Union. Mr. Stalin stated that the Persian Gulf-Iranian route was not good because of the limited capacity of the Iranian railways and highways. He stated "Furthermore we do not yet know the view of the Iranian Government on this subject".

Mr. Stalin stated that the Vladivostok route was not a favorable one. I emphasized the danger of its being cut off by the Japanese and Mr. Stalin in turn emphasized the great distance from the scene of battle.

Mr. Stalin believed that the Archangel route was probably the most practicable. Both Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov stated that the Archangel harbor could be kept open in the winter by the aid of ice breakers.

Mr. Stalin pointed out that the only two absolutely ice free ports in the north were Murmansk and Kaldalaksha.

I told Mr. Stalin that my stay in Moscow must be brief. I wished to accomplish as much as possible in the short time which I had at my disposal. I asked Mr. Stalin whether he wished to carry on the conversations personally or would prefer that I would discuss some of the details with other representatives of the Soviet Government. I said that, of course, I would prefer to confer directly with him but I realized he had a great many responsibilities at the moment. I told him that I had some personal messages from the President which I wanted to deliver at an appropriate time.

Mr. Stalin replied, "You are our guest; you have but to command." He told me he would be at my disposal every day from six to seven. It was then agreed that I confer with representatives of the Red Army at ten o'clock that night.

I reiterated to Mr. Stalin the appreciation of the people of the United States of the splendid resistance of the Soviet Army and of the President's determination to do everything to assist the Soviet Union in its valiant struggle against the German invader.

Mr. Stalin replied with an expression of gratitude of the Soviet Government.

I told Mr. Stalin that I expected to interview

the representatives of the Anglo-American press following my meeting and asked whether Mr. Stalin had any wishes in connection with what I should say or whether he would prefer that no interview be held at all. I told him that under any circumstances the correspondents' stories would be subject to the control of his censorship.

To this Mr. Stalin replied that anything I might have to say would require no censorship by his Government.

I expressed to Mr. Molotov my desire to call upon him and it was arranged that I should see Mr. Molotov at three the next day.

CONFERENCE AT THE KREMLIN, JULY 31, 1941
3 TO 4 P.M.

PRESENT: MR. MOLOTOV, FOREIGN COMMISSAR U.S.S.R.
AMBASSADOR STEINHARDT
HARRY L. HOPKINS

Mr. Molotov stated that while the Soviet-Japanese relations presumably had been fixed by, first, the conversations with Matsuoka and, secondly, the neutrality pact signed between the two countries, nevertheless, the attitude of the new Japanese Government toward the Soviet Union is uncertain and, since the Soviet Government is by no means clear as to the policy which the Japanese Government intends to pursue, it is watching the situation with the utmost care.

He stated that the one thing he thought would keep Japan from making an aggressive move would be for the President to find some appropriate means of giving Japan what Mr. Molotov described as a "warning".

While Mr. Molotov did not use the exact words, it was perfectly clear that the implication of his statement was that the warning would include a statement that the United States would come to the assistance of the Soviet Union in the event of its being attacked by Japan.

Mr. Molotov did not express any immediate concern that Japan was going to attack Russia and on Russia's part Mr. Molotov stated repeatedly that Russia did not wish any difficulties with Japan.

He left me with the impression, however, that it was a matter of very considerable concern to him and that he felt the Japanese would not hesitate to strike

State Dept copy published in

Foreign Relations of the United States
1941, Vol. IV, The Far East

pages 1013-1014

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if a propitious time occurred. Hence his great interest in the attitude of the United States towards Japan.

I told Mr. Molotov that the Government of the United States was disturbed at the encroachments which Japan was making in the Far East and I was sure the American people would not look with any favor on Japan gaining a further hold in Siberia; that our long period of friendly relations between Russia and the United States, with our two countries only fifty miles apart, should be some indication of our interest in seeing stability in the Far East, including Siberia.

I told him that our Government was watching developments in the Far Eastern situation with great care and looked with misgivings and concern at the threatening attitude of Japan, both to the South and to the North. I told him, however, that our attitude towards Japan was a reasonable one and that we had no desire to be provocative in our relations with Japan.

I told him I would give the President his message regarding his, Molotov's, anxiety about Siberia and his desire to have the President indicate to Japan that further encroachments would not be tolerated.

I asked Mr. Molotov what their relationships with China were in the light of new developments and whether or not they could continue rendering the substantial material assistance they had been giving to Chiang Kai-shek or whether the Soviet Union's requirements in its own war with Germany would preclude their continuing to supply China.

Mr. Molotov replied that, of course, the Soviet Union's requirements for war material must of necessity adversely affect delivery to China; that while they do not wish to cut them off entirely and would continue to give everything they could, the necessities of their own situation required them to divert the Chinese supplies to their own battle line. Molotov expressed the hope that the United States would increase its own deliveries to make good the deficiency caused by Germany's attack on the Soviet Union.

I told Mr. Molotov that the American people were impressed by the gallant defense of the Soviet Army and assured him of the desire of the President to render every possible aid in the terms of materials to the Soviet Union as speedily as possible.

Mr. Molotov asked me to convey the Soviet Government's thanks to the President for sending his personal representative on this mission to Moscow.

COPY
TELEGRAM

Safe:
Russia

PSF

~~SECRET~~

SEPTEMBER 18, 1941

TO: AMEMBASSY
LONDON

FOR WISANT AND HARRISAN FROM HOPKINS

PRESIDENT REFERRED YOUR 4354 TO ME. ARMY ARE
RELEASING THREE B-26'S AND THREE B-25'S TO RUSSIANS.
THERE ARE NO B-24'S OR B-17'S AVAILABLE. THE PLANES
OFFERED TO THE RUSSIANS ARE FIRST CLASS.

HOPKINS

RECEIVED
UNCLASSIFIED

261p01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

Will you answer this
and tell him about the B-25s?

F. D. R.

ablp02

EJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated September 18, 1941

Rec'd 11:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

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4354, September 18, 2 p.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE
PRESIDENT.

Yesterday I talked with Oumansky. He came
in with Maisky. Oumansky had just gotten word
from Washington that the Russian air contingent
here would not be given either a B-24 or a B-17.
He tells me they had asked for five large bombers,
that they had agreed to take four medium bombers
but believed that you were going to get them one
large bomber with automatic pilot and he hoped
with a sperry sight. He felt that the arrival of
this ranking group of Russian airmen in one of our
best planes in Moscow would have a marked psycho-
logical effect and lift confidence there.

Since he told me he had had his conversations
with you personally, I thought I should report the
matter directly to you. He attached great im-
portance to it.

WINANT

BB

ablp03

TULLY:

1. ATTACHING A COPY OF THE
TELEGRAM THAT THIS LETTER CONCERNS.

L. BERNEY

Safe: Russia
Russell *PSF*

September 18, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

It is important that we know on Monday the number of airplanes by types that can be exported from the United States each month beginning October 1 through July 1, 1942. I want this figure irrespective of the source of funds.

As a rule of thumb, particularly as it concerns the 4-engine heavy bomber, I suggest 50 percent of our output from January 1 to July 1, meeting the commitment until January 1 which General Marshall and General Arnold worked out with the British at my conference with Churchill.

The planes which the British promised the Russians on a monthly basis will be fighter planes, probably Hurricanes.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.

HLB/lmb

261201

~~SECRET~~ AND MOST URGENT

18 SEPTEMBER 1941

FROM: HARRIMAN

TO: HOPKINS

CR0925

SUPPLEMENTING TODAY'S CABLE TO THE PRESIDENT:

THE 200 PLANES PER MONTH THE BRITISH HAVE PROMISED RUSSIA WILL BE FIGHTERS, PROBABLY HURRICANES. WE RECOMMEND, IF THE PRESIDENT APPROVES OUR SUPPLYING 200 AIRPLANES PER MONTH THROUGH JUNE AS WELL. AFTER CONSULTING, BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF BRITISH, GENERAL CHANEY SUGGESTS FOLLOWING: ■ FOUR ENGINE HEAVY BOMBERS AVERAGE THREE A MONTH. MODEL B-25, MEDIUM BOMBERS 5 PER MONTH. MODEL A-20A, B AND C LIGHT BOMBERS 92 PER MONTH. MODEL P40E PURSUIT 100 PER MONTH. WE WILL PROPOSE TOTAL OF 200 OBSERVATION MODEL P-52 LIEU OF LIGHT BOMBERS OR PURSUIT IF WE FIND RUSSIANS CAN USE THEM EFFECTIVELY PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER ABOVE SATISFACTORY AS WE MUST BE EXACT AND DETAILED IN OUR PROMISES TO THE RUSSIANS SO AS TO AVOID THEIR CLAIMING AT LATER DATE MORE MODERN TYPES SUCH AS AIR-COBRA ETC., WHICH MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE. WE ALSO FEEL THAT NUMBER OF TYPES SHOULD BE LIMITED AS FAR AS PRACTICABLE. ■■■■■■ THE FOREGOING RECOMMENDATION INCLUDES SPARES EDUCATIONAL PERSONNEL, IN THE FIELDS OF ASSEMBLY, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ALSO AMMUNITION, GARMENTS, AND OTHER SPECIAL EQUIPMENT ESSENTIAL TO COMBAT OPERATION OF THE AIRPLANES LISTED.

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Safe: K...

PM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated September 17, 1941

Rec'd 6:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

REGRADED
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TRIPLE PRIORITY.

4321, September 17, 11 a.m.

MOST URGENT AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR HOPKINS FROM HARRIMAN.

We have been meeting with the British since arrival Monday afternoon, largely working through five subcommittees. Greatest obstacle so far is tanks due to disappointment on the part of the British because the number of tanks available for export on account of the low production figures used by Embick is so much smaller than what they had been led to believe from earlier information. General Wesson tells us that 1000 a month to be reached in April is not feasible on account of insufficient guns and ammunition.

Discussion tanks is becoming acrimonious particularly because, as you well know, the British had definitely counted on the large number prior to January 1 as promised at cruise meeting.

It would

ablr01

-2- No. 4321, September 17, 1941, 11 a.m., from
London.

It would be most helpful if you could now
give me the definite figures on tanks by months
and types which will be made available for export
through June.

WINANT.

WWC

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF
Safe: *Russin*

September 19, 1941

MISS TULLY:

This telegram is in answer to Mr. Harriman's telegram of September 13 to the President. I assume you have a copy of Mr. Harriman's telegram. If not I will make one for you from the copy Mr. Hopkins has.

L. Berney

ab1501

TELEGRAM

SEPTEMBER 18, 1941

TO: HARRIMAN
LONDON

PRODUCTION SCHEDULES OF TANKS IN THIS COUNTRY WILL NOT BE BELOW SCHEDULES. IN FACT DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO INCREASE THEM ABOVE SCHEDULES. WILL ADVISE YOU MONDAY OR TUESDAY OF TOTAL NUMBER OF TANKS BY DESIGN AND MONTH THAT CAN BE EXPORTED FROM THIS COUNTRY IRRESPECTIVE OF SOURCE OF FUNDS.

IMPORTANT THAT YOUR MISSION IN COOPERATION WITH OTHERS JOINTLY DETERMINE ON DISTRIBUTION OF OUR EXPORTABLE TANKS.

ALL THAT I HAVE SAID ABOUT TANKS APPLIES EQUALLY TO AIRPLANES. NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE BY THIS GOVERNMENT RELATIVE TO DISTRIBUTION OF BIG BOMBERS AFTER JANUARY FIRST. WILL ADVISE YOU AT AN EARLY DATE RELATIVE TO NUMBER OF FOUR ENGINE BOMBERS THAT CAN BE EXPORTED FROM JANUARY FIRST TO JULY FIRST 1942.

ALTOGETHER PROPER THAT YOU SHOULD DISCUSS WITH STALIN VICTORY PROGRAM.

DO NOT WISH YOU TO DELAY YOUR TIME OF DEPARTURE. INFORMATION SHOULD REACH YOU BY THE TIME YOU ARE IN MOSCOW.

AGREE WITH YOU THAT OFFERS TO RUSSIA BY ENGLAND AND UNITED STATES SHOULD BE SPECIFIC.

abls02

- 2 -

ASSUME YOU MEAN THAT WE SEND TOP RAILROAD MAN
TO IRAN AND WILL ARRANGE THIS AT ONCE.

GOOD LUCK. WILL KEEP YOU CLOSELY ADVISED.

(signed) Roosevelt

261503

~~SECRET~~ AND MOST URGENT

18 SEPTEMBER 1941

FROM: HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
COPY TO: HOPKINS

REC
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DISCUSSIONS ON ALLOCATIONS TO RUSSIA HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN EASY BECAUSE OF DISAPPOINTMENT OF BRITISH DUE TO:

- (A) REDUCED PRODUCTION SCHEDULES BELOW THEIR EXPECTATIONS
- (B) THEIR HAVING COUNTED ON RECEIVING MUCH OF WHAT WE NOW OFFER TO ALLOCATE TO RUSSIA.

AFTER A DETAILED ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT, THE PRIME MINISTER, CONCURRED IN BY BEAVERBROOK MAKES THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS:

(1) THE UNITED STATES TO OFFER RUSSIA TANKS AND AIRCRAFT EQUAL IN NUMBER TO THAT ALREADY PROMISED BY THE BRITISH NAMELY 2000 AIRCRAFT AND 250 TANKS PER MONTH OCTOBER THROUGH JUNE.

(2) THIS EQUIPMENT TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM LEND-LEASE OR UNITED STATES ARMY PURCHASES AS YOU MAY DETERMINE.

(3) THAT THE TANK PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED AS TO MEDIUM TANKS AND THAT THE PRODUCTION OF LIGHT TANKS BE CONTINUED AT PEAK PRODUCTION RATE WITH THE HOPE THAT IN ADDITION TO PRODUCTION FROM BRITISH CONTRACTS THE BRITISH WILL RECEIVE MINIMUM OF 1,500 TO 2,000 OF EACH TYPE DURING THE PERIOD FROM EXPORTABLE SURPLUS. THIS IS A HOPE, NO

261504

A CONDITION TO OUR RUSSIAN OFFER.

(4) THE ALLOCATION OF 1,800 AIRCRAFT TO RUSSIA DURING THE NEXT 9 MONTHS IS AN INCREASE OF 600 AIRPLANES OVER THE APPROXIMATELY 1,200 SUGGESTED BY THE ARMY, THIS ADDITIONAL 600 PLANES TO COME FROM THE UNITED STATES ARMY ALLOCATIONS AND NOT IN FURTHER REDUCTION OF BRITISH UNDER LEND-LEASE.

(5) BRITISH SHARE MUCH DISAPPOINTED WITH THEIR ALLOCATION OF BIG BOMBERS AND AS THEY HAVE BEEN CUT DOWN TO 51 FROM AMERICAN PRODUCTION AGAINST AT LEAST 200 HOPED FOR THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO SEE ANY GO TO RUSSIA. WITH THIS VIEW I PERSONALLY AGREE. ON THE OTHER HAND GENERALS EMBICK, BURNS AND CHANEY ALL FEEL THE MORAL EFFECT OF BIG BOMBERS ON RUSSIANS IS IMPORTANT AND GENERAL EMBICK PARTICULARLY EMPHASIZES THE VALUE OF DETERANT EFFECT ON JAPAN. I WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ON WHETHER TO OFFER AN BIG BOMBERS TO RUSSIA AND IF SO, HOW MANY AND DATE OF AVAILABILITY.

(6) PRIME MINISTER HOPES THAT YOU WILL AUTHORIZE ME TO TELL STALIN OF THE DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE VICTORY PROGRAM IN GENERAL, NOT IN DETAIL, AND ALLOW ME TO INDICATE TO STALIN THAT AFTER JUNE RUSSIANS WILL OBTAIN FROM THE UNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH THEIR FAIR SHARE OF EXPORTABLE MUNITIONS.

(7) HE HOPES THAT WE WILL GIVE ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXPANSION OF THE CAPACITY OF THE IRANIAN RAILROAD SO NECESSARY TO SUPPLY RUSSIA AS WELL AS ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN TROOPS IN THIS AREA. HE ASKS THAT WE SEND TOP RAILROAD MEN TO ADVISE AND SUPPORT HIS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROMPT SHIPMENT OF MATERIAL NEEDED. THIS MAN IS NEEDED IN ADDITION TO THE ONE ABOUT TO GO TO EGYPT.

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PAGE 3.

(8) MEMBERS OF YOUR MISSION AND GENERAL EMBICK RECOMMEND ACCEPTANCE OF PRIME MINISTER'S SUGGESTIONS EXCEPT AS NOTED ABOVE REGARDING HEAVY BOMBERS AND REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON THESE POINTS AND IN ADDITION ON METHODS BY WHICH PROMISES TO RUSSIA WILL BE FIANCED. DISCUSSIONS REGARDING VICTORY PROGRAM ARE CONTINUING.

WE HOPE TO LEAVE FOR RUSSIA SUNDAY OR AS SOON THEREAFTER AS WE RECEIVE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. WE FEEL IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT OUR OFFERS TO RUSSIA BE SPECIFIC AND IN DETAIL. WE ARE FORWARDING RECOMMENDATION IN SEPARATE CABLE AS TO SPECIFIC TYPES OF AIRCRAFT TO MAKE UP THE ABOVE MENTIONED 200 A MONTH, ALSO AS TO TANKS AND OTHER ARMY, NAVY AND RAW MATERIAL ITEMS

abls06

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sept. 19, 1941.

Mr. Forster:

Attached telephoned over private wire to Mr. Long at Poughkeepsie and will be delivered to The President when Mr. Hassett goes out to the house in the morning.

Tel. & Tel.

mc-

10:15PM.

abl +01

19 SEPT 1941

Safe:
Russ
PSF

MEMO TO MR FOSTER
EXECUTIVE CLERK
WHITE HOUSE

THE NAVAL AIDE HAS DIRECTED THAT THE ENCLOSED BE TELEPHONED
TO THE PRESIDENT.

RESPECTFULLY

R. G. Copeland
R. G. COPELAND

LIEUT, U.S. NAVY

CODING ROOM 2100/19SEPT., 1941

a61+02

19 Sept., 1941.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN. (COPY TO HOPKINS).

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN YOUR STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE THIRTY NINE ZERO FOUR WILL LEAVE ON DATE MENTIONED IN MY ALUSNA EIGHTEEN FOURTEEN THIRTY EIGHT. I ASSUME THAT YOU APPROVE OUR OFFERING RUSSIA TWO HUNDRED AIRCRAFT PER MONTH AND AVERAGE OF TWO HUNDRED FIFTY TANKS PER MONTH DURING NEXT NINE MONTHS OCTOBER THROUGH JUNE. THE SCHEDULE OF MONTHLY TANK DELIVERIES CAN BE WORKED OUT FROM THE FIGURES OF EXPORTABLE SURPLUS GIVEN ME BY THE ARMY AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE BRITISH. THIS IS NOT TRUE OF THE AIRCRAFT HOWEVER. MY CABLE INCLUDED RECOMMENDATION MADE AT URGENT REQUEST OF BRITISH THAT TWELVE HUNDRED COME FROM FIGURES GIVEN AS EXPORTABLE SURPLUS AND SIX HUNDRED FROM ARMY ALLOCATIONS IN WHICH RECOMMENDATION ALL HERE INCLUDING GENERAL EMBICK CONCUR. HOPE WE MAY HAVE DECISION ON THIS POINT. IN ADDITION AM MOST ANXIOUS FOR CLARIFICATION OF METHOD OF FINANCE BY OUR ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW.

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~~SECRET~~

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*X-41. Copied and
Sent to...*

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19 Sept., 1941

URGENT FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN. COPY TO HOPKINS.

PARA ONE. THE BRITISH ARE SHIPPING TO RUSSIA THIS MONTH FIVE THOUSAND LONG TONS OF ALUMINUM AND HAVE PROMISED TWO THOUSAND PERE MONTH THEREAFTER. TOTAL APPROXIMATELY THIRTY THOUSAND TONS. THIS WILL SO REDUCE BRITISH STOCKS THAT THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ASK FOR A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THIS ALLOCATION FROM US BY END OF NINETEEN FORTY TWO. IN ADDITION THEY ARE PROVIDING SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF OTHER ESSENTIAL MATERIALS SUCH AS TIN LEAD RUBBER JUTE INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS WOOL SHOES AND SUGAR. FORTY THOUSAND TO FIFTY THOUSAND TONS OF COPPER ASKED FOR BUT NONE AVAILABLE HERE.

PARA TWO. LIST OF MATERIALS AS SUBMITTED BY OPM REMAINS UNCHANGED AND WE ASSUME AUTHORIZATION TO OFFER THIS HELP TO RUSSIA. WILL DISCUSS AVAILABILITY OF TEXTILES OFFERED BY YOU IN CABLE THIRTY NINE ZERO SIX ON ARRIVAL IN RUSSIA.

PARA THREE. IT IS BELIEVED HERE THAT LARGE QUANTITIES OF THESE AND OTHER RAW MATERIALS LIKELY TO BE ASKED FOR AT MOSCOW.

192133.
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CODING WATCH OFFICER

261104

TRIPLE PRIORITY

TELEGRAM

THROUGH NAVY RADIO

SEPTEMBER 20, 1941

TO: MR. HARRIMAN

AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

RECORDED
UNCLASIFIED

FOLLOWING DISTRIBUTION OF TANKS BY MONTHS HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND HE HAS INSTRUCTED ME TO SEND IT TO YOU AT ONCE. THE LIST INCLUDES ALL TANKS BY MONTHS AND TYPES AVAILABLE FOR EXPORT IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THEY GO TO BRITISH OR RUSSIANS. FURTHERMORE IT IS AN INCLUSIVE LIST IRRESPECTIVE OF SOURCE OF ORIGINAL FUNDS. IT THEREFORE INCLUDES UNITED STATES ARMY ORDERS, BRITISH ORDERS AND LEND LEASE ORDERS. THE FIGURES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

MEDIUM TANKS OCTOBER 116 NOVEMBER 184 DECEMBER 304
JANUARY 415 FEBRUARY 425 MARCH 435 APRIL 520 MAY 810
JUNE 785 TOTAL 3994.

LIGHT TANKS OCTOBER 183 NOVEMBER 180 DECEMBER 180
JANUARY 100 FEBRUARY 110 MARCH 300 APRIL 300 MAY 300
JUNE 300 TOTAL 1953.

THERE WILL BE DIFFICULTIES IN THE EARLY MONTHS WITH 37 mm AMMUNITION FOR LIGHT TANKS, 75 mm FOR MEDIUM TANKS AND SOME POSSIBLE SHORTAGE OF 75 mm GUNS. HOWEVER YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S INTENTION TO GIVE IMMEDIATE APPROPRIATE PRIORITIES TO EVERYTHING RELATING TO TANKS.

FURTHERMORE CONFERENCE BEING HELD HERE MONDAY WILL I BELIEVE SUBSTANTIALLY ACCELERATE PROGRAM DURING THE COMING MONTHS AND GREATLY INCREASE OUR PRESENT PLANS FOR TANK PRODUCTION DURING THE NEXT EIGHTEEN MONTHS.

ablu01

IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THEREFORE THAT THE ABOVE LIST IS A MINIMUM WHICH I BELIEVE CAN BE FURTHER INCREASED.

IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE YOU AIRPLANE FIGURES TODAY BUT BELIEVE PROPOSAL MADE BY BRITISH IS REASONABLE. DETAILS HOWEVER MUST BE WORKED OUT AND THESE WILL BE CABLED TO YOU TO MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY.

PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE THIS CABLE AND REPEAT FIGURES TO BE SURE THERE IS NO MISTAKE.

IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE TANK FIGURES THAT MORE THAN 250 A MONTH SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO RUSSIA. BELIEVE PUBLIC OPINION HERE TO AID RUSSIA IMPROVING BUT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO GIVE YOU DEFINITE INSTRUCTIONS AS TO METHOD OF FINANCING ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND THAT IT CAN BE FULLY WORKED OUT AND WE WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED. JONES HAS ALREADY PROMISED TO ADVANCE ONE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS FOR PURCHASE OF RAW MATERIALS FROM RUSSIA AND THIS ARRANGEMENT HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY RUSSIA.

YOUR 4371 PARAGRAPH (D) NO COMMITMENT CAN BE MADE AT THIS TIME RELATIVE TO TRANSFER OF LEND LEASE MATERIAL BY BRITISH TO RUSSIA. THAT POLICY IS DEPENDENT ON FINAL OUTCOME OF METHODS OF FINANCING ALL RUSSIAN PURCHASES IN THE UNITED STATES.

THIS WILL ALSO ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR CABLE ABOUT ALUMINUM. ANY TENTATIVE FIGURES AS TO AMOUNTS OF ALUMINUM TO BE REQUIRED IN RUSSIA SHOULD BE CABLED FROM MOSCOW. THE LIST OF MATERIAL WHICH PRESIDENT HAS APPROVED BEFORE YOU LEFT WILL BE DELIVERED. WILL SEND YOU MOSCOW MONDAY CONFIRMING TELEGRAM GIVING PRECISE DATES OF DELIVERY OF ALL THOSE MATERIALS.

WILL ALSO CABLE YOU MONDAY PRECISE INFORMATION RELATIVE TO "JEEPS" AND GARAND RIFLES.

HOPKINS

ablu02

PS
Safe: Russia
Box
9 October 1941.

From: Mr. Harriman
To: The President of the United States and
Mr. Hopkins.

" Beavorbrook and I agreed with Stalin to furnish him 400 airplanes per month for period October to June both inclusive, the British to furnish 200 fighters per month and the United States to make available 100 fighters and 100 bombers per month.

It is essential that shipments in these amounts be initiated at once. To carry out our part of this agreement British have agreed with us to divert from their share in both Lease-lend contracts and their own contracts, during the first part of this period up to 300 A 20's provided the borrowed planes can be returned to the British in like amounts from our later productions as soon as possible, and provided the number borrowed from them is kept to absolute minimum necessary to insure our fulfilling our agreements.

After examining characteristics of the O trajector 52 the Soviets definitely concluded they can not use this type and do not desire it to be shipped to them. They are very doubtful of being able to use the A trajector 29 due to its inadequate speed, defensive armament and armor. All their operations are in face of fighter opposition even over Black Sea. Their urgent request was for bombers with a radius of action of about 375 miles with bomb load

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of one ton, with good speed and defensive armaments and armor at the rate of 300 per month:

As this was impossible they desire the A trajector 20 and what we can give of the B trajector 25's. I am convinced that bombers furnished must have adequate defensive armament and armor to be of use to Soviets and that their operating personnel are fully capable of flying and maintaining our best and latest equipment. Based on above I urgently recommended that the U.S.S.R. be allotted 900 P trajectors 40 trajector E, 828 A trajector 20 and 72 B 25's in the amounts of 100 bombers and 100 fighters per month beginning with October:

In addition to the 141 Tomahawks and 2 R.A.F. squadrons totalling 40 Hurricanes now operating on Russian front the British have shipped from England 100 Hurricanes in September and will ship 300 in October, all to arrive in Archangel before first week in November. Russians wish our aircraft shipped to Archangel as well for the present."

But
Life: Russia *PST*
VIA NAVY RADIO

OCTOBER 13, 1941

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

FOR HARRIMAN FROM HOPKINS

THE PRESIDENT TODAY SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
STALIN.

WE ARE SHIPPING OCTOBER 94 LIGHT TANKS AND 72
MEDIUM 32-TON TANKS WITH SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION.
MOST OF THESE WILL LEAVE THE UNITED STATES BY
OCTOBER 15.

WE ARE SHIPPING 100 BOMBERS AND 100 OF OUR NEWEST
FIGHTER PLANES WITH SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION. THESE
WILL BE PLACED ON SHIPS DURING THE NEXT TEN DAYS.

WE ARE SHIPPING 5500 TRUCKS DURING OCTOBER AND
LARGE AMOUNTS OF BARBED WIRE. ALL OTHER MILITARY
SUPPLIES WE PROMISED FOR OCTOBER ARE BEING SWIFTLY
ASSEMBLED TO BE PLACED ON SHIPS.

THREE SHIPS LEFT THE UNITED STATES YESTERDAY FOR
RUSSIAN PORTS. EVERY EFFORT BEING MADE TO RUSH OTHER
SUPPLIES.

HOPKINS

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VIA NAVY RADIO

~~SECRET~~

OCTOBER 13, 1941

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY
MOSCOW

FOR STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT

WE ARE SHIPPING OCTOBER 94 LIGHT TANKS AND 72
MEDIUM 32-TON TANKS WITH SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION.
MOST OF THESE WILL LEAVE THE UNITED STATES BY
OCTOBER 15.

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SUPPLIES WE PROMISED FOR OCTOBER ARE BEING SWIFTLY
ASSEMBLED TO BE PLACED ON SHIPS.

THREE SHIPS LEFT THE UNITED STATES YESTERDAY FOR
RUSSIAN PORTS. EVERY EFFORT BEING MADE TO RUSH OTHER
SUPPLIES.

ROOSEVELT

(signed F. D. R.)

RECEIVED
UNCLASSIFIED

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X State Dept: copy of paraphrased text
Published in

Safe: Russia

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941, Vol. I, General, The Soviet Union

pages 851-852.

Oct. 30, 1941 ?

I CONFERENCE HELD IN MOSCOW
I WITH THE MEMBERS OF OUR

RLJ 1/30/59

I HAVE APPROVED ALL OF THE ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
AND AMMUNITIONS AND HAVE DIRECTED THAT THE UTMOST EXPEDITION BE USED
TO PROVIDE SO FAR AS POSSIBLE THE RAW MATERIALS. I HAVE ORDERED
THAT DELIVERIES BEGIN AT ONCE AND BE MAINTAINING IN THE GREATEST
POSSIBLE VOLUME.

IN ORDER TO REMOVE ANY FINANCIAL OBSTACLES I HAVE ALSO
DIRECTED THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE EFFECTED IMMEDIATELY WHEREBY SHIPMENTS
UP TO THE VALUE OF ONE BILLION DOLLARS MAY BE MADE UNDER THE LEND
LEASE ACT.

I PROPOSE, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE U.S.S.R., THAT NO INTEREST BE CHARGED ON THE INDEBTEDNESS INCURRED
AS A RESULT OF THESE SHIPMENTS AND THAT THE PAYMENTS ON SUCH INDEBTED
NESS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R. BEGIN ONLY FIVE YEARS AFTER
THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR AND COMPLETED OVER A PERIOD OF TEN YEARS
THEREAFTER.

I HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT CAN ARRANGE TO MAKE SPECIAL
EFFORTS TO SELL THE UNITED STATES SUCH COMMODITIES AND RAW MATERIALS
AS MAY BE AVAILABLE AND OF WHICH THE UNITED STATES MAY BE IN URGENT
NEED, THE PROCEEDS OF SUCH SALES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED

261X01

STATES TO BE CREDITED TO THE ACCOUNT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

I WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE APPRECIATION OF THIS GOVERNMENT FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS WAY IN WHICH THE SUPPLY CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW WAS HANDLED BY YOU AND YOUR ASSOCIATES AND TO ASSURE YOU THAT ALL OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THAT CONFERENCE WILL BE CARRIED OUT TO THE LIMIT.

I TRUST YOU WILL NOT HESITATE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME DIRECTLY SHOULD THE OCCASION REQUIRE IT.

ROOSEVELT

ablx02

[1941]

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM DATED OCTOBER 30 TO
MR. STALIN

I have examined the record of the Moscow Conference and the members of the mission have discussed the details with me. All of the military equipment and munitions items have been approved and I have ordered that as far as possible the delivery of raw materials be expedited. Deliveries have been directed to commence immediately and to be fulfilled in the largest possible amounts. In an effort to obviate any financial difficulties immediate arrangements are to be made so that supplies up to one billion dollars in value may be effected under the Lend-Lease Act. If approved by the Government of the U.S.S.R. I propose that the indebtedness thus incurred be subject to no interest and that the payments by the Government of the U.S.S.R. do not commence until five years after the war's conclusion and be completed over a ten-year period thereafter.

I hope that special efforts will be arranged by your Government to sell us the available raw materials and commodities which the United States may need urgently under the arrangement that the proceeds thereof be credited to the Soviet Government's account.

At this opportunity I want to tell you of the
appreciation

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appreciation of the United States Government for the expeditious handling by you and your associates of the Moscow supply conference, and to send you assurances that we will carry out to the limit all the implications thereof. I hope that you will communicate with me directly without hesitation if you should so wish.

Roosevelt

TELEGRAM

Lock Box

[Oct. 30, 1941]

Mr.
TO: STALIN

I HAVE SEEN THE PROTOCOL OF THE CONFERENCE HELD IN MOSCOW AND DISCUSSED THE DATA CONTAINED THEREIN WITH THE MEMBERS OF OUR MISSION.

I HAVE APPROVED ALL OF THE ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND MUNITIONS AND HAVE DIRECTED THAT THE UTMOST EXPEDITION BE USED TO PROVIDE SO FAR AS POSSIBLE THE RAW MATERIALS. I HAVE ORDERED THAT DELIVERIES BEGIN AT ONCE AND BE MAINTAINED IN THE GREATEST POSSIBLE VOLUME.

IN ORDER TO REMOVE ANY FINANCIAL OBSTACLES I HAVE ALSO DIRECTED THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE EFFECTED IMMEDIATELY WHEREBY SHIPMENTS UP TO THE VALUE OF ONE BILLION DOLLARS MAY BE MADE UNDER THE LEND LEASE ACT.

I PROPOSE, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R., THAT NO INTEREST BE CHARGED ON THE INDEBTEDNESS INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THESE SHIPMENTS AND THAT THE PAYMENTS ON SUCH INDEBTEDNESS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R. BEGIN ONLY FIVE YEARS AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR AND COMPLETED OVER A PERIOD OF TEN YEARS THEREAFTER.

I HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT CAN ARRANGE TO MAKE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO SELL THE UNITED STATES SUCH COMMODITIES AND RAW MATERIALS AS MAY BE AVAILABLE AND OF WHICH THE UNITED STATES MAY BE IN URGENT NEED, THE PROCEEDS OF SUCH SALES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF

ablx05

THE UNITED STATES TO BE CREDITED TO THE ACCOUNT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

I WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE APPRECIATION OF THIS GOVERNMENT FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS WAY IN WHICH THE SUPPLY CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW WAS HANDLED BY YOU AND YOUR ASSOCIATES AND TO ASSURE YOU THAT ALL OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THAT CONFERENCE WILL BE CARRIED OUT TO THE LIMIT.

I TRUST YOU WILL NOT HESITATE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME DIRECTLY SHOULD THE OCCASION REQUIRE IT.

HLH/lmb

abl x 06

- 4 -
 MISS TULLY:
 This telegram was sent in the
 President's name by Mr. Hopkins today.
 L. BERNEY
 10/31/41
 Look But

261401

TELEGRAM VIA NAVY RADIO

~~SECRET~~

October 31, 1941

TO: STALIN

THROUGH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY

[REDACTED] FOR STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT

1. It was agreed in the Confidential Protocol of the Moscow Supply Conference that the possibility of supply of a number of items you requested was to be investigated.

Investigation shows that in addition to the items definitely offered in the Protocol the following items can be made available as requested and I have so directed.

Item 7, Field Telephone Apparatus,

Item 8, Field Telephone Cable,

Item 9, Underwater Telegraph Cable,

Item 10, Submarine Cable,

Item 11, Aluminum and Duraluminum,

Item 18, Rolled Brass,

Item 22, Tubes and other manufactures of copper,

Item 31, Hot-Rolled Steel,

Item 32, Steel Billets, Chrome-Silicon-Manganese,

Item 33, Cold-Rolled Steel Strip,

Item 34, Cold-Rolled Steel Sheet,

Item 35, Tinplate,

Item 36, Steel-Wire

Item 37, Steel-Wire-Ropes,

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Item 41, Barbed Wire,
Item 45, Petroleum-Products,
Item 46, Ethylene Glycol,
Item 47, Sodium Bromide,
Item 48, Phosphorus,
Item 52, Colloxylin,
Item 58, Abrasives,
Item 59, Graphitized Electrodes,
Item 64, Sole Leather

2. The items listed below can be made available in part or require further mutual study:

Item 6, Trucks, 5,600 immediately and 10,000 monthly thereafter. Difficulty will be shipping.

Item 14, Nickel, the full amount of this item will be supplied jointly by United States and Great Britain in equal amounts for the next three months; further amounts to be subject to later considerations.

Item 19, Magnesium Alloys. Cannot be supplied from the United States at the present time. Study of the possibilities will be continued.

Item 20, Electrolytic Zinc, the full amount of this item will be supplied jointly by the United States and Great Britain as follows: Great Britain will supply the full amount for October, the United States will supply the full amount for November and each will supply 750 tons monthly thereafter.

Item 21, Bimetal, requires further study of possibilities of supply.

Item 23, Ferrosilicon, 300 tons monthly,

Item 24, Ferrochrome, 200 tons monthly. Immediate study will be given to possibilities for further expansion of American production of Ferrosilicon and Ferrochrome with a view to increasing monthly amounts if possible.

Item 25, Armor Plate, 1,000 tons monthly for the present. It may be possible to increase monthly supplies of this item later as capacity is enlarged.

Item 26, Hard alloys and cutting tools, 100,000 dollars monthly.

Item 28, High-Speed Steel, 100 tons monthly for the present. Further study will be given to possible increases in monthly amounts.

Item 29, Tool Steel, 500 tons monthly.

Item 30, Calibrated Steel, requires further study as to possibilities of fabrication.

Item 38, Steel Alloy Tubes, 200 tons monthly.

Item 39, Stainless Steel Wire, 20 tons monthly.

Item 40, Nickel Chrome Wire, 20 tons monthly.

Item 42, Toluol, 2,000 tons monthly and 10,000 tons of TNT as soon as possible.

Item 43, Nitroglycerine Powder. Powder of the chemical composition specified is not manufactured in this country. Studies are being given by representatives Amtorg and U.S. Army to the possibility of using a comparable powder manufactured in this country.

Item 44, Phenol, 400 tons before the end of the year and 750 tons monthly thereafter.

Item 49, Dibutyl-Phtalate, 400 tons before the end of year and 300 tons monthly thereafter.

Item 50, Dimethylaniline, 100 tons monthly beginning November; 200 tons monthly beginning March 1942.

Item 51, Diphenylamine, 100 tons monthly.

Item 53, Metal cutting machine tools, is receiving further joint study by Great Britain, United States and Amtorg.

Item 54, Electric Furnaces, 140 pieces definitely, further amounts dependent upon specifications.

Item 55, Forgings and Press Equipment, 627 pieces definitely, further amounts dependent upon specifications.

Item 56, Various Industrial Equipment, every assistance practicable will be given, satisfaction or particular requisitions being dependent upon specifications.

Item 66, Army Boots, at least 200,000 pairs monthly available and already offered to Amtorg.

Item 67, Army Cloth, amounts available dependent upon specifications but one million yards woolen overcoat cloth will be available upon requisition over next four months.

3. Further communications will be sent shortly on navy and medical supply lists.

ROOSEVELT

ab1y05

Life: Russia

PARAPHRASE OF THE TEXT OF A LETTER ADDRESSED
BY MR. JOSEF STALIN UNDER DATE OF NOVEMBER 4,
1941 TO THE PRESIDENT.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Steinhardt, through Mr. Vyshinski, presented to me on November 2, 1941 an aide memoire containing the contents of your message, the exact text of which I have not yet received.

First of all I would like to express my sincere thanks for your appreciative remarks regarding the expeditious manner in which the conference was handled. Your assurances that the decisions of the conference will be carried out to the limit is deeply appreciated by the Soviet Government.

Your decision, Mr. President, to grant to the Soviet Union a loan in the amount of one billion dollars subject to no interest charges and for the purpose of paying for armaments and raw materials for the Soviet Union is accepted with sincere gratitude by the Soviet Government as unusually substantial aid in its difficult and great struggle against our common enemy, bloodthirsty Hitlerism.

I agree completely, on behalf of the Government of the Soviet Union, with the conditions which you outlined for this loan to the Soviet Union, namely that payments on the loan shall begin five years after the end of the war and shall be completed during the following ten-year period.

The

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-2-

The Government of the U.S.S.R. stands ready to expedite in every possible way the supplying of available raw materials and goods required by the United States.

I am heartily in accord with your proposal, Mr. President, that we establish direct personal contact whenever circumstances warrant.

ab1202

SAFE FILE: Sabotage

SUM/AF/1th

Boyle

WALTER REED GENERAL HOSPITAL
ARMY MEDICAL CENTER
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 14, 1942.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIA. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

SUBJECT: Disposal of Bodies of Six Saboteurs.

TO: The President of the United States.

THROUGH: Chief of Staff, United States Army.

1. On August 8, 1942, at 4:15 P.M., in accordance with previous secret arrangements, the bodies of:

Herbert Hans Haupt
Heinrich Harm Heinok
Edward John Kerling
Hermann Otto Neubauer
Richard Quirin
Werner Thiel

were brought to Walter Reed General Hospital from the District Jail in two Army Medical Center ambulances. Major Robert S. Higdon, Medical Corps, was in charge of the ambulance detail. The bodies were identified by Colonel Martin F. DuFrenne, Medical Corps, and Major Thomas M. Rives, Assistant Provost Marshal, D. C., who accompanied them from the execution room. Individual name tags were attached to the bodies and they were receipted for by Colonel Paul A. Schule, Medical Corps, of the Walter Reed Hospital Laboratory Section.

2. The six bodies were stored in individual compartments of the refrigerating room at the hospital morgue. An armed guard was present in the morgue day and night until the bodies were removed, to insure that the boxes were unopened and the bodies not seen by any unauthorized person. On the evening of August 10, 1942, each body was embalmed in the hospital morgue by Mr. William G. Durisoe of the Tabler Funeral Home, Incorporated, in the presence of Major Carl J. Lind, Medical Corps, of the Hospital Laboratory Section.

3. At 6:00 P.M., August 11, 1942, the bodies were placed in individual plain pine boxes, identified by name tag, and taken in a light truck, accompanied by Major Lind, Major Harland W. Layer, Medical Administrative Corps, and three armed guards to the Potters Field, Blue Plains, D. C.

4. A detail from Fort Myer, under the direction of Captain Josiah T. Showalter, Medical Corps, had prepared the graves. The bodies were receipted for by Mr. Otto J. Cass, Superintendent of the Home for the Aged and Infirm and

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Potters Field. Each box was identified to correspond with the stake to be erected above that individual grave. A combined Protestant and Catholic burial service was provided by Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Charles D. Trexler, Protestant, and Chaplain (First Lieutenant) Edward J. McTague, Catholic. The six bodies were buried at 7:30 P.M., August 11, 1942, and the numbered stakes without names were placed above the graves in the following order;

- 276 - Richard Quirin
- 277 - Heinrich Harm Heinck
- 278 - Herbert Hans Haupt
- 279 - Edward John Kerling
- 280 - Hermann Otto Neubauer
- 281 - Werner Thiel

The precautions taken were such that no information has been given out and no photographs taken during any stage of these procedures so far as known. All concerned with the disposition of the bodies have been warned concerning need for secrecy both present and future.

S. U. Marietta

S. U. MARIETTA,
Brigadier General, Medical Department,
Commanding.

1st Ind.
Office Chief of Staff - August 15 - 1942

A copy of this report will be shown to the Secretary of War and to the Chief of Staff and then filed in the 'secret' files of The Adjutant General's Office.

John W. Stearns
Colonel, G. S. C.
Secretary, General Staff

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5-16
S. H. H. H.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Record of trial of Haupt,
Heinok, Kerling, Neubauer, Quirin,
Thiel and execution of sentence.
Tried by Military Commission by order
of the President, July 2, 1942, for
sabotage, etc.

N. M. Rigdon
St. N. H.

To be placed with
President Roosevelt's
Map Room Records

a63601

SAFE FILE: Alexander Sachs

Albert Einstein
Old Grove Rd.
Nassau Point
Peconic, Long Island

August 2nd, 1939

F.D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
White House
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future. Certain aspects of the situation which has arisen seem to call for watchfulness and, if necessary, quick action on the part of the Administration. I believe therefore that it is my duty to bring to your attention the following facts and recommendations:

In the course of the last four months it has been made probable - through the work of Joliot in France as well as Fermi and Szilard in America - that it may become possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium-like elements would be generated. Now it appears almost certain that this could be achieved in the immediate future.

This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is conceivable - though much less certain - that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory. However, such bombs might very well prove to be too heavy for transportation by air.

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The United States has only very poor ores of uranium in moderate quantities. There is some good ore in Canada and the former Czechoslovakia, while the most important source of uranium is Belgian Congo.

In view of this situation you may think it desirable to have some permanent contact maintained between the Administration and the group of physicists working on chain reactions in America. One possible way of achieving this might be for you to entrust with this task a person who has your confidence and who could perhaps serve in an unofficial capacity. His task might comprise the following:

a) to approach Government Departments, keep them informed of the further development, and put forward recommendations for Government action, giving particular attention to the problem of securing a supply of uranium ore for the United States;

b) to speed up the experimental work, which is at present being carried on within the limits of the budgets of University laboratories, by providing funds, if such funds be required, through his contacts with private persons who are willing to make contributions for this cause, and perhaps also by obtaining the co-operation of industrial laboratories which have the necessary equipment.

I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium from the Czechoslovakian mines which she has taken over. That she should have taken such early action might perhaps be understood on the ground that the son of the German Under-Secretary of State, von Weizsäcker, is attached to the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut in Berlin where some of the American work on uranium is now being repeated.

Yours very truly,

A. Einstein

(Albert Einstein)

a64a02

ONE SOUTH WILLIAM STREET
NEW YORK

October 11, 1939

Dear Mr. President:

With approaching fulfillment of your plans in connection with revision of the Neutrality Act, I trust that you may now be able to accord me the opportunity to present a communication from Dr. Albert Einstein to you and other relevant material bearing on experimental work by physicists with far-reaching significance for National Defense.

Briefly, the experimentation that has been going on for half a dozen years on atomic disintegration has culminated this year (a) in the discovery by Dr. Leo Szilard and Professor Fermi that the element, uranium, could be split by neutrons and (b) in the opening up of the probability of chain reactions, - that is, that in this nuclear process uranium itself may emit neutrons. This new development in physics holds out the following prospects:

1. The creation of a new source of energy which might be utilized for purposes of power production;
2. The liberation from such chain reaction of new radioactive elements, so that tons rather than grams of radium could be made available in the medical field;
3. The construction, as an eventual probability, of bombs of hitherto unenvisaged potency and scope: As Dr. Einstein observes, in the letter which I will leave with you, "a single bomb of this type carried by boat and exploded in a port might well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory!"

In connection, then, with the practical importance of this work - for power, healing and national defense purposes - it needs to be borne in mind that our supplies of uranium are limited and poor in quality as compared with the large sources of excellent uranium in the Belgian Congo and, next in line, Canada and former Czechoslovakia. It has come to the attention of Dr. Einstein and the rest of the group concerned with this problem that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium from the Czechoslovakian mines it seized. This action must be related to the fact that the son of the German Under-Secretary of State, Karl von Weizsaecker, had been an assistant at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin

a64601

to some of the great physicists now resident in this country who are carrying forward these experiments on uranium.

Mindful of the implications of all this for democracy and civilization in the historic struggle against the totalitarianism that has exploited the inventions of the free human spirit, Dr. Szilard, in consultation with Professor E. P. Wigner, head of the physics department of Princeton, and Professor E. Teller of George Washington University, sought to aid this work in the United States through the formation of an association for scientific collaboration, to intensify the cooperation of physicists in the democratic countries - such as Professor Joliot in Paris, Professor Lindemann of Oxford and Dr. Dirac of Cambridge - and to withhold publication of the progress in the work on chain reactions. As the international crisis developed this summer, these refugee scholars and the rest of us in consultation with them unanimously agreed that it was their duty, as well as desire, to apprise you at the earliest opportunity of their work and to enlist your cooperation.

In view of the danger of German invasion of Belgium, it becomes urgent to make arrangements - preferably through diplomatic channels - with the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga, whose head office is at Brussels, to make available abundant supplies of uranium to the United States. In addition, it is necessary to enlarge and accelerate the experimental work, which can no longer be carried out within the limited budgets of the departments of theoretical physics in our universities. It is believed that public-spirited executives in our leading chemical and electrical companies could be persuaded to make available certain amounts of uranium oxide and quantities of graphite, and to bear the considerable expense of the newer phases of the experimentation. An alternative plan would be the enlistment of one of the foundations to supply the necessary materials and funds. For either plan and for all the purposes, it would seem advisable to adopt the suggestion of Dr. Einstein that you designate an individual and a committee to serve as a liaison between the scientists and the Executive Departments.

In the light of the foregoing, I desire to be able to convey in person, in behalf of these refugee scholars, a sense of their eagerness to serve the nation that has afforded them hospitality, and to present Dr. Einstein's letter together with a memorandum which Dr. Szilard prepared after some discussion with me and copies of some of the articles that have appeared in scientific journals. In addition, I would request in their behalf

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a conference with you in order to lay down the lines of policy with respect to the Belgian source of supply and to arrange for a continuous liaison with the Administration and the Army and Navy Departments, as well as to solve the immediate problems of necessary materials and funds.

With high regard,

Yours sincerely,

Alexander Sachs

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

a64603

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 13, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL WATSON

Will you prepare a nice
note of thanks to Professor
Einstein and return his letter
to Grace for our very con-
fidential files?

F. D. R.

a64c01

October 17, 1939

Dear Professor Einstein:

The President has asked me to thank you very much for your recent letter and for your thoughtfulness in sending the manuscripts to him. He has found the data of this research most interesting and is deeply grateful for your kindness in bringing it to his attention. I am glad to inform you that the matter is being thoroughly investigated by a board in cooperation with Dr. Sachs.

With kindest regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

EDWIN M. WATSON
Secretary to the President

Dr. Albert Einstein,
Old Grove Road,
Massau Point,
Peconic, Long Island,
New York.

get

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C O P Y

October 19, 1939

My dear Professor:

I want to thank you for your recent letter and
and the most interesting and important enclosure.

I found this data of such import that I have
convened a Board consisting of the head of the Bureau
of Standards and a chosen representative of the Army
and Navy to thoroughly investigate the possibilities
of your suggestion regarding the element of uranium.

I am glad to say that Dr. Sachs will cooperate
and work with this Committee and I feel this is the
most practical and effective method of dealing with
the subject.

Please accept my sincere thanks.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

Dr. Albert Einstein,
Old Grove Road,
Nassau Point,
Peconic, Long Island,
New York.

C O P Y

264e01

MEMORANDUM

Much experimentation on atomic desintegration was done during the past five years, but up to this year the problem of liberating nuclear energy could not be attacked with any reasonable hope for success. Early this year it became known that the element uranium can be split by neutrons. It appeared conceivable that in this nuclear process uranium itself may emit neutrons, and a few of us envisaged the possibility of liberating nuclear energy by means of a chain reaction of neutrons in uranium.

Experiments were thereupon performed, which led to striking results. One has to conclude that a nuclear chain reaction could be maintained under certain well defined conditions in a large mass of uranium. It still remains to prove this conclusion by actually setting up such a chain reaction in a large-scale experiment.

This new development in physics means that a new source of power is now being created. Large amounts of energy would be liberated, and large quantities of new radioactive elements would be produced in such a chain reaction.

In medical applications of radium we have to deal with quantities of grams; the new radioactive elements could be produced in the chain reaction in quantities corresponding to tons of radium equivalents. While the practical application would include the medical field, it would not be limited to it.

A radioactive element gives a continuous release of energy for a certain period of time. The amount of energy which is released per unit weight of material may be very large, and therefore such elements might

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be used - if available in large quantities - as a fuel for driving boats or airplanes. It should be pointed out however that the physiological action of the radiations emitted by these new radioactive elements makes it necessary to protect those who have to stay close to a large quantity of such an element, for instance the driver of the airplane. It may therefore be necessary to carry large quantities of lead, and this necessity might impede a development along this line, or at least limit the field of application.

Large quantities of energy would be liberated in a chain reaction which might be utilized for purposes of power production in the form of a stationary power plant.

In view of this development it may be a question of national importance to secure an adequate supply of uranium. The United States has only very poor ores of uranium in moderate quantities; there is a good ore of uranium in Canada where the total deposit is estimated to be about 3000 tons; there may be about 1500 tons of uranium in Czechoslovakia, which is now controlled by Germany; there is an unknown amount of uranium in Russia, but the most important source of uranium, consisting of an unknown, but probably very large amount of good ore, is Belgian Congo.

It is suggested therefore to explore the possibility of bringing over from Belgium or Belgian Congo a large stock of pitchblend, which is the ore of both radium and uranium, and to keep this stock here for possible future use. Perhaps a large quantity of this ore might be obtained as a token reparation payment from the Belgian Government. In.

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taking action along this line it would not be necessary officially to disclose that the uranium content of the ore is the point of interest; action might be taken on the ground that it is of value to secure a stock of the ore on account of its radium content for possible future extraction of the radium for medical purposes.

Since it is unlikely that an earnest attempt to secure a supply of uranium will be made before the possibility of a chain reaction has been visibly demonstrated, it appears necessary to do this as quickly as possible by performing a large-scale experiment. The previous experiments have prepared the ground to the extent that it is now possible clearly to define the conditions under which such a large-scale experiment would have to be carried out. Still two or three different setups may have to be tried out, or alternatively preliminary experiments have to be carried out with several tons of material if we want to decide in advance in favor of one set-up or another. These experiments cannot be carried out within the limited budget which was provided for laboratory experiments in the past, and it has now become necessary either to strengthen - financially or otherwise - the organizations which concerned themselves with this work up to now, or to create some new organization for the purpose. Public-spirited private persons who are likely to be interested in supporting this enterprise should be approached without delay, or alternatively the collaboration of the chemical or the electrical industry should be sought.

The investigations were hitherto limited to chain reactions based on the action of slow neutrons. The neutrons emitted from the splitting uranium are fast, but they are slowed down in a mixture of uranium

a64f03

and a light element. Fast neutrons lose their energy in colliding with atoms of a light element in much the same way as a billiard ball loses velocity in a collision with another ball. At present it is an open question whether such a chain reaction can also be made to work with fast neutrons which are not slowed down.

There is reason to believe that, if fast neutrons could be used, it would be easy to construct extremely dangerous bombs. The destructive power of these bombs can only be roughly estimated, but there is no doubt that it would go far beyond all military conceptions. It appears likely that such bombs would be too heavy to be transported by airplane, but still they could be transported by boat and exploded in port with disastrous results.

Although at present it is uncertain whether a fast neutron reaction can be made to work, from now on this possibility will have to be constantly kept in mind in view of its far-reaching military consequences. Experiments have been devised for settling this important point, and it is solely a question of organization to ensure that such experiments should be actually carried out.

Should the experiments show that a chain reaction will work with fast neutrons, it would then be highly advisable to arrange among scientists for withholding publications on this subject. An attempt to arrange for withholding publications on chain reactions has already been made early in March, but was abandoned in spite of favorable response in this country and in England on account of the negative attitude of certain French laboratories. The experience gained in March would make it possible to revive this attempt whenever it should be necessary.

Leo Szillard
(Signed)

a64f04

With compliments
from Leo Szilard

Neutron Production and Absorption in Uranium

H. L. ANDERSON, E. FERMI AND LEO SZILARD

Reprinted from THE PHYSICAL REVIEW, Vol. 56, No. 3, August 1, 1939

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Neutron Production and Absorption in Uranium*

H. L. ANDERSON, E. FERMI AND LEO SZILARD
Columbia University, New York, New York

(Received July 3, 1939)

IT has been found¹⁻³ that there is an abundant emission of neutrons from uranium under the action of slow neutrons, and it is of interest to ascertain whether and to what extent the number of neutrons emitted exceeds the number absorbed.

This question can be investigated by placing a photo-neutron source in the center of a large water tank and comparing, with and without uranium in the water, the number of thermal neutrons present in the water. In the previous experiments of this type^{1,2} it was attempted to have as closely as possible a spherically symmetrical distribution of neutrons. The number of thermal neutrons present in the water was determined by measuring along one radius the neutron density ρ as a function of the distance r from the center, and then calculating $\int r^2 \rho dr$. A difference in favor of uranium of about five percent was reported by von Halban, Joliot and Kovarski.⁴

Since one has to measure a small difference, slight deviations from a spherically symmetrical distribution might give misleading results. The present experiments which are based on the same general principle do not require such symmetry. In order to measure the number of thermal neutrons in the water we filled the tank with a ten-percent solution of MnSO_4 . The activity induced in manganese is proportional to the number of thermal neutrons present. A physical averaging was performed by stirring the solution before measuring the activity of a sample with an ionization chamber. To obtain an effect of sufficient magnitude, about 200 kg of U_3O_8 was used.

The experimental arrangement is shown in Fig. 1. A photo-neutron source, consisting of about 2 g of radium and 250 g of beryllium was

placed in the center of the tank. The geometry was such that practically all neutrons emitted by the source and by the uranium oxide were slowed down and absorbed within the tank. Each irradiation extended over several half-life periods of radiomanganese and the observed activity of the solution was about four times the background of the ionization chamber. Alternating measurements were taken with the cans filled with uranium oxide, and with empty cans of the same dimensions. The activity proved to be about ten percent higher with uranium oxide than without it. This result shows that in our arrangement more neutrons are emitted by uranium than are absorbed by uranium.

In order to find the average number of fast neutrons emitted by uranium for each thermal neutron absorbed by uranium, we have to determine what fraction of the total number of neutrons emitted by the photo-neutron source is, in our experiment, absorbed in the thermal region by uranium. The number of photo-neutrons




FIG. 1. Horizontal section through center of cylindrical tank which is filled with 540 liters of 10-percent MnSO_4 solution. A, Photo-neutron source composed of 2.3 grams of radium and 250 grams of beryllium. B, One of 52 cylindrical cans 5 cm in diameter and 60 cm in height, which are either empty or filled with uranium oxide.

*Publication assisted by the Ernest Kempton Adams Fund for Physical Research of Columbia University.

¹v. Halban, Joliot and Kovarski, *Nature* **143**, 470 (1939).

²L. Szilard and W. H. Zinn, *Phys. Rev.* **55**, 799 (1939).

³Anderson, Fermi and Hanstein, *Phys. Rev.* **55**, 797 (1939).

⁴v. Halban, Joliot and Kovarski, *Nature* **143**, 680 (1939).

emitted by the source is indicated by the activity of the solution in the tank when the irradiation is carried out with empty cans surrounding the source. We obtained a measure of this number by taking into account that in our solution about 20 percent of the neutrons are captured by manganese and the rest by hydrogen. In order to obtain, in the same units, a measure of the number of neutrons absorbed by uranium we proceeded in the following way: A mixture of sand and manganese powder, having the same thermal neutron absorption as uranium oxide replaced the uranium oxide in $\frac{1}{4}$ of the cans which were distributed uniformly among the other uranium oxide-filled cans. After irradiation, all this powder was mixed together, a ten-percent MnSO_4 solution was prepared from a sample, and its activity was measured with our ionization chamber.

In this way we found that about 50 percent of the neutrons emitted by the source are absorbed as thermal neutrons by uranium in our arrangement. It follows that, if uranium absorbed only thermal neutrons, the observed ten-percent increase in activity obtained with uranium present would correspond to an average emission of about 1.2 neutrons per thermal neutron absorbed by uranium. This number should be increased, to perhaps 1.5, by taking into account the neutrons which, in our particular arrangement, are absorbed at resonance in the nonthermal region by uranium, without causing neutron emission.

From this result we may conclude that a nuclear chain reaction could be maintained in a system in which neutrons are slowed down without much absorption until they reach thermal energies and are then mostly absorbed by uranium rather than by another element. It remains an open question, however, whether this holds for a system in which hydrogen is used for slowing down the neutrons.

In such a system the absorption of neutrons takes place in three different ways: The neutrons are absorbed at thermal energies, both by hydrogen and uranium, and they are also absorbed by uranium at resonance before they are slowed down to thermal energies. Our result is independent of the ratio of the concentrations of hydrogen and uranium, insofar as it shows that, for thermal neutrons, the ratio of the cross

section for neutron production and neutron absorption in uranium is greater than one, and probably about 1.5. What fraction of the neutrons will reach thermal energies without being absorbed will, however, depend on the ratio of the average concentrations of hydrogen and uranium. Since there is an appreciable absorption even far from the center of the resonance band, it follows that the fraction of neutrons absorbed by uranium at resonance will increase with decreasing hydrogen concentration. This has to be taken into account in discussing the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction in a system composed essentially of uranium and hydrogen. A chain reaction would require that more neutrons be produced by uranium than absorbed by uranium and hydrogen together. In our experiment the ratio of the average concentration of hydrogen to uranium atoms was 17 to 1, and in the experiment of von Halban, Joliot and Kovarski this ratio was 70 to 1. At such concentrations the absorption of hydrogen in the thermal region will prevent a chain reaction. By reducing the concentration of hydrogen one would obtain the following effect: On the one hand a larger fraction of those neutrons which reach thermal energies will be absorbed by uranium; on the other hand fewer neutrons reach the thermal region due to an increased absorption by uranium at resonance. Of these two counteracting factors the first is more important for high hydrogen concentrations and the second is more important for low hydrogen concentrations. Starting with high hydrogen concentrations, the ratio of neutron production to total neutron absorption will thus first rise, then pass through a maximum, and, as the hydrogen concentration is decreased, thereafter decrease. We attempted to estimate the quantities involved from the information available about resonance absorption in uranium⁶⁻⁷ and from the observed net gain of 0.2 in the number of neutrons in our experiment. The effect of the absorption at resonance turns out to be so

⁶ Meitner, Hahn and Strassman, *Zeits. f. Physik* 106, 249 (1937).

⁷ v. Halban, Kovarski and Savitch, *Comptes rendus* 208, 1396 (1939).

⁸ H. L. Anderson and E. Fermi, *Phys. Rev.* 55, 1106 (1939).

large that even at the optimum concentration of hydrogen it is at present quite uncertain whether neutron production will exceed the total neutron absorption. More information concerning the resonance absorption of uranium as well as more accurate measurement of some of the values which enter into our calculation are required before we can conclude whether a chain reaction is possible in mixtures of uranium and water.

We wish to thank Dr. D. W. Stewart, of the Department of Chemistry, and Mr. S. E. Krewer, for advice and assistance in carrying out some of these experiments. We are much indebted to the Eldorado Radium Corporation for enabling us to work with large quantities of uranium oxide in our experiments, and to the Association for Scientific Collaboration for the use of the photo-neutron source and other facilities.

THE ERNEST KEMPTON ADAMS FUND FOR PHYSICAL RESEARCH
OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

REPRINT SERIES

INSTANTANEOUS EMISSION OF FAST NEUTRONS IN
THE INTERACTION OF SLOW NEUTRONS
WITH URANIUM

By

LEO SZILARD AND WALTER H. ZINN

Reprinted from THE PHYSICAL REVIEW, Vol. 55, No. 8, April 15, 1939

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Instantaneous Emission of Fast Neutrons in the Interaction of Slow Neutrons with Uranium*

Recently it became known¹ that uranium can be split by neutrons into two elements of about equal atomic weight. In this fission of uranium the two elements produced have a large neutron excess; moreover they are probably produced in an excited nuclear state. One might therefore expect that these excited fragments instantaneously emit neutrons and that perhaps the number emitted is even larger than one per fission.

One might also expect a delayed emission of neutrons—as was first pointed out by Fermi—if some of the fragments go through one or more beta-transformations before they emit a neutron. Delayed emission of neutrons caused by the action of both slow and fast neutrons on uranium has recently been reported by Roberts, Meyer, and Wang,² who find a period of about 12 seconds.

In order to see if there is an instantaneous emission of neutrons from the fission of uranium we have performed the following experiment. We exposed uranium oxide to neutrons which were slowed down by paraffin wax, using as a source of neutrons a block of beryllium from which photoneutrons were liberated by the gamma-rays of radium. A helium-filled ionization chamber connected to a linear amplifier served as a detector for fast neutrons. The ionization pulses of the chamber were observed visually by means of a cathode-ray oscillograph and were recorded by the usual counting arrangement.

Figure 1 shows a diagram of the experimental arrangement. The ionization chamber is covered by a cadmium sheet cap *G* which prevents the thermal neutrons from penetrating to the helium ionization chamber. A cadmium sheet shield *H*, 0.5 mm thick, is used to cover the cylindrical box *E* which contains 2300 g of uranium oxide. The uranium oxide is screened from the thermal neutrons by this shield and can be exposed to them simply by removing the shield.

We observed about 50 pulses per minute from the helium chamber when we exposed the uranium oxide to the thermal neutrons in the absence of the cadmium shield *H*, but obtained only 5 pulses per minute when the uranium was screened from the thermal neutrons by the cadmium shield. The difference of about 45 pulses per minute we have to attribute to fast neutrons emitted from uranium under the action of thermal neutrons. It is reasonable to assume that this emission of fast neutrons is connected with the fission of uranium.




FIG. 1. Arrangement for the observation of the emission of fast neutrons from uranium. A, Radium. B, Beryllium block. C, Paraffin wax. D, Lead block. E, Box filled with uranium oxide. F, Ionization chamber. G, Cadmium sheet cap. H, Cadmium sheet shield.

Control experiments were carried out in which uranium was replaced by lead. The effect of the presence and absence of the cadmium shield *H* and the cadmium cap *G* was tested.

In order to estimate the number of fast neutrons emitted per fission under the action of thermal neutrons we used an ionization chamber lined with a thick layer of uranium oxide having an area of 25 cm². This uranium chamber was put in place of the helium chamber without otherwise materially changing the experimental arrangement. Under these conditions the uranium chamber gave about 45 fissions per minute. Assuming the range of the fission fragments to be about 0.005 g per cm² in uranium oxide, the observed 45 fissions per minute should occur in a surface layer, weighing 0.13 g, of the thick uranium oxide lining. Accordingly, about 800,000 fissions per minute should occur in the 2300 g of uranium oxide which was used in our experiment. By taking into account the solid angle, the size of the helium chamber and the pressure used, and by assuming that the "fission neutrons" have an average collision cross section in helium of 3.5×10^{-24} cm² we find the number of neutrons emitted per fission to be about two.

This number is of course only a rough estimate; the main cause of uncertainty is the considerable variation of the cross section of helium with the neutron energy in the region around one million volts.³ A hydrogen-filled

ionization chamber is now being used in order to obtain a more accurate estimate. It seems to be established, however, that the order of magnitude is one neutron per fission.

Anderson, Fermi and Hanstein have independently, and by a different method, carried out experiments on the neutron emission connected with the fission of uranium. Our observations are consistent with their results, and we wish to thank them for communicating their results to us before publication.

While from our observations we can only say that the time delay involved in this "instantaneous" neutron emission appears to be less than one second, we should expect, for theoretical reasons, this emission to take place within less than 10^{-14} second.

We have also looked for a delayed emission of fast neutrons by performing the following experiment. The uranium oxide was irradiated for some length of time in the arrangement shown in Fig. 1. Then the radium was quickly removed from the beryllium block and the cathode-ray oscillograph screen was watched for a period of 15 seconds for an indication of a delayed emission of fast neutrons. After the radium is removed there is no gamma-ray background to set a lower limit for the observable helium recoil energy; the only slight background remaining is due to electrical fluctuations of the amplifier. In 50 experiments, corresponding to a total observation time of

more than 12 minutes, we observed only two pulses which may or may not have been due to a delayed emission of fast neutrons. This is to be compared with the emission of 45 fast neutrons per minute, the number observed while the radium is inside the beryllium block. We conclude that, if slow neutrons falling on uranium cause a delayed emission of neutrons which are sufficiently fast for us to observe, their number must be very much smaller than the number of neutrons which we have observed in the instantaneous emission.

We are indebted to Dr. S. Seely for his assistance in carrying out some of these experiments. We wish to thank the Department of Physics of Columbia University for the hospitality and the facilities extended to us, and also wish to thank the Association for Scientific Collaboration for enabling us to use one gram of radium in these experiments.

LEO SZILARD

WALTER H. ZINN

Pupin Physics Laboratories,
Columbia University,
New York, New York,
March 16, 1939.

* Publication assisted by the Ernest Kempton Adams Fund for Physical Research of Columbia University.

¹ O. Hahn and F. Straassmann, *Naturwiss.* 27, 11 (1939); L. Meitner and R. Frisch, *Nature* (February, 1939).

² R. B. Roberts, R. C. Meyer, and P. Wang, *Phys. Rev.* 55, 510 (1939).

³ H. Staub and W. E. Stephens, *Phys. Rev.* 55, 131 (1939).

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JOHN MOYNAHAN & COMPANY, INC.

133 EAST 44TH STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

MURRAY HILL 7-2545

CABLE: MOYNAJON

Public Relations

September 29, 1965

69-453
Miss Elizabeth B. Drewry, Director
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
Hyde Park, New York

Dear Miss Drewry:


Thank you very much for your September 24 letter and the copies of four more letters on nuclear fission. We have carefully noted your statement that literary rights are limited to President Roosevelt's letters and Professor Einstein's 1939 letter to him.

You and Mr. Nixon have been so helpful to us that we should like to do something for you. In his September 9 letter to us, Mr. Nixon said it was not clear whether Leo Szilard's undated memorandum was an enclosure to Einstein's letter or to Sachs's letter. Our researches have revealed the following information, verified by Atomic Energy Commission history on this subject:

The Einstein letter dated August 2, 1939, emerged from conferences between Alexander Sachs and Leo Szilard. Einstein signed it at their request. Sachs asked Szilard to write an accompanying memorandum explaining more fully the underlying science of nuclear fission and stressing chain reaction. Sachs was to deliver both documents to President Roosevelt in an interview with him. President Roosevelt became very preoccupied with the international crisis and was busy trying to win repeal of the arms embargo from a reluctant Congress. Therefore Sachs waited for a more propitious time to see him, and arranged an appointment for October 11. He wrote his October 11 letter, placed it with the Einstein letter and the Szilard memorandum to form a dossier, and went to the White House. At the beginning of the interview, Sachs read his own October 11 letter as President Roosevelt listened, then delivered all three documents to him. As the interview came to a close, President Roosevelt called in his aide, "Pa" Watson, and said, "This requires action."

Therefore the three documents, taken together, may be characterized as a unit — the dossier which set in motion the machinery which produced The Bomb.

Very sincerely yours,


Howard Walls

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LIBRARY

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SAFE FILE: TREASURY DEPARTMENT

Copy

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

October 30, 1939

In reply refer to
EA 862.00/3894

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury and encloses, for his strictly confidential information, a copy of despatch no. 1435 from the American Embassy at Berlin, dated September 28, 1939, transmitting a memorandum of a conversation of Donald R. Heath, Esquire, First Secretary of the Embassy, with Dr. Hjalmar Schacht.

Enclosure:

From Berlin, no. 1435,
September 28, 1939.

DECLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

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COPY

Berlin, September 28, 1939

No. 1435

Subject: Transmitting Memorandum of Conversation
with Dr. Schacht.

~~Confidential~~

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit a memorandum of
a conversation of Donald R. Heath, Esquire, First
Secretary of the Embassy, with Dr. Hjalmar Schacht,
Minister without portfolio, and until January of
this year President of the Reichsbank.

Respectfully yours,

Alexander Kirk
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum

800

DRH/hu

A true copy of
the signed original.
"HU"

268203

Copy of a Copy

Enclosure 1 to despatch No. 1435
dated September 26, 1939, from the
American Embassy, Berlin, Germany.

~~Confidential~~

Memo: To Mr. Kirk.

September 27, 1939.

I had a long talk with Schacht at his home this morning. He began by reviewing his present position in the Government; i.e., he had retained his position as Minister without portfolio in the thought that a situation might eventually arise in which he could, without compromising his own views, be of assistance to the Government. This position was entirely nominal. He had seen no member of the Government since his return from India with the exception of Funk, with whom he had had one conversation. He had not attended the Reichstag meeting on September 1, nor had he been present at the von Fritsch funeral. He said his position was very similar to that of General Beck, former Chief of Staff, who was living in complete retirement in Lichterfelde. Like himself, Beck had maintained his independence and had refused to compromise on questions of principle and fundamental policy.

While he had maintained his ministerial position in the hope that a situation might develop where his services could be utilized, he saw little early likelihood of such an occurrence. His personal relations with Hitler were by no means unfriendly, however, and his farewell
interview

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RECORDED
UNCLASSIFIED

interview last January had been in an atmosphere of respect, although not one of cordiality. Hitler was not ungrateful for what he had accomplished but could not forgive his refusal to become a real member of the Party. In previous years, he said, Hitler had personally besought him on several occasions to identify himself with the Party. He could understand that attitude because Hitler depended on the Party and could not remain in power without it. He, however, had certain principles, and the fact was that most of the Party leaders were not very honest men or, if they were, they were fanatics. This was the case of Hess, who was unquestionably honest but entirely fanatic and limited in outlook. He remarked that the only Party personage who would oppose his return to the Government in time of emergency and was personally inimical to him was Ribbentrop. That was for reasons of difference of policy and personal jealousy. Ribbentrop's policy and influence had certainly contributed to the tragic developments of these last weeks.

The immediate starting point of the present war was Germany's mistake in invading Czechoslovakia last spring. That was where his policy had always been at variance with Ribbentrop's, since he had always held that Germany's predominant interests in southeastern Europe were economic and they could best be achieved by

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a scrupulous respect of the sovereignty of the countries in that area. The war was utterly needless and a mistake in that it resulted in both Russian and German occupation of Poland. It was not to Germany's real interest to have alien minorities nor to have Russia on its borders, but now it would be impossible to restore an independent Poland except through the cooperation of England, France and Germany, a rather unthinkable development, to say the least, under the present circumstances. Russia had not forgotten its idea of Pan-Slavism and through the occupation of Poland and Germany's present obligation, not to say dependence on her, was in a position to push the doctrine not merely in Poland but also in the Balkans, which would not be in Germany's interest.

He regretted the fact that the Party leaders did not have a long-term international outlook or any understanding of international reactions. England would not have opposed Danzig and the Corridor returning to Germany or a rectification of the frontier at other points combined with exchange of populations. England had gone to war because of the methods that had been employed. While he likewise opposed these methods it was also to be said that it was also the fault of England in
being

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being so slow and shortsighted in failing to cooperate with the Streseman government and rectifying at least a part of the intolerable inequities of the Versailles Treaty. If England had then given Germany 10 percent of what Hitler has since taken the present situation and regime would not have arisen. England had also blundered in not taking active measures to solve the remaining critical problems of Europe following the Munich Agreement. Immediately after that agreement England should have come to Hitler and said, "It is agreed to take no step likely to trouble the European situation without consultation and we have come, therefore, to consult about the problems of Danzig and the Corridor and the other difficulties." Had England taken such a step there was a possibility that the present tragedy might have been avoided. He thought that Henderson had been an unfortunate choice as Ambassador in that, until it was too late to stop the march of events, he had given the German Government the impression that England would not really go to war. The previous French Ambassador - Poncet - had been an excellent one - Coulondre's term had been too brief for him to acquire influence.

Turning

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Turning to the economic side he remarked that it was tragic to see Germany losing much of its wealth and losing its trade as, for example, to Japan. He said that he and his successors in economic authority had greatly strengthened the Reich's ability to withstand war. After this remark he made a rather veiled statement in which he said he understood, however, Gamelin's strategy of postponement and that at a given time the war would suddenly blaze out into a "Material Krieg", which, he indicated, would put a great strain on Germany's supply of materials. The implication was obvious that Germany's position as regards eventual sufficiency of war materials was not good. He hoped that in some unforeseen way this useless tragic conflict could be stopped before it reached that point, not only for Germany's good but for the welfare of England and France.

He concluded by saying that he had always held that a régime which crippled freedom of thought and speech and compelled obedience by the exercise of authority to the point of terrorism must eventually disappear, and that it could only maintain itself in a country like Germany while it had a record of success.

success. He added that he was still of that belief but that human beings could endure a great deal and it might be a long time before a change occurred. He himself was no revolutionary or intriguer and all that he would or could do, if opportunity arose, was to counsel a course of moderation and justice.

D.R.H.

DRH/hu

a68a09



PSF *Safe : Treasury*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON

April 1, 1940

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:

The Secretary thought you would be interested in the attached copy of a cable which came through the British Embassy from the Chancellor of the Exchequer explaining the reasons for and the significance of the fall in the dollar-sterling rate in the free market in New York, and expressing views on the criticism which that fall has evoked.

out Bill

268501

(Copy of memorandum handed by Mr. Opie of the British Embassy to Mr. Cochran of the Treasury Department at 6:15 p.m. March 30, 1940 and explained by Mr. Opie as constituting a message from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Secretary of the Treasury)

The following is the substance of a telegram received to-day expressing the views of His Majesty's Government on the reasons for, and the significance of, the fall in the dollar/sterling rate in the free market in New York, and on the criticism which that fall has invoked.

The only practicable correctives that could be undertaken to prevent the fall in the rate are:-

- (i) Direct intervention in support of the rate, thus providing an official demand for sterling on which the market could rely, and
- (ii) measures designed to limit the supply of sterling by immobilising sterling held by neutrals.

Action of the first kind would be to give away with our left hand reserves of foreign exchange which we are trying to conserve with our right. The second course would not only prejudice the international status of sterling as a currency, but it would also seriously penalize willing holders of sterling for the sake of preventing a withdrawal of balances now in foreign hands..

There is no sign at present of any mass withdrawals, and the volume of sales in the free market accounts for only a small fraction of the total transactions in sterling. The fall in sterling is mainly due to our recent measures of export control

/which

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which have the effect of reducing the demand for free sterling and of increasing the proportion of our exports which can be used to pay for imports. The effect of lowering the rate is natural and was expected; what we have done is to strengthen our exchange control, and it would be a travesty to say that by so doing we are deliberately depreciating our currency. On the contrary, weakness in sterling due to the erratic market abroad is the natural corollary of an efficient control over exchange transactions, and it must be expected that despite the effects upon the rate for free sterling we shall continue to strengthen and extend our control in this and other ways.

Criticism which asserts that the fall in the rate is damaging to our prestige is due to the failure to appreciate that the market and the rate are dominated by the official transactions, and that the free markets deal only with a small overflow which we are concerned to diminish but not to manage. The relative unimportance of the movements in the free sterling rate is demonstrated by the advance of the quotation from the low point of 3.44 to 3.60 while this telegram was being drafted. The thinner the market the larger the fluctuations are likely to be.

30th March 1940.

268603



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

PSF
Safe
Treas.

February 13, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I have had the enclosed very confidential chart prepared, based on information secured for me by O. N. I.

Please note that although the imports are below the stated requirements, they are almost equal to those of the first year of the war.

I have asked O. N. I. to please try and get the December figures as soon as possible, because I am under the impression that they will show an improvement.

Yours sincerely,


The President,
The White House.

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

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TONNAGE OF IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM



Cumulative Monthly, Second Year of War Compared with First Year



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UNCLASSIFIED

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PSF
Safe
Treas.



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

For the first time, I have received very highly confidential information as to the disposition of American planes once they leave our factories. I would appreciate it if you would destroy the enclosed statement after reading the same.

We have had a great deal of trouble with both the State Department and the Department of Justice trying to get permission for the English to fly the new Consolidated bomber overseas with English crews. The matter is not yet straightened out. The trouble originated when the State Department filed a complaint with the Department of Justice.

Yours sincerely,

The President,

The White House.

Declassified per T.O. 160
RHP, 1-21-72

a68d01

STATEMENT of AIRCRAFT SHIPPED to U.K.
& OVERSEAS COMMANDS

Type	Destination	Assembly Point	By Sea during week ending Jan. 25.41	By Air during week ending Feb. 15.41
<u>Douglas</u>				
Boston I	-	-	-	-
Boston II	U.K.	U.K.	13	-
<u>Lockheed</u> *				
Hudson I	U.K.	U.K.	1	-
Hudson III	U.K.	U.K.	-	2
Hudson IV	U.K.	U.K.	3	-
Electra	U.K.	U.K.	3	-
<u>Curtiss</u>				
Tomahawk	M.E.	Takoradi	100	-
<u>Glenn Martin</u>				
Maryland	M.E.	Takoradi	20	-
<u>Consolidated</u> *				
PBY	-	-	-	-

British Air Commission
February 19th, 1941

- * The Consolidated PBY's are flown via Bermuda and the Lockheeds via Montcal, Halifax. (This information was given by phone by the British Purchasing Commission at 3:30 p.m., February 20, 1941.)

a68dc2



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

PSF Safe : Treasury

PSF

July 11, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith a chart which
I have had checked by Mr. Lubin.

Please note that in the period from January 5 to July 5, inclusive, the Navy has received only 100 flying boats and the British Empire, 87; that there are only 896 flying boats on order, of which 75 are for the British Empire.

Yours sincerely,

W. M. C. Thompson

The President,
The White House.

Copies to:
Secretary of War
Secretary of the Navy
Mr. Knudsen
Mr. Hillman

a68201

4-Engine Bombers, 2-Engine Bombers, and Flying Boats*

Actual Deliveries January 5 to July 5, 1941, and
Scheduled Deliveries as of July 5, 1941
Covering Orders of the Army, Navy, and British Empire

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Classification and purchaser	Actual deliveries January 5 to July 5, 1941	Unfilled orders as of July 5, 1941	Estimated deliveries of unfilled orders																								Undis- tributed						
			1941												1942													1943					
			July 6 to July 31	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June							
			July 6 to July 31	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June							
4-engine bombers																																	
Army.....	51	3,178	6	9	19	35	43	58	79	86	87	87	91	100	106	108	116	132	145	130	108	130	149	149	145	149	908						
Navy.....	20	139	12	21	23	23	23	13	12	7																							
British Empire.....																																	
Total.....	71	3,317	18	30	42	58	66	76	91	93	87	87	91	100	106	108	116	132	145	130	108	130	149	149	145	149	908						
2-engine bombers																																	
Army.....	280	6,001	54	75	106	171	150	279	329	425	511	465	471	520	510	459	305	305	259	268	60	35					243						
Navy.....																																	
British Empire.....	123	1,915	176	204	137	172	196	163	197	160	160	160	100	90																			
Total.....	1,103	7,924	230	279	243	343	346	442	526	580	675	625	571	610	510	459	305	305	259	268	60	35					243						
Flying boats (4-engine and 2-engine patrol boats)																																	
Army.....	-	74							6	15	22	15	9	6																			
Navy.....	100	747	11	31	22	13	16	10	13	14	23	35	43	51	53	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	30								
British Empire.....	87	75	6	3	8	11	14	16	14	3																							
Total.....	187	896	17	34	30	29	30	26	33	32	45	52	57	57	53	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	30								

Prepared July 8, 1941.

Office of the Secretary of the Treasury, Division of Research and Statistics.

Source: Reports from individual companies.

Note: Lease-lend orders are placed by the Army and Navy and are classified as such rather than by the destined recipient; therefore, the British Empire classification includes only British dollar contract orders.

* Excludes spare parts.

268202

SAFE FILE: United Nations Conference (1)

POLITICAL MEMORANDA

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INDEX

WORLD SECURITY

- 1) The Problem of Voting in the Security Council.

Attachments:

- (a) Analysis of President's formula given to Soviet and British Ambassadors.
 - (b) Letter of January 14 from British Embassy agreeing with President's formula.
- 2) Composition of the Security Council -- status of France.
- 3) Nations to be Invited to the United Nations Conference -- status of six American Associated Nations.
- 4) Conference of American Republics in Mexico City and Discussions with Latin American Ambassadors in Washington.
- 5) Dependent Territories and International Trusteeship.
- 6) The International Court of Justice.
- 7) Liquidation of the League of Nations.

EUROPE

- 1) The necessity of the three principal Allies arriving at a common political program for Liberated countries.
- 2) American policy toward spheres of influence.
- 3) UNRRA
 - (1) Accomplishments and problems.
 - (2) Operations in the Balkans.
 - (3) Relations with the Soviet Government.
- 4) Treatment of Germany (Political).
- 5) Economic policies toward Germany.
- 6) German Reparations.
- 7) Treatment of Austria (Political).
- 8) Economic

a69 Kc01

- 8) Economic treatment of Austria.
- 9) Suggested United States policy regarding Poland.
- 10) Reconstruction of Poland and the Balkans.
- 11) General Balkan policy.
- 12) American position on Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.
- 13) Reparation policy with reference to Rumania and Hungary.
- 14) Principal Albanian problems.
- 15) Principal Bulgarian problems.
- 16) Principal Hungarian problems.
- 17) Principal Rumanian problems.
- 18) Principal Yugoslav problems.
- 19) United States policy toward Italy.
- 20) France
 - (1) Role in United Nations Councils.
 - (2) Zone of Occupation in Germany.
 - (3) Control Machinery for Germany.
 - (4) Attitude toward future German economy.
- 21) Rearming of French Forces.
- 22) French views on treatment of Germany.
- 23) Czechoslovakia.
- 24) Russian request for financing of acquisitions of capital equipment during and after the war.
- 25) The needs of Great Britain for financial aid during Phase III.
- 26) Post-war trade policy (Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreements).
- 27) British plan for a Western European Bloc.

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA

1) Turkey

Memorandum regarding the question of the Turkish Straits.

269c02

2) Greece

- 2) Greece
 - (a) Allied support of regency and possible tripartite commission to supervise plebiscite and elections in Greece.
 - (b) Necessity of Russian Agreement to oppose aggression against Greece in guise of a movement for Macedonian independence.
 - (c) Bulgaria's restitution of Greek property and delivery to Greece of supplies for relief and rehabilitation.
- 3) Lebanon and Syria

Necessity of encouraging the French to confirm the independence of Lebanon and Syria and of opposing any French attempt to reassert mandatory powers.
- 4) Palestine
 - (a) Suggested procedure regarding the Palestine question.
 - (b) Extract regarding Palestine from report of Culbertson Mission to Near East.
- 5) Saudi Arabia
 - (a) King Ibn Saud.
 - (b) Undesirability of discussions on a tripartite basis.
- 6) Iran
 - (a) American policy in Iran.
 - (b) Problem of oil concession in Iran.
 - (c) Desirability of limiting or removing Allied military censorship in Iran.
 - (d) Suggested international trusteeship to operate Iranian railways and free port on Persian Gulf.
- 7) India

Suggested action for improvement in Indian political situation.
- 8) Southeast Asia

Imperialism versus an enlightened colonial policy in the area of the South East Asia Command.
- 9) Morocco

Future status of Tangier.

a69c03

FAR EAST

FAR EAST

- 1) China
 - (a) Political and military situation if U.S.S.R. enters war in Far East.
 - (b) Unity of Anglo-American-Soviet policy.
 - (c) Short-range objectives and policies.
 - (d) Long-range objectives and policies.
- 2) Inter-Allied consultation regarding Japan.
- 3) Inter-Allied consultation regarding Korea.
- 4) Future status of Thailand.
- 5) Indochina.

LATIN AMERICA

- 1) Policy toward Argentina.
- 2) Soviet Union in relation to the Other American Republics.
- 3) British activities in the Other American Republics.
- 4) Main factors affecting present relations with the Other American Republics.
- 5) Current situation in the Other American Republics.

269c04

WORLD SECURITY

1. The Problem of Voting in the Security Council.

Attachments:

(a) Analysis of President's formula given to Soviet and British Ambassadors

(b) Letter of January 14 from British Embassy agreeing with President's formula

2. Composition of the Security Council -- status of France.

3. Nations to be Invited to the United Nations Conference -- status of six American Associated Nations.

4. Conference of American Republics in Mexico City and Discussions with Latin American Ambassadors in Washington.

5. Dependent Territories and International Trusteeship.

6. The International Court of Justice.

7. Liquidation of the League of Nations.

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PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Summary

1. President's formula calls for unanimity in most cases.

Unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council, under the voting formula proposed by the President on December 5, 1944, would prevail in six categories of decisions having political and enforcement character. It would also prevail in the remaining category of decisions involving promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, except when one of the permanent members is a party to a dispute.

2. Soviet proposal would increase domestic United States opposition.

The proposed formula, or its basic principle, seems more clearly essential to us now than heretofore. Our talks with members of Congress, and groups and individuals throughout the country, indicate that its abandonment would gravely alienate many sincere supporters of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and would provide perfectionists and isolationists with a powerful weapon against American participation in the Organization. It is furthermore disturbing that acceptance by us of the straight unanimity rule would be interpreted as surrender to Russia, whose rigid advocacy of that rule is widely known.

3. Soviet proposal is opposed by small nations.

At the same time, our discussions with representatives of other American republics and United Nations have disclosed the strongest official opposition to the straight unanimity rule. It may be difficult, if not impossible, for their governments to secure popular support for entrance into an international organization which, with such a rule, would bear every earmark of a great-power alliance. It appears that all of them would be bitterly disillusioned, that some may stay out, and that under such a rule various smaller nations after joining the organization may feel obliged to align themselves with great powers, which would render the organization undependable and unstable.

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THE PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I

To bring the problem into its proper perspective, the question of voting procedure in the Security Council must be considered in relation to the functions and powers to be assigned to the Council and, therefore, to the type of substantive decisions which the Council might be called upon to make. The various types of decisions are listed in the attached memorandum, in which they are grouped into seven categories.

Under the voting formula proposed by the President, unanimity of the permanent members would always be required for all categories of decisions except one: in those decisions involving promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, a permanent member of the Council would not cast a vote if it is a party to the dispute in question.

This exception is based upon the principle that the procedures involved under the excepted category would be quasi-judicial in character, and in such procedures no nation should be placed above the law in an organization based fundamentally on the principle of equality under the law. The rule of unanimity should always prevail under the other six categories of decisions because the procedures involved are of a political character and may require the use of force. In such procedures there is every justification for placing the permanent members in a special position since they must bear the principal responsibility for action in the maintenance of peace and security.

While it is clear that, in general, the rule of unanimity of the permanent members is necessary, the proposed voting formula--or, at least, its basic principle--is essential from our point of view. It amply safeguards our basic national interests. Its abandonment would weaken rather than strengthen our position, both at home and abroad, and would cause us no end of trouble.

Our talks with members of Congress and with many individuals and groups throughout the country clearly

indicate

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indicate that failure to provide for at least this much of a modification of the unanimity rule would be profoundly deplored by many sincere supporters of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. There is strong evidence that it would become a powerful weapon in the hands of both the perfectionists and the isolationists. Moreover, acceptance by us of a straight unanimity rule would inevitably be interpreted as surrender to Russia. These factors might well jeopardize our chances for adequate public and Congressional support in this country.

At the same time, our discussions with representatives of the American Republics and of other United Nations have already disclosed their strong opposition to the straight unanimity rule. All of them have indicated that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for their governments to secure whole-hearted support on the part of their peoples for an international organization which would thus, in popular estimation, have every earmark of a great-power alliance. Without at least some such provision as is contained in the proposed voting formula, all of them will be bitterly disillusioned, and some of them may even decide to stay out. Furthermore, under these conditions, the smaller nations, even after joining the organization, might well seek to align themselves with the various great powers and thus render the whole system precarious and unstable.

Taken in conjunction with the fact that we may have to acquiesce in some unsatisfactory peace settlements, all this would inevitably impair both our moral prestige and our political leadership in the world and might come perilously close to defeating the great cause in which we are now exercising so vigorous a leadership.

Soviet Russia's case against the proposed formula is extremely weak. Under the proposal, she--as well as we and each of the other three permanent members--would have veto power in the following decisions:

1. Admission of new members;
2. Suspension and expulsion of members;
3. Determination of the existence of a threat to the peace or of a breach of the peace;
4. Use

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4. Use of force or the application of other measures of enforcement;
5. Approval of agreements for the provision of armed forces;
6. All matters relating to the regulation of armaments;
7. Determination of whether a regional arrangement is consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

So long as this is so, Soviet Russia has more to gain than to lose, just as have we--in stature, in prestige, in leadership, and in prospects for a successful and effective world order--by agreeing to place herself on an equal footing with all other countries before the bar of world opinion as regards efforts on the part of the new organization to bring about peaceful settlement of whatever controversies may arise between her and other countries.

II

The manner in which the proposed voting formula would safeguard our basic national interests may be seen from the following concrete example. If the United States were to become involved in a dispute with Mexico, and if Mexico or some other country were to bring the situation to the attention of the Security Council on the plea that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace, the United States would accept the Council's decisions made without its participation, by a vote of the other permanent members and at least two non-permanent members only on the following questions:

1. Whether the matter should be investigated by the Council;
2. If an investigation is made, whether, on the basis of its results, the dispute should be considered to be of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;
3. Whether the Council should call on the United States and Mexico to settle or adjust the dispute by means of their own choice;

4. Whether,

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4. Whether, if the United States and Mexico, having failed to settle the dispute by means of their own choice, refer it--as they are obligated to do--to the Council, the latter should make a recommendation to them as to methods and procedures of settlement;
5. Whether the circumstances require that such a recommendation be made by the Council before the dispute is referred to it by the parties;
6. What should be the nature of the recommendation;
7. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;
8. Whether the dispute does in fact arise out of a matter which, by international law, is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States when the United States claims that this is the case;
9. Whether, if there exists a regional inter-American agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, the Council should ask such an agency to concern itself with the dispute in question;
10. Whether the matter should be referred by the Council to the General Assembly for consideration and recommendation.

Once the situation gets beyond the field of conciliation and of efforts at peaceful settlement, and the Security Council is confronted with the question as to whether or not the dispute between the United States and Mexico constitutes a threat to the peace, the United States would resume the right to cast its vote in the Council's decisions. The right of the United States to cast its vote under the unanimity rule in all other substantive decisions of the Council would, of course, remain unimpaired throughout.

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NOTE: Copies of this document were given informally to the Soviet and British Ambassadors in Washington shortly after January 15, 1945.

~~SECRET~~

January 15, 1945

PRINCIPAL SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS
ON WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL
WOULD HAVE TO VOTE

Under the voting formula proposed by the President, all of the decisions listed below would require the affirmative votes of 7 members of the Security Council, including the votes of the permanent members. The only exception would be that, in the event that a permanent member is a party to a dispute or a situation before the Council, that member would not cast its vote in decisions listed under "Promotion of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" (Category III below).

I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

1. Admission of new members;
2. Suspension of a member;
3. Expulsion of a member;
4. Election of the Secretary General.

II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

III. Promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, including the following questions:

1. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council's attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;
2. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;
3. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

4. Whether

RECORDED
UNCLASSIFIED

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4. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;
5. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.

IV. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:


1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;
2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;
3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;
4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

V. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.

VI. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

VII. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

a69d08



BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

14th January, 1945

Dear Leo,

In confirmation of my telephone message of yesterday, I am writing, on the Ambassador's instructions, to inform you that His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the President's proposed compromise on voting on the Security Council of the World Organization.

His Majesty's Government are still not entirely clear as to the precise effect of the application to paragraph 1 Chapter 8, Section C of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of the rule that parties to a dispute should not vote, but they do not anticipate any difficulty on this score.

The Foreign Office ask us to recall to you that the question of voting is not the only one that remains to be settled before a United Nations Conference could be called, and that all difficulties will not probably have been got out of the way before the next Three Power meeting. This must unfortunately militate against going ahead too precipitately. The Foreign Office also recall that the idea was that the invitation to the Conference should be sent out in the names of the Three (or Four) Powers. Consultation between us would consequently be required before the invitation actually issues.

Yours sincerely,

Michael Lough

Mr. Leo Pasvolsky,
Department of State of the United States
Washington, D.C.

269d09

COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

PRESENT PROPOSAL

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provide that the Security Council should be composed of eleven members, of which the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China and, in due course, France, would have permanent seats. Six other states would be elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, which states would not be immediately eligible for reelection.

CHANGED STATUS OF FRANCE

The condition attached to French tenure of a permanent seat has been met by virtue of recognition of the French Provisional Government, of that Government's having become a full member of the European Advisory Commission, and of its having signed the United Nations Declaration. The other permanent members should, accordingly, reach prompt agreement that hereafter they will treat France as one of the powers sponsoring the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals if France so desires.

POSSIBILITY OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS PROPOSING CHANGES

It is not believed that the Soviet Union will raise questions about the present Proposals for the composition of the Security Council.

It is considered more likely that Great Britain may advance recommended changes in the present Proposals which would recognize the right of the medium-sized powers to something akin to semi-permanent seats, based on their greater ability to assist in the maintenance of international peace and security through military action. It is believed that any such proposal should be resisted.

269d10

NATIONS TO BE INVITED TO THE
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

During the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations it was assumed that the nations to be invited to the United Nations Conference for the drafting of the Charter of the General International Organization would be the initial or founding members of the Organization, but the question of which nations should be invited was left open.

We took the position that both the United Nations and the nations associated with the United Nations should be invited. The Chinese agreed with us.

The Soviet representatives maintained the position that the Conference should be restricted to the United Nations, but did not rule out the possibility that the associated nations might be admitted to membership in the Organization immediately after the United Nations had signed.

The British representatives did not object to the American position, suggesting only that additional states might desirably be invited to be initial members though not to take part in the Conference.

The British since then have seemed to feel that the problem is particularly an American one; six of the associated nations are American Republics, the other two being Egypt and Iceland. The six American countries are: Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Although we are suggesting to these six countries the desirability of their adhering to the United Nations Declaration, special problems in each country make such action unlikely for some months.

The question of which nations should be invited to the Conference may arise in discussion of the voting problem since, apparently, the Soviet view was advanced chiefly for bargaining in that connection. The question will more certainly arise if the voting problem is solved, since such agreement will remove the main obstacle to calling the Conference.

Should this development occur, it is recommended that this Government maintain its previous position. If we cannot obtain concurrence with it, the preferable

alternative

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alternative would be to invite the associated nations to send observers, if possible with right to present views, and to sign the Charter immediately after the United Nations have signed.

In order to provide for admission of other states, prior to the coming into force of the Charter, it is recommended that the Charter be held open for adherence by certain states, agreed upon through consultation, in the category of adhering signatories.

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CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN REPUBLICS IN
MEXICO CITY AND DISCUSSIONS WITH
LATIN AMERICAN AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON

Should Prime Minister Churchill or Marshall Stalin raise any question about either of the above subjects, the following background material may be helpful.

Mexico City Conference

The Conference, which will convene February 21, is not a regular Consultative Meeting of American Foreign Ministers. It is being held, however, in accordance with the practice of the American republics to consult together on matters of mutual interest. No such general meeting having been held since that at Rio de Janeiro in January, 1942, a demand for a meeting has been growing during the past year in the other American republics. The agenda for the Conference is as follows:

- I. Further cooperative measures for the prosecution of the war to complete victory.
- II. Consideration of problems of international organization for peace and security.
 - A. World organization
 - B. The further development of the inter-American system, and its relations to world organization.
- III. Consideration of the economic and social problems of the Americas.
 - A. War and transitional Economic cooperation
 - B. Consideration of methods of further cooperation for the improvement of economic and social conditions of the peoples of the Americas with the end of raising their general standard of living.
- IV. Other factors of general and immediate concern to the participating Governments.

Attention may be given to the Argentine problem.

With respect to plans for world organization, it is the objective of this Government to have a full discussion

of

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of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals at the Conference, and no commitment inconsistent with the proposals will be assumed by this Government at the Conference.

Discussions with Latin American Ambassadors

This Government has followed the same policy in discussing the Dumbarton Oaks proposals with the Ambassadors of the other American republics in Washington at a series of meetings during the fall and winter which have had the same objective of enabling the other republics to express their views, and of winning support for the proposals.

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DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

The Department has tentatively formulated, for use when approved, a Draft Plan for International Trusteeship, a Draft Plan for Regional Advisory Commissions for Dependent Areas, and a Draft Declaration Regarding Administration of Dependent Areas.

No discussion with other governments has as yet occurred regarding these papers. While we were prepared to transmit a proposal on trusteeship prior to the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, this part of our Tentative Proposals was taken out at the instance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who in the light of circumstances last summer feared that embarrassing territorial discussions might result. Accordingly, no formal discussion occurred during those Conversations. However, the British, Soviet, and Chinese representatives informally expressed much interest in the matter, and it was understood that this question would be considered later as one of the questions left open.

Our Draft Plans are being submitted to review, in the light of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, by the Secretary's Staff Committee and by the War and Navy Departments for presentation to the President before communication to other governments. Their essential points are summarized below.

Categories of Dependent Territories.--Dependent areas should be divided, for reasons of status and corresponding difference in degree and directness of international concern, into two categories: (a) trust (or mandated) territories whose special status makes it desirable to place them under the authority of the general international organization as trustee; and (b) other dependent territories whose control by individual states is recognized pending their development toward self-government to the fullest extent of the capacity of the dependent people.

Declaration of Principles.--The authorities responsible for the administration of dependent territories should agree upon a general declaration of principles designed to establish minimum

political

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political, economic, and social standards applicable to all non-self-governing territories, whether colonies, protectorates, or trust territories.

These principles should be formulated in accord with two essential assumptions: (1) that the welfare of dependent peoples and the development of the resources of dependent territories should be recognized as of proper concern to the international community at large; and (2) that states responsible for the administration of dependent territories should recognize the principle of some measure of accountability to the international community for such administration.

A Trusteeship Mechanism.--A trusteeship mechanism should be provided by which the international organization would succeed to the rights, titles, and interests of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and to the rights and responsibilities of the League of Nations with respect to the mandates. It should also be given authority over certain territories which may be detached from the present enemy states, and over any other territories which by agreement may be placed under its control.

Regional Advisory Commissions.--Regional advisory commissions should be established, wherever practicable, in regions in which dependent territories are numerous, to assist the responsible authorities in the discharge of their international accountability for such territories together with their obligation to develop the resources and promote the welfare of these territories and their peoples. The regional advisory commissions should as a general rule have wide membership, including states which hold colonies in a given region, independent states and certain advanced dependent territories in the region, and other states which have major strategic or economic interests in the region. They should be entitled to call on the general organization and on specialized economic or social agencies related to the general international organization for advice and assistance and should make reports available to the general organization and related agencies.

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~ISO 28g
July 19, 1944DRAFT DECLARATION REGARDING ADMINISTRATION
OF DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

The United Nations and the Nations associated with them

Having regard for the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter and in the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942;

Desiring to give in dependent territories effective application of those principles and provisions of existing international conventions and agreements which have promoted and which may be expected to promote the social, economic, and political advancement of dependent peoples;

Realizing that economic development and stability in dependent territories are closely related to the welfare of the world community and to the preservation of world peace;

Being convinced that the well-being of the world requires the protection of dependent peoples against aggression and imposes upon these peoples and upon the administering authorities a mutual obligation to comply with the requirements of world security;

Reaffirming the intention to assist in the development of the capacities of dependent peoples with a view to realization by them of reasonable aspirations which may be theirs to participate in and contribute to the progress of the world community;

jointly declare that:

I Political

U.S. GOVERNMENT

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I

Political Development

1. It is the duty of all authorities responsible for the administration of dependent peoples to foster the development of political institutions suited to their needs and to develop in them the capacity for self-government. To this end they should:

- (a) Safeguard the political and civil rights of the inhabitants of dependent territories, including freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and of worship and religious teaching;
- (b) Give due consideration, in the evolution of forms of self-government, to the cultural development and traditional institutions of the people;
- (c) Promote the development of organs of local self-government, the extension of the franchise where and as feasible, and the increasing participation of the people in the various branches of government and public service and in the activities of any regional institutions which may be established in the area; and
- (d) Arrange, with due consideration always for the wider interests of the world community, that peoples which desire to be self-governing and which have acquired and have demonstrated adequate capacity, shall become self-governing, on the basis either of independence or of autonomous association with other peoples within a state or a grouping of states.

2. It is the duty of those peoples which aspire to self-government or to independence to make every effort to prepare themselves for the corresponding duties and responsibilities and to demonstrate their capacity to maintain stable government and to safeguard political and civil rights of the inhabitants.

II Economic

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II

Economic Development

1. The economic development of dependent territories should be conducted in a manner which will safeguard and promote the interests of the inhabitants and give due consideration to the interests of the world at large. To this end all authorities responsible for the administration of dependent territories should:

- (a) Promote rational use of resources, with such diversification of production and distribution as may best serve that purpose; and make available to all peoples without discrimination, but with due regard to the rights and interests of the dependent peoples and to the requirements of world security and peace, the resources, products, and economic opportunities of dependent territories;
- (b) Protect dependent peoples against loss of their lands and occupations; assist them to become progressively competent to manage their own economic affairs, subject only to the requirements of a sound international economy; and aid them to participate on fair terms in world trade; and
- (c) Facilitate access by dependent peoples to capital and technical assistance needed for sound economic development.

2. The administering authorities in each territory should apply, as far as practicable, the provisions of all generally accepted international agreements wherein principles of equality of commercial treatment, of freedom of transit and navigation, or of similar practices are affirmed or elaborated.

III Social

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XII

Social Development

1. The administering authorities in each territory should promote the health, education, and general social development of the dependent peoples thereof.

2. The administering authorities should, so far as feasible, apply the provisions of generally accepted agreements relating to these matters, including relevant portions of the Treaty of St. Germain, 1919, relating to the Congo Basin; the Opium Conventions of 1912 and 1931; the Slavery Convention of 1926; and the Social Policy in Dependent Territories Recommendation, 1944.

IV

The Obligation to Report

The administering authorities in each territory should publish annually and make available to other governments and to appropriate general or regional international organizations a full report upon the political, economic, and social conditions within that territory and upon all efforts being made to give effect to this Declaration.

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November 21, 1944.

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ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP

Section A SCOPE AND PURPOSES

1. The Organization, on behalf of the world community, should establish under its own authority a system of international trusteeship for the administration and supervision of certain non-self-governing territories. The Organization, as trustee, would (a) succeed to the rights, titles, and interests of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers under the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Lausanne and to the rights and responsibilities of the League of Nations under the Covenant with respect to the non-self-governing territories detached from previous sovereignties in 1919, and (b) acquire authority over certain territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the present war. By action of the General Assembly the system might be extended in whole or in part to any territories at the request of states having control over such territories. Italy and Japan should be required by the terms of the peace settlement to relinquish all their rights, titles, and interests in the present mandated territories.

2. The basic objectives of the trusteeship system should be: (a) to promote, in accordance with the provisions of a declaration to be agreed upon, the political, economic, and social advancement of the trust territories and their inhabitants and their progressive development toward self-government; (b) to provide non-discriminatory treatment in trust territories for appropriate activities of the nationals of all member states; and (c) to further international peace and security.

Section B STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION

1. The responsibilities of trusteeship should be vested in the General Assembly. Supervision of the authority administering each trust territory should be exercised by a Trusteeship Council responsible to the

General

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General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council should be composed of persons of special competence designated (a) one each by states and international mixed commissions administering trust territories and (b) one each by an equal number of other states named for three-year periods by the General Assembly. Decisions by the Trusteeship Council should be taken by a majority of those present and voting. The Trusteeship Council should make arrangements for representatives of appropriate specialized organizations or agencies to participate in its deliberations, their votes being recorded but not counted.

3. There should be attached to the Trusteeship Council a permanent secretariat of experts, with adequate fact-finding powers, to provide technical advice and assistance to the Trusteeship Council and to the General Assembly upon its request.

4. The administering authority over each trust territory should be a state or a specially constituted international mixed commission. Each territory administered under a mandate, except the islands formerly administered by Japan and mandated territories which shall have achieved their independence, should be administered under these trusteeship arrangements by the state which now administers it, unless in a particular case or cases some other disposal is made by the Organization.

5. Each territory should be governed in accordance with a territorial charter, which should constitute the fundamental law of the territory defining the rights and obligations of the parties concerned. Each charter should be so drawn as to take into account the special circumstances of each territory.

Section C POWERS

1. The General Assembly should be empowered:
 - a. to call for and to act upon the reports, recommendations, and decisions of the

Trusteeship

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Trusteeship Council;

- b. by a two-thirds vote to adopt the initial territorial charters, to amend such charters, to designate the administering authorities, to remove the authorities for cause, to determine the conditions of termination, and to terminate trusteeship of any territory;
- c. to institute investigations into any aspect of the trusteeship system;
- d. to authorize representation of the Organization on any regional or technical commission within whose sphere of responsibility a trust territory may be situated;
- e. to encourage and facilitate cooperation between the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council and between the administering authorities and the economic, social, and other organizations or agencies brought into relationship with the Organization; and
- f. to assign to the Trusteeship Council such powers and functions, in addition to those listed in paragraph 2 below, as may be deemed desirable.

2. The Trusteeship Council, exercising general supervision over trust territories, should be empowered:

- a. to advise the authorities administering trust territories;
- b. to call for and examine reports from the administering authorities;
- c. to interrogate representatives of those authorities;
- d. to receive petitions and to hear petitioners in person;

e. to

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- e. to recommend or pass upon economic projects of more than a minor local character and to conduct investigations relevant to such projects;
- f. to conduct periodic inspections in the trust territories;
- g. to make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding the territorial charters, the administering authorities, and other aspects of the trusteeship system;
- h. to assist the Security Council at its request;
- i. to make public its records and reports; and
- j. to adopt its own rules of procedure and the method of selecting its President.

Section D
PROCEDURES

1. The financial position of each trust territory should be reviewed periodically by the Trusteeship Council. The costs of administration should in general be met from the regular revenues of the trust territory, and the costs of supervision should be provided in the budget of the Organization.

2. The administering authorities should cooperate fully in the application of any international security measures specified by the Security Council.

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October 18, 1944.DRAFT PROPOSAL
REGIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSIONSA. PURPOSE

1. The welfare of dependent peoples and the resources of dependent territories are of proper concern to the international community at large. The establishment of regional advisory commissions in regions characterized by the presence of numerous dependent territories would be one means whereby states responsible for dependent territories could recognize such concern and could discharge their obligation to promote the welfare of dependent peoples through international cooperative effort.

2. The regional advisory commissions should have as their primary purpose the promotion of the political, economic, and social welfare of the peoples inhabiting the region.

B. MEMBERSHIP AND
STRUCTURE

1. Membership in the regional commissions should consist of states responsible for the administration of dependent territories in the region, independent states

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within the region, dependent territories in the region which have attained a considerable degree of self-government, and other states having major economic or strategic interests in the region. The general international organization should be represented on any regional commission within whose sphere of responsibility a trust territory may be situated.

2. Each regional commission should operate on the basis of an agreement between its members. With a view to the progressive advancement of the dependent peoples, such an agreement should incorporate a statement of the principles which would guide those members responsible for the administration of the dependent territories within the region.

3. The members of the regional commissions should designate official representatives to serve as commissioners. The number of commissioners to be designated by the members of each regional commission should be specified in the basic agreement.

4. The regional commissions should be responsible within their terms of reference for the formulation of policy and the initiation of programs and recommendations. Each commission should appoint a secretary-general and provide for a joint permanent secretariat, composed of

experts

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experts on the problems of the region. The secretary-general should be charged with the preparation of memoranda and reports, with the organization of conferences, and with the administrative functions of the commission. The headquarters of each commission should be located within the region.

5. The regional commissions should have technical research agencies and such other committees, regional offices, conferences, and development agencies as may be found essential for the effective discharge of their responsibilities.

6. The members administering the dependent territories in the region should, to the extent feasible, include as commissioners, representatives of the peoples native to the region. In the secretariat and auxiliary agencies of the commissions, to the extent consistent with the effective functioning of such bodies, qualified personnel should also be drawn from the peoples native to the region.

C. TERMS OF REFERENCE
AND AUTHORITY

1. The regional commissions should undertake to encourage and strengthen social and economic cooperation within the region. They should stimulate technical research on the problems of the area, develop regional

self-help,

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self-help, and avoid unnecessary duplication in research.

2. The regional commissions should be empowered to make recommendations to the respective members relating to the problems of common concern to the given region and to request and review annual or special reports on subjects within the competence of the commissions from members administering dependant territories in the region. The commissions should be empowered to reach agreements, subject to acceptance by their respective members, on budgetary arrangements, personnel, and other administrative details pertaining to the commissions.

3. The official representatives of the regional commissions should for purposes of gathering information essential to the work of the commissions, and subject to prior notification to the authorities concerned, enjoy the privilege of free access to the dependent territories of any member in the region.

D. PROCEDURE

1. Each regional advisory commission should adopt its own rules of procedure, including provision for new members.

2. Each regional commission should prepare reports periodically on the work of the commission for submission

to

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to its members and for the information of the general international organization and the public.

E. AREAS OF POSSIBLE APPLICATION

Regional advisory commissions might be considered as practicable for the following general regions:

The Caribbean

Central and South Pacific

Southeast Asia

West Africa

East and Central Africa

Southern Africa

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PW Ireland

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THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSALS

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provide that: (1) an international court of justice should be established as the principal judicial organ of the Organization; (2) the court should have a statute which should be annexed to the Charter of the Organization; (3) all members of the Organization should ipso facto be parties to the statute; (4) states not members of the Organization should be permitted to become parties to the statute upon conditions laid down by the General Assembly upon recommendation by the Security Council; and (5) the statute should be either (a) the statute of the present Permanent Court of International Justice with such modifications as may be desirable, or (b) a new statute based upon the present Statute.

PRESENT STATUS OF THE PROBLEM

It was suggested informally during the Conversations that prior to the United Nations Conference a preliminary meeting of jurists be held for the purpose of drafting the statute of the court and formulating plans for its establishment, to be submitted to that conference. No definite agreement was reached on this suggestion, and there was no detailed discussion of the content of the proposed statute nor of the possible means by which it might be put into effect. The United States delegation handed informally to the other delegations a tentative revised draft of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice as a possible basis for future consideration.

The preliminary meeting of jurists, and, subsequently, the Conference, will therefore be faced with complex legal and practical problems resulting from the fact that the Permanent Court of International Justice is still an organization in being, and that the adoption either of a new statute or a revision of the present Statute will necessarily involve the interests of states which will not be initial members of the organization. These include eight enemy states or states under armistice, and six neutral states. Since no decision was reached during the Conversations on the time for the proposed meeting of jurists, on its composition, or on its terms of reference,

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these questions will presumably be decided by agreement between the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China.

RECOMMENDED PROCEDURE

If this matter arises for consideration, it is recommended that the following procedure be favored: (1) the convening of the meeting of jurists immediately upon the issuance of invitations to the United Nations Conference; (2) the meeting to consist of about fifteen jurists selected on the basis of technical competence by agreement among the four powers; (3) their terms of reference to be (a) the preparation for submission to the Conference of a statute for the court, on the basis of the present Statute, leaving for decision at the United Nations Conference the question whether it is to be treated as a revision of the present Statute, or as a new one, and (b) the preparation for submission to the Conference of alternative procedures for putting the statute into effect.

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LIQUIDATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ACTION AT DUMBARTON OAKS

The question of the dissolution of the League of Nations and the transition from it to the United Nations Organization was discussed informally by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and China at Dumbarton Oaks, October 7, 1944. It was informally agreed that papers on the subject should be exchanged, no date being set for the exchange. As this Government is not a member of the League it has preferred to await the initiative of the other Governments in this matter. No papers have been received. A copy of a paper prepared in the Department is attached.

ACTION OF THE LEAGUE'S SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE

Early in December 1944 the Supervisory Committee of the League met in London and appointed a committee of three consisting of Mr. Hambro (Norway), Mr. Bruce (Australia), and Mr. Castillo Najera (Mexico), to select a Conciliation Committee for the purpose of conferring with such group as might be designated by the United Nations Conference to deal with questions arising out of the dissolution of the League and the transfer of functions to the new Organization.

Previous to this London meeting, on November 23 the Mexican Ambassador, Chairman of the Supervisory Committee, expressed the hope to Mr. Stettinius that when the contemplated Conciliation Committee should meet with the designated United Nations group at the forthcoming United Nations Conference, the United States would appoint an expert to consult with the Committee. The Acting Secretary made no commitment on this point, but said the matter would be borne in mind.

After the London meeting, on December 23 the Mexican Ambassador informed Mr. Stettinius of the action taken by the Supervisory Committee and stated that the Conciliation Committee would be ready to meet with the designated United Nations group at their convenience. The Secretary made no comment and explained that no plans could be

made

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made for such a meeting until a time had been set for a United Nations Conference to consider the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.

It is expected that the League Supervisory Committee at a meeting scheduled for January 19, 1945 in London will discuss the matter of the liquidation of the League generally and decide what preparatory work should be undertaken for a further meeting to be held probably in July at which a report will be presented for adoption.

RECOMMENDED PROCEDURE

It is recommended that no initiative be taken by the United States with respect to the liquidation of the League. The question should be left for consideration at the United Nations Conference, unless a different procedure is initiated by the United Kingdom and/or by China, both of which are members of the League.

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TRANSITION FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

I. THE PROBLEM

Establishment of a new general international organization in place of the League of Nations will raise three important problems respecting the League of Nations: (1) how the League of Nations may be legally terminated in favor of the new organization; (2) how its properties and any of its functions, aside from those vested in the League by separate agreements, may be transferred to the new organization; and (3) how the functions vested in the League by separate agreements may also be transferred. It is desirable that these problems be clarified and, if possible, steps be taken to avoid uncertainty and confusion when the new organization is established.

The problem arises because the Covenant of the League of Nations still constitutes a binding obligation upon the states members of the League, and unless the League is terminated concurrently with the establishment of the new organization these states may be faced with conflicting legal obligations to two general international organizations. Moreover, there would exist some possibility that a few states might endeavor to maintain the League of Nations, in which event there would be two organizations endeavoring to operate in the same field. Furthermore, there might be confusion with regard to the legal status of several hundred treaties which vest certain powers and functions in the League.

II. RELATION OF THE
UNITED STATES TO
PROBLEM

The termination of the League of Nations is not a matter of primary concern to the United States in view

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of the fact that the United States is not a member. It is, however, a matter of concern to the extent that the United States has an interest in or is a party to treaties vesting functions in the League of Nations. It also becomes of concern insofar as the continued existence of the League may complicate the establishment of the new general international organization and to the extent that other governments might consult the United States to ascertain any views which it may hold with regard to the best procedure for the transition to the new organization.

It may also be to the interest of the United States that ways and means be found whereby the new international organization may avail itself of the property and assets of the League of Nations.

The present discussion is in response to the suggestions made in the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks that research papers examining possible solutions of the problem of transition and possible procedures to achieve such solutions be prepared and exchanged. To these ends, two sets of solutions are explored below, the first dealing with the substantive problem of dissolution of the League and transfer of its functions to the new international organization and the second dealing with the problem of discovering ways and means which could lead to the adoption of an appropriate mode of dissolution and transfer.

III. STATUS OF LEAGUE MEMBERSHIP

The status of membership of the League of Nations in relation to prospective membership of the new international organization is as follows:

1. Twenty-eight of the forty-five present members of the League are United Nations or associated with the United Nations.

United Nations: The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, Canada, India, Union of South Africa, New Zealand,

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China, Belgium, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Associated Nations: Ecuador, Egypt, and Uruguay.

2. Seventeen of the members of the League of Nations are neither United nor Associated Nations:

Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Eire, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and Turkey.

3. Fifteen of the United Nations and of the Associated Nations are not members of the League:

United Nations: Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Soviet Union, and the United States.

Associated Nations: Chile, Iceland, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.

IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF TRANSITION

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A. Protocols

(1) Protocol of Dissolution and Transfer

(2) Protocol of Transfer.

(1) A protocol of dissolution and of transfer of properties and of functions of the League, aside from those functions vested in it by separate treaties, could be opened for signature by states members of the League, at the time of signing of the basic instrument of the new organization. Such a protocol could provide, as among the signatory states, for the following:

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1. The Covenant of the League of Nations should be terminated as of the date the protocol becomes effective.
2. The continuing functions of the League, with the exception of those related to the Permanent Court of International Justice, should be transferred to the new organization, subject to the provisions of the charter of the new international organization.
3. All archives and records of the League should be transferred to the new organization.
4. All the rights, titles, and interests of the League in property of any kind should be transferred to the new international organization, subject to the fulfillment of existing obligations and commitments.
5. The protocol should be open for signature by all members of the League.
6. The protocol, after ratification by at least all those states members of the League who would become initial members of the new organization, should become effective as between the parties at the moment of entry into force of the basic instrument of the new organization. These parties should thereupon proceed with the liquidation of the League.

The suggestion of such a protocol assumes that in the absence of any provision in the Covenant providing for its own termination, common consent or a general consensus, and not unanimous consent, is adequate to the purpose.

It would be desirable, nevertheless, to secure unanimous consent if possible. Every effort to that end should be made. Among the states members of the League but which would not at the outset become members of the Organization are three enemy states, Bulgaria, Finland, and Thailand, and two states not now represented by recognized governments, Albania and Austria, which

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would be required to consent to the dissolution as part of the terms of the peace settlement. It can be assumed that now, since recognition of the provisional government, France is in a position and would be disposed to consent to dissolution. The status of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is doubtful, and it seems likely that they will not be in a position to assert any interest which they may have in this problem.

This leaves only the following "neutral" states: Afghanistan, Argentina, Denmark, Eire, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. The possibility that one or more of these states might adopt an intransigent attitude cannot entirely be ignored. If this should occur the principal practical effect would be a possible delay of the transfer of property rights. The possible number of recalcitrant states is too small and their position acting separately too weak seriously to impede the proposed procedure. Presumably, virtually all of them when given an opportunity will join the new organization, and acquiesce in the liquidation of the League.

If it were planned to proceed by means of such a protocol, it would appear that appropriate provision might have to be made in the basic instrument of the new organization authorizing the acceptance of the properties, powers and functions so tendered, and arranging for proper transitory measures, subject to subsequent assignment by the Organization to its appropriate organs.

(2) Protocol of Transfer

Simultaneously with the opening for signature of the protocol of dissolution and transfer, there might be opened for signature by all states with the appropriate interest a protocol to the following effect:

1. In all treaties or other engagements, excepting the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, to which the signatories are parties or in which they have or claim an interest, vesting any rights, powers, authority, or functions in the League of Nations, the new

organization

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Organization should be substituted for the League, subject to the provisions of the Charter of the new Organization.

2. This protocol, after ratification by at least all those States members of the League who would become initial members of the new Organization, should become effective as between the parties at the moment of entry into force of the basic instrument of the new Organization.

B. Amendment of the Covenant

Article 26 provides a procedure for amendment of the Covenant through favorable action by all members of the League represented on the Council, and a majority of those represented in the Assembly. This procedure could conceivably be used either to substitute the provisions of the Charter of the new Organization for the provisions of the Covenant or to terminate the League and transfer its functions to the new Organization. This use of the amending process could be regarded as the action of the constituent authority of the League. States dissenting from such an amendment would in accordance with the Covenant cease to be members of the League, but it is to be presumed that any member willing to join the new Organization would be willing to support such an amendment. One advantage of this method is that it perhaps constitutes as near an approach to an unimpeachable legal process as could be found, and that it offers a dignified procedure by which the League could terminate its own existence.

It may be argued against this procedure that it would call for meetings of organs of the League whose status is now uncertain. While it may also be argued that there is little precedent for using the amending process for such a purpose, it may be less open to objections on the ground of illegality than some other method. It may further be argued that this method, by preserving formal continuity between the League and the new Organization and making the latter the legal successor of the former, would arouse opposition from some who have regarded the League with disfavor. This objection would have less force if the new Organization were created

independently

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independently, as it is proposed that it should be, and thereafter accented by the League through its process of amendment. Aside from any validity which this objection may have in fact, the same objection could be raised against procedure by separate protocol. In either case the validity of the objection would depend upon the effect of the protocol or the amendment.

C. Revision of the Peace Treaties of 1919

Since the Covenant of the League of Nations is a part of each of four treaties of peace of 1919 which became effective, the League might be dissolved and its properties transferred to the new international organization through termination of the appropriate parts of those treaties.

This procedure would be open to the objections: (1) that, under the view that the Covenant is separate or severable from the various peace treaties in which it is found, the consent of the parties to those treaties, respectively, would not be necessary; (2) that, if the Covenant is not separate or severable despite the amendment now ratified by 18 states, the consent of all signatories to those treaties would be ineffective, since the states parties to the four treaties of peace and the states members of the League were not and never have been identical; (3) that this procedure could not dispose of the interests of at least 13 states members of the League but not signatories of the peace treaties.

Since the states parties to the several treaties of peace of 1919 and the States members of the League are not now identical in most cases, the view may be adopted that the Covenant of the League can be terminated only by consent of both the parties to the treaties of peace of 1919 and the present members of the League. If so, an appropriate procedure might be to adopt a protocol of dissolution and transfer signed by both groups of states.

D. Establishment

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D. Establishment of New Organization
Without Reference to Treaties or
Covenant

A practical approach which would disregard legal continuity as such, but which might conform to the practice at times resorted to by States, would be for the states desiring to establish the new general international organization to agree to the basic instrument for the new organization without reference to the peace treaties of 1919 or to the Covenant of the League of Nations, and to proceed to act henceforth under the obligations of this instrument. This procedure might more nearly satisfy the requirements of international law, and might further be justified on the ground that the Covenant had lost its force by desuetude, thus leaving states free to set up a new international organization by agreement.

V. POSSIBLE MEANS TO
INITIATE SOLUTION
OF TRANSITION

With respect to the question of possible ways and means of achieving the adoption of an appropriate solution of the problem of transition, the following possible means are submitted. They could be utilized with respect to the achievement of any of the Possible Solutions explored above except D. Establishment of New Organization Without Reference to Treaties or Covenant.

A. States members of the United Nations, who are also members of the League of Nations, could before or at the time of the forthcoming conference of the United Nations initiate intergovernmental discussions on the formulation of plans looking toward the assumption of the initiative by the League itself with respect to its dissolution.

B. Alternatively, the United Nations, while in conference or preparatory thereto, could initiate the transfer by indicating what functions and responsibilities now exercised and possessed by the League of Nations, they would be willing to assume under the new Charter.

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C. A further possibility lies in the setting up of a Committee representing the United Nations and a committee representing the League of Nations, either before or during the forthcoming conference of the United Nations, to confer together with a view to proposing to their respective bodies an appropriate solution to the problem of transition.

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EUROPE

- 1) The necessity of the three principal Allies arriving at a common political program for Liberated countries.
- 2) American policy toward spheres of influence.
- 3) UNRRA
 - (1) Accomplishments and problems.
 - (2) Operations in the Balkans.
 - (3) Relations with the Soviet Government.
- 4) Treatment of Germany (Political).
- 5) Economic policies toward Germany.
- 6) German Reparations.
- 7) Treatment of Austria (Political).
- 8) Economic treatment of Austria.
- 9) Suggested United States policy regarding Poland.
- 10) Reconstruction of Poland and the Balkans.
- 11) General Balkan policy.
- 12) American position on Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.
- 13) Reparation policy with reference to Rumania and Hungary.
- 14) Principal Albanian problems.
- 15) Principal Bulgarian problems.
- 16) Principal Hungarian problems.
- 17) Principal Rumanian problems.
- 18) Principal Yugoslav problems.
- 19) United States policy toward Italy.
- 20) France
 - (1) Role in United Nations Councils.
 - (2) Zone of Occupation in Germany.
 - (3) Control Machinery for Germany.

(4) Attitude

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(4) Attitude toward future German economy.

- 21) Rearming of French Forces.
- 22) French views on treatment of Germany.
- 23) Czechoslovakia.
- 24) Russian request for financing of acquisitions of capital equipment during and after the war.
- 25) The needs of Great Britain for financial aid during Phase III.
- 26) Post-war trade policy (Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreements).
- 27) British plan for a Western European Bloc.

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Subject: The necessity of the three principal Allies arriving at a common political program for liberated countries.

Although the principal Allies have been able to work out a generally satisfactory coordination of military strategy and operations in the prosecution of the war against Germany, there has been no such coordination in regard to political policies. Recent events in Europe have demonstrated the very real danger not only to Allied unity during the war but to the hope of a stable peace, as a result of the failure of the Allies to evolve an agreed and mutually acceptable political program.

Growing evidence of Anglo-Soviet rivalry on the continent of Europe and the resulting power politics scramble for position is due less to the difficulties over territorial questions than to the question of the political character of the governments in various countries of Europe beyond the Soviet borders. On the one hand, it is evident that the Soviet Government suspects that Great Britain desires to see installed wherever possible right-wing governments which from the Soviet point of view would be hostile to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the British view with apprehension the possibility that the Soviet Government will endeavor in its turn to install and support left-wing totalitarian governments as far west as possible in Europe.

In actual fact these mutual suspicions appear to be unjustified in that it is not a fixed and calculated British policy to support right-wing elements in Europe, nor on the basis of existing evidence can it be said that the Soviet Government is determined to install Communist regimes throughout Europe. However, these interacting mutual suspicions tend to push British policy, in action, farther to the right and Soviet policy farther to the left. Recent events in Greece will undoubtedly be widely interpreted in Moscow as confirmation of their suspicions of Great Britain's intentions, and the recent events in Poland with the formation of the Lublin Committee into a provisional government will likewise confirm British fears in regard to Soviet policy.

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If the situation is to be saved it is essential for the three principal Allies to examine carefully the present political forces at work in the liberated countries in Europe in order to ascertain if there are not political groups and parties which would be mutually acceptable and to which all three countries could give whole-hearted support. It would be necessary to start by excluding either a right-wing government in which "reactionary" elements regarded by the Soviet Government as intrinsically hostile would predominate, or a single party Communist totalitarian state. Between these two extremes, however, lies the bulk of the political sentiment of the peoples of Europe.

Judging from present indications the general mood of the people of Europe is to the left and strongly in favor of far-reaching economic and social reforms, but not, however, in favor of a left-wing totalitarian regime to achieve these reforms. Until such time as it is possible to hold genuine elections in the liberated areas, in certain countries at least, such as Greece and Poland, it will probably be necessary for the principal Allies, and for this purpose France should be included in that category, to accept and support interim governments. The character and composition of these governments is precisely the place where the Allies must have an agreed political program. These governments must be sufficiently to the left to satisfy the prevailing mood in Europe and to allay Soviet suspicions. Conversely, they should be sufficiently representative of the center and petit bourgeois elements of the population so that they would not be regarded as mere preludes to a Communist dictatorship.

In so far as the United States is concerned the following two criteria could be applied to any proposed interim government: (1) that it should be dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties; (2) that it should favor social and economic reforms.

In order to work out with its Allies for the interim period an agreed, mutually acceptable political basis for coordinated policies, the United States Government should be prepared, when the internal condition of a liberated country so demands, to participate in inter-Allied commissions to act as observers and to insure that at the proper time the people of that country will be given a genuine opportunity to elect their future government.

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**AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SPHERES
OF INFLUENCE**

Summary

Much of the underlying paper is a record of the background facts concerning what we know of the spheres of influence arrangement between the British and Soviet Governments in their relations as regards Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia. It is supposed to have become effective in the early summer of 1944, and, as a result of American objections, to have been limited to a three-month period, which would have expired in September, though in some respects at least it appears still to be operative.

Our position (pp 2-3) is that while we acknowledge the usefulness of arrangements for the conduct of the war, we cannot give our approval to such plans as would extend beyond the military field and retard the processes of broader international cooperation. The paper refers also to the argumentation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (annex to the paper) setting forth the importance from the point of view of American national interest of preventing if possible a contest for power between the British and Soviet Governments.

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AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SPHERES
OF INFLUENCE

The American attitude toward spheres of influence took definite and public form as a result of the Moscow Conference. In Mr. Hull's report to the Joint Session of Congress on November 18, 1943 he said:

"As the provisions of the Four Nation Declaration are carried into effect there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power or any other of the separate alliances, through which, in the unhappy past, the nation strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests."

In the late spring of 1944 the Department was informed of a contemplated arrangement between the USSR and Great Britain whereby Rumanian affairs should be the "main concern" of the Soviet Government and Greek affairs should be the "main concern" of the British Government. Subsequently, the arrangement was extended to include Bulgaria as a Soviet concern, with the British receiving roughly an equal position with the Russians in Yugoslavia. The term "spheres of influence" was sedulously avoided, or disclaimed, in all the correspondence; the term "taking the lead" was occasionally used. In subsequent reports, from London and from Ankara, there was some talk of the arrangement having crystallized to the degree that the distribution of influence was to be on a basis of 80-20 percent (Russian v.s. British) in Rumania and Bulgaria, and 50-50 in Yugoslavia, though the Russians thought it should be 60-40. In the message from Ankara the British share was described as "Anglo-American."

The question has since arisen in connection with the Soviet and British interest in the political situation, and with somewhat more precision, in a proposed arrangement between the Soviet and British Governments for the rearmament of Yugoslavia.

Reverting to the earliest communication from the British, upon their learning of our misgivings concerning the proposal, Mr. Churchill suggested to the President that the arrangement be given a three-months' trial, subject then to review by the three Governments, to which the President's assent was given. The British Government then informed the Soviet Government that our assent had been given but that the three-months limit had been set in order not to "prejudice the question of establishing postwar spheres of influence."

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The Department had also received a note from the Soviet Embassy inquiring as to our position. Apparently the Soviet Government had supposed that the whole arrangement had had American approval, and on learning of the three-months provision desired to "subject this matter to additional study."

It is thus our reply to the Soviet note, a copy of which was sent also to the British, which best sets forth the American position, which is briefly as follows:

Our assent to the trial period of three-months was given in consideration of the present war strategy. Except for this overriding consideration, this Government would wish to make known its apprehension lest the proposed agreement might, by the natural tendency of such arrangements, lead to the division in fact of the Balkan region into spheres of influence.

It would be unfortunate, in view of the decisions of the Moscow Conference, if any temporary arrangement should be so conceived as to appear to be a departure from the principle adopted by the three Governments at Moscow, in definite rejection of the spheres of influence idea. Consequently this Government hopes that no projected measures will be allowed to prejudice the efforts toward directing the policies of the Allied Governments along lines of collaboration rather than independent action, since any arrangement suggestive of spheres of influence cannot but militate against the establishment and effective functioning of a broader system of general security in which all countries will have their part.

It was supposed that the three-month trial period would enable the British and Soviet Governments to determine whether such an arrangement is practicable and efficacious as applicable only to war conditions and essentially related to the military operations of their respective forces, without in any way affecting the rights and responsibilities which each of the three principal Allies will have to exercise during the period of the reestablishment of peace, and afterwards, in regard to the whole of Europe.

Finally, this Government assumes that the arrangement would have neither direct nor indirect validity as affecting the interests of this Government, or of other Governments associated with the three principal Allies.

In somewhat further detail we had stated to the British that we acknowledge that the Government whose military forces are operating in a given territory will in the ordinary course of events take the principal initiative in making decisions affecting that territory, due to the circumstances of the military operations therein. We believe that the natural tendency for such initiatives to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by the conclusion of an agreement of the type suggested, and that the practical and military advantages sought in resorting to plans of this general nature do not counterbalance the evils inherent in such a system.

The Department's views in opposition to the doctrine of spheres of influence, with particular reference to Great Britain and the USSR, is in full accord with the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as set forth in Admiral Leahy's letter of May 16, 1944, the pertinent part of which is quoted as an attachment to this memorandum.

The evolution of events in recent months indicates that the British and Soviet Governments are in fact operating under such an arrangement, as shown chiefly by the Soviet forbearance in Greece and the teamwork in Yugoslavia where the British seem to feel, however, that the odds are against them. In Albania, where, so far as we know, no arrangement was made, the British have tried to keep a little ahead of the Russians. In Hungary the Russian military position has given the Soviet Government a predominant position, which the British have perforce had to accept. With only a somewhat precarious "lead" in Greece, the British may well feel that the scheme has neither divided in an equitable manner the areas of influence, nor protected the British position in the Mediterranean. This may account for the revival of British interest in a Balkan federation, which, if it includes Albania and Turkey, might limit to a certain degree the Slav power in the area which otherwise seems inevitably to reach toward Salonika and the Aegean coast line.

ANNEX

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ANNEX

EXCERPT FROM LETTER OF ADMIRAL LEAHY
May 16, 1944.

"From the point of view of national and world-wide security, our basic national policy in post-war settlements of this kind should seek to maintain the solidarity of the three great powers and in all other respects to establish conditions calculated to assure a long period of peace, during which, it may be hoped, arrangements will be perfected for the prevention of future world conflicts. The cardinal importance of this national policy is emphasized by a consideration of the fundamental and revolutionary changes in relative national military strengths that are being brought about in Europe as a result of the war.

"It would seem clear that there cannot be a world war, or even a great war, which does not find one or more of the great military powers on each side. At the conclusion of the present war, there will be, for the foreseeable future, only three such powers -- the United States, Britain and Russia. Since it would seem in the highest degree unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia alone, would be aligned against the United States, it is apparent that any future world conflict in the foreseeable future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps.

"In appraising possibilities of this nature, the outstanding fact to be noted is the recent phenomenal development of the heretofore latent Russian military and economic strength -- a development which seems certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future politico-military international relationships, and which has yet to reach the full scope attainable with Russian resources. In contrast, as regards Britain several developments have combined to lessen her relative military and economic strength and gravely to impair, if not preclude, her ability to offer effective military opposition to Russia on the continent except possibly in defensive operations in the Atlantic coastal areas. In a conflict between these two powers the disparity in the military strengths that they could dispose upon that continent would, under present conditions, be far too great to be overcome by our intervention on the side of Britain. Having due regard to the military factors involved -- resources, manpower, geography and particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean and exert it decisively upon the continent -- we might be able to successfully defend Britain, but we could not, under existing conditions, defeat Russia. In other words, we would

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find ourselves engaged in a war which we could not win even though the United States would be in no danger of defeat and occupation.

"It is apparent that the United States should, now and in the future, exert its utmost efforts and utilize all its influence to prevent such a situation arising and to promote a spirit of mutual cooperation between Britain, Russia and ourselves. So long as Britain and Russia cooperate and collaborate in the interests of peace, there can be no great war in the foreseeable future.

"The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and Russia would seem to grow out of either nation initiating attempts to build up its strength, by seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary. Having regard to the inherent suspicions of the Russians, to present Russia with any agreement on such matters as between the British and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in starting a train of events that would lead eventually in the situation we most wish to avoid."

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January 4, 1945.

UNRRA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROBLEMS

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I. Accomplishments. - Some 1200 persons have been recruited, including an excellent Bureau of Supply and Health Division. As to finance, contributions of nearly \$1,800,000,000 have been provided for operating expenses and most of the members have paid their administrative quotas. As to operations, while UNRRA has not yet taken over direction of relief in any liberated area, the following facts may be noted: (1) it is running refugee camps in the Middle East for some 50,000 Greek, Yugoslav, Albanian and Italian refugees; (2) it has arranged with the military to care for displaced persons in Italy and to send supplies to Italy early this year to supplement the military relief program; (3) it has sent personnel into Greece to act for the military and is prepared to do the same in Albania and Yugoslavia; (4) it has arranged with SHAEF to attach UNRRA health and displaced persons personnel to the SHAEF G-5 missions; (5) it has arranged with the U.S. Typhus Commission for interchange of personnel on typhus teams; (6) it has concluded agreements with Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Luxembourg to send UNRRA missions to those countries for health, welfare and displaced persons activities; (7) it is prepared, as soon as they have the consent of the Soviets, to send supplies to Poland and Czechoslovakia, and WSA has promised a small amount of shipping for this purpose commencing this month; (8) UNRRA has made substantial progress with respect to the acquisition of supplies in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and the American republics; (9) an UNRRA mission is in Ethiopia; and (10) regional offices for the Far East have been opened at Sydney and Chungking.

II. Problems. - 1. UNRRA urgently needs a vigorous and competent Senior Deputy Director General to counteract the Governor's over-cautiousness. The British have not offered a capable substitute for Sir Arthur Salter who previously had this job. The Governor has asked for Commander Jackson of MESC and Richard Law has promised to do what he can to release him. If he cannot get Jackson, the place might then be filled by a strong European such as P. A. Kerstens of the Netherlands or a first-class American like Charlie Polcetti or Ferdie Eberstadt.

2. It needs a strong American Deputy in London in charge of field operations. This position has been vacant since Lithgow Osborne resigned. The Governor tried to get Charlie Taft and President Hopkins of Dartmouth. Bill Batt has been mentioned as a possibility.

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3. It must as soon as possible take over full responsibility for relief in Greece. Although his staff is anxious to do so, the Governor is extremely cautious about this. Law and I have strongly urged him to move forward on this, and this is the type of problem on which a strong Senior Deputy could be of great help.

4. The Governor's relations with the Soviet Government leave much to be desired. The main problem as to Poland and Czechoslovakia has been the reluctance of the Soviets to come to terms with the Governor who has been unable thus far to arrange for a mission to go to Poland or for himself to go to Moscow. There is still to be worked out the all important question of transit of supplies through Soviet territory. We have done all that we properly can to help the Governor on this.

5. The shipping situation, of course, affects UNRRA as it does all relief operations. You are familiar with this.

While we and the British are not satisfied, therefore, with the progress of UNRRA, we are both committed to trying to work it out.

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POLICY TOWARD UNRRA OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS

General Picture of UNRRA Accomplishments

Some 1200 persons have been recruited, including an excellent Bureau of Supply and Health Division. As to finance, contributions of nearly \$1,800,000,000 have been provided for operating expenses and most of the members have paid their administrative quotas. As to operations, while UNRRA has not yet taken over direction of relief in any liberated area, the following facts may be noted: (1) it is running refugee camps in the Middle East for some 50,000 Greek, Yugoslav, Albanian and Italian refugees; (2) it has arranged with the military to care for displaced persons in Italy and to send supplies to Italy early this year to supplement the military relief program; (3) it has sent personnel into Greece to act for the military and is prepared to do the same in Albania and Yugoslavia; (4) it has arranged with SHAEF to attach UNRRA health and displaced persons personnel to the SHAEF G-5 missions; (5) it has arranged with the U.S. Typhus Commission for interchange of personnel on typhus teams; (6) it has concluded agreements with Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Luxembourg to send UNRRA missions to those countries for health, welfare and displaced persons activities; (7) it is prepared, as soon as they have the consent of the Soviets, to send supplies to Poland and Czechoslovakia, and WSA has promised a small amount of shipping for this purpose commencing this month; (8) UNRRA has made substantial progress with respect to the acquisition of supplies in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and the American republics; (9) an UNRRA mission is in Ethiopia; and (10) regional offices for the Far East have been opened at Sydney and Chungking.

Immediate Balkan Problems

An important difficulty in UNRRA operations in the Balkans has been the shipping shortage in general and the necessity hitherto of dependence on the military for shipping allocations. Arrangements are now being made for ships to be allocated to UNRRA for Northwestern Europe, and this arrangement may later be extended to the Balkans. UNRRA has made no plans for operations in the ex-enemy states, Rumania, Bulgaria or Hungary, or in Austria except as it may be desirable to handle, for the military,

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the problem of displaced persons of Allied nationality.

As noted above, the operations in Greece have begun, and will develop as the military situation there clears up. An UNRRA--Yugoslav agreement, preliminary work on which was done at Cairo last spring and at Washington in the autumn, must await the negotiations, now about completed, between the Allied military authorities and the Yugoslavs for the military period. The plan is for UNRRA to begin operations in Yugoslavia (and also in Albania) at an early date, under the military, and to shorten the military period as much as possible.

Some progress has been made in the negotiations between the military and the Yugoslavs for relief in the military period, the chief difficulty having been Marshal Tito's unwillingness to agree to Allied personnel as observers to make sure that relief supplies are not distributed in a discriminatory manner. There seems to have been an agreement made for a certain number of observers, and relief supplies are, in any case, being sent in on an ad hoc basis even in the lack of a formal agreement. Some of these difficulties mentioned above may nevertheless extend over into the UNRRA period, since Marshal Tito seems to be frankly unfriendly to the program. For example, there has been a recent report that a member of his entourage has been urging him not to sell his country's independence "for a box of UNRRA chocolates." Marshal Tito's argument that the admission of Allied observers is a derogation of Yugoslav national sovereignty seems thoroughly unreasonable, but it is perhaps the best explanation he can find for his unwillingness to allow Allied observers of any kind to move about in Yugoslavia.

Policy Recommendations

It is the American view that the UNRRA should operate independently and with full responsibility and authority as an international organization at the earliest possible date, with the minimum of advice or influence by the British or American Governments, even though these Governments are the heaviest contributors. The British appear to favor keeping a guiding hand on UNRRA. They also favor integrating the work of voluntary relief or

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philanthropic agencies into the UNRRA, whereas we prefer that such voluntary organizations should continue to operate independently, unless the UNRRA agreements with the respective countries specifically provide otherwise. It is of course desirable that there should be a coordination of effort, but particularly in Balkan countries these voluntary agencies, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Near East Foundation, and certain American-sponsored schools for mechanical and trade training, are extraordinarily well adapted to the needs of the region and staffed and organized for efficient service. Finally it is our view that UNRRA should be left a free hand for direct negotiation of its agreements with the various Governments, and in general should be made to feel that the success of its operations will depend on its own efforts and achievements.

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RELATIONS BETWEEN UNRRA AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The most important problem to work out in connection with the relations between UNRRA and the Soviet Union is to obtain necessary permission and cooperation from the Soviet Government so that relief in Eastern Europe can go forward. This will require a decision by the Soviet Union (a) to admit UNRRA personnel to Poland and Czechoslovakia; (b) to permit transit of supplies through Soviet territory and the use of Soviet port and convoy facilities in connection therewith; (c) to receive an UNRRA mission in Moscow to work out the necessary arrangements. The Soviet Government has held up all of these matters since last June. UNRRA has recently applied for permission (from the respective Control Commissions) to send personnel to Rumania and Bulgaria to help relieve Jews and other victims of war, but to date it has not been able to make progress on this matter. All of this is due in part to faulty handling of relations on the part of UNRRA but primarily it is due to the inability of the U.S.S.R. to make up its mind as to whether it desires to be a recipient of relief from UNRRA or to continue to receive supplies through the Protocol. Decisions permitting the beginning of UNRRA operations in Eastern Europe are urgently required. If they are not obtained soon, the public repercussions may be so great in this country as to terminate any hope whatever of UNRRA's success.

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UNCLASSIFIED

January 12, 1945

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THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY - SUMMARY

I. POLICY FOR THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE

It is recommended that the draft "Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany" submitted by the European Advisory Commission be accepted without reservation, and that the authority of the projected Control Council be made paramount throughout Germany.

It is recommended that immediate security measures include (1) expeditious disbandment and future prohibition of all German military and para-military forces, (2) seizure and destruction of all existing German arms, ammunition and implements of war, including airplanes, and the prohibition of further manufacture, (3) and the destruction of industrial plants and machinery incapable of conversion to peaceful uses.

It is recommended that the National Socialist system be destroyed through the dissolution of Party organizations, abrogation of Nazi laws and Nazi public institutions, and the elimination of active Nazis from public office and from positions of importance in private enterprise.

It is recommended that direct inter-allied military government supplant the central government of the Reich but that, in the interest of simplifying the tasks of the military, use be made of the German administrative machinery.

It is recommended that the Control Council assume authority over all German informational services and cultural activities and that schools be reopened as soon as objectionable text-books and teaching personnel can be replaced.

II. LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES AND MEASURES

The attached paper also discusses our long-range objectives in Germany.

III. FRONTIER SETTLEMENTS

It is recommended that this Government adopt, as its basic principles in the settlement of territorial disputes,

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(1) the most reasonable prospect of general acceptance and stability, and (2) the maximum contribution to the orderly development of general international order.

It is recommended that: (1) the Danish-German frontier remain unchanged, (2) that the water-boundary between the Netherlands and Germany be moved to the main channel of the Ems Estuary and that further consideration be given to any Netherlands claims on German territory as compensation for war damage, (3) that the 1920-1940 boundary between Belgium and Germany be restored, (4) that Alsace-Lorraine be returned to France, (5) that the pre-1938 Austro-German frontier, with a slight rectification, be restored, (6) that the pre-Munich frontiers between Czechoslovakia and Germany be in principle restored, subject to any minor rectifications which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to propose, and (7) that Poland acquire East Prussia (except for the Koenigsberg area), the Free City of Danzig, German Upper Silesia, and Pomerania.

It is recommended that although this Government should not oppose a general transfer of the German minorities from neighboring states, it should, wherever possible, favor a selective transfer. Such action, if carried out gradually, in an orderly manner, and under international supervision, would contribute to better relations between the states concerned.

THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY

I. POLICY FOR THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE

A. Control Machinery

1. The Department of State recommends that the draft "Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany" should be accepted without reservation.

This proposal provides for the exercise of supreme authority over Germany by the American, British and Soviet generals, each in his own zone of occupation and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of a supreme organ of control designated as the Control Council. The functions of this Council would be (a) to ensure uniformity of action in the several zones of occupation, (b) to initiate plans and make agreements, within the powers granted by the respective Governments, for dealing with questions involving the whole of Germany, (c) to control and direct the central German administration, and (d) to direct the administration of the joint zone of Greater Berlin. Appropriate sub-agencies would be organized on a tripartite basis to carry out the administrative and supervisory functions of the Control Council.

2. The Department of State recommends that the directives given to the commanding generals should so define their duties that the Control Council's authority would be paramount throughout Germany and that the zones of occupation would become, in so far as feasible, areas for the enforcement of the Council's decisions rather than regions in which the commanders would possess a wide latitude of autonomous power.

This recommendation rests on two convictions: (1) that it is highly desirable, even at the expense of curtailing to some degree the freedom of action of the commander of the United States zone, to prevent any of the occupying powers from dealing as it pleases with its zone of occupation, and (2) that it is essential, in the interest of effective military government to maintain such parts of the normal administrative unity of Germany as will have survived the defeat. The problem, for example, of providing sufficient food for the German people to prevent epidemics and disorders would be seriously complicated if the Control Council could not direct the transportation and distribution of the total food supply within Germany. Should the surplus supplies of the

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eastern zone be denied to the southern and northwestern zones, the United States and British Governments would be faced with the choice between delivering large quantities of foodstuffs from their own stores or allowing wholesale starvation.

B. Functions of Military Government

1. Security Measures

The Department of State recommends the adoption of the following policies with respect to immediate security measures:

a. Demobilization and disbandment of the German armed forces, including para-military organizations.

This recommendation would not exclude the detention of individuals and units of the Waffen SS and other Nazi military formations for security reasons or for employment in special services or for trial as war criminals.

b. Dissolution and prohibition of all military and para-military agencies including the General Staff, party military and quasi-military organizations, reserve corps, military academies and military training, civilian administrative units performing purely military functions, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany. -

c. Seizure and destruction of all German arms, ammunition and implements of war.

The recommendation for the destruction of these categories of war material, which are in general not convertible to peacetime purposes, is based on belief that the rearming of the European nations with surrendered German equipment would complicate the problem of restoring political stability, render future general disarmament more difficult, tend to make the countries acquiring the equipment look to Germany and to German technicians for spare parts and replacements, and might inaugurate an armaments race detrimental to the hopes for international peace and security.

d. Confiscation of military archives and military research facilities and vesting authority over them in the Control Council.

e. Immediate prohibition on the manufacture of arms, ammunition and implements of war.

f. Destruction of industrial plants and machinery incapable of conversion to peaceful uses.

g. Dismantlement

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g. Dismantlement of aircraft industry and prohibition on manufacture of aircraft.

2. Political Actions

a. Destruction of the National Socialist System.

The Department of State recommends the following measures designed to destroy the Nazi tyranny in Germany:

(1) Dissolution of the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organs with the transfer to public agencies of such social services now performed by the Nazi groups as it may be found desirable to continue.

(2) Abrogation of the Nazi laws which provided the legal basis of the régime and which established discriminations on the basis of race, creed and political opinion.

(3) Abolition of Nazi public institutions, such as the People's Courts and the Labor Front, which were set up as instruments of Party domination.

(4) The elimination of active Nazis from public and quasi-public office and from positions of importance in private enterprise.

The Department of State believes it desirable to distinguish between the total membership of the Nazi Party, numbering probably more than 6 million, and those Germans, numbering about 2 million, who have been Party leaders at all levels of its organization. This latter group can be easily identified in a preliminary way by office-holding in the various Party organizations. So many Germans have joined the Party for so many different reasons that nominal membership is no serious index of political conviction. Selective expulsion of the proposed sort would effectively destroy the structure and influence of National Socialism and would immeasurably lighten the administrative burden of military government.

(5) The selection of personnel for labor reparation, in case certain of our Allies insist on that form of reparation, from the ranks of active Nazis and of Nazi organizations such as the SS rather than by an indiscriminate draft.

This recommended procedure would place the burden where it most justly belongs and would remove from Germany some of the most dangerous political influences during the period when an effort must be made to establish an acceptable government.

(6) The arrest

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(6) The arrest and punishment of the principal political malefactors and of war criminals.

b. The Government of Germany

The Department of State recommends that, after the destruction of the Nazi régime, no central German government be recognized and that tripartite military government, as envisaged in the surrender instrument, exercise supreme power over Germany. The Department further recommends the use of German administrative machinery in so far as it can serve the purposes of the occupation authorities and does not perpetuate Nazi abuses and the use of German civil servants, not identified as active Nazis, in so far as they are efficient and obedient to the occupation authorities.

Direct military government will be desirable as a means of reinforcing the reality of defeat on the German mind. It will probably be necessary in any case because of internal confusion. Since there is little prospect that the Nazi and militaristic groups who should bear the onus of defeat will survive, it is politically undesirable to allow anti-Nazi groups immediately to take over political authority and thenceforth be identified as tools of the conqueror's military government.

The establishment of comprehensive military government would prevent the equally undesirable development of the importation into Germany of a substantially ready-made provisional government perhaps recognized by and functioning under special foreign auspices.

c. Future Change to Civilian Control. - The Department of State recommends that, as soon as military considerations cease to be paramount, the control machinery in Germany should be transferred to inter-allied civilian hands.

d. German Political Activity and Association. The Department of State recommends that, when security conditions permit, political parties opposing Nazi and other kinds of ultra-nationalistic ideologies be permitted to organize and to engage in public discussion.

This recommendation is based on the conviction that the German people will need information, public debate and political organization before they are prepared to decide their future form of government, and that there is advantage in the Germans beginning these activities while National Socialism is perhaps in greatest discredit under the immediate impact of defeat.

3. Control over Information and Cultural Activities.

a. Public Information. - The Department of State recommends that, under the direction and supervision of the Control Council, there be established throughout Germany a system of control

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over

over all media for the dissemination of public information.

This proposal is designed to insure against the further dissemination of Nazi propaganda, to facilitate the Control Council's presentation of instructions and information to the German people, and, as security permits, to allow responsible Germans to carry on an orderly discussion of political reform.

The Department of State wishes to emphasize the importance of placing this control function under the authority of the Control Council rather than leaving it to the discretion of the zonal commanders.

b. Educational Policy. - The Department of State recommends a system of control over German education designed to eradicate Nazi doctrines and to inculcate democratic values. To this end it is recommended, as the first step, that the German schools, beginning at the elementary level, be reopened as soon as military considerations permit and when objectionable text-books and teaching personnel can be satisfactorily replaced. The Department believes that it should be the policy of military government to work as unobtrusively as possible through existing German educational machinery after Nazi influences have been removed, and likewise to leave the initiative of positive educational reform to the Germans themselves, subject to review by the Control Council. It would, therefore, oppose Allied imposition of new curricula and the introduction of foreign teachers.

The desirability of keeping changes in German education to a common procedure throughout the Reich points to the necessity of maintaining, at least temporarily, the national machinery of educational supervision. Maintenance of this machinery would simplify the problem of holding to a uniform policy as well as the task of systematic control. It is deemed injudicious to return education to a decentralized basis until more rational units of federal government can be worked out than have existed heretofore and until the need for close supervision is less insistent.

The Department believes it urgent to reopen the schools as promptly as possible in order that the younger children can be looked after and the youth can be kept from the streets and subject to discipline which may be otherwise lacking because of the break-up of families and the dissolution of the Nazi youth organizations.

In the Department's opinion the Control Council's role must be largely in terms of prohibiting certain things and in consenting to changes proposed by the Germans. A new direction of German education and a new positive content will necessarily be the work of German educators and the victors can do little more than encourage the adoption of a set of beliefs and objectives to take the place of the perverted concepts now being inculcated.

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The problem for the victors, consequently, is (1) to determine what kind of teaching in Germany would be most conducive to our long-range aims of world security, and (2) to consider what means could be employed to foster that teaching.

The Department is well aware of the difficulties but sees no constructive alternative, as an ultimate objective, to a German school system promoting the psychological disarmament of the German people and reflecting a democratic outlook in which a humanitarian and international outlook will supersede the current ultra-nationalism.

This program is recommended as a contribution toward that end. The Department foresees, however, that no fundamental change in the German mentality can be effected by the schools alone. The hope for a transformation of educational values will depend less on what is done in the school room than on the whole experience of the German people in the occupation and post-war periods.

c. Religious Activity. - The Department of State recommends that the Nazi legislation and organizations for maintaining the Party's tyranny over German religion should be terminated and that full religious freedom, including the rights of teaching, publishing and conducting social service, should be established as quickly as security needs will permit.

II. LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES AND MEASURES

The Department of State recommends that the measures applied during the period of military government should from the beginning be worked out and applied in the light of long-range objectives with respect to Germany and Germany's ultimate place in the projected world order.

The enduring interest of the United States is peace, and so far as Germany is concerned the basic objective of this Government must be to see to it that that country does not disturb the peace.

Security against a renewal of German aggression must be guaranteed during the foreseeable future by a rigorously enforced prohibition of a German military establishment and by a vigilant control of German war potential.

An indefinitely continued coercion of so many millions of technically resourceful people, however, would be at best an expensive undertaking. There is, moreover, no certainty that the victor powers will be willing and able indefinitely to apply coercion. In the long run, therefore, the best guaranty of security, and the least expensive, would be the assimilation of the German people into the world society of peace-loving nations.

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These considerations urge the search for a continuing policy which will prevent a renewal of German aggression and, at the same time, pave the way for the German people in the course of time to join willingly in the common enterprises of peace.

A. Security Controls

The Department of State believes that it would be premature at present to attempt to specify the nature of the long-term security controls to be established over Germany beyond the general principles of complete disarmament and control of war potential.

In determining the exact manner in which Germany's ability to make war is to be destroyed, the Department of State believes that the various proposals should be judged by their prospective effectiveness and the possibility of their continued enforceability. There are several ways in which Germany could be effectively made militarily impotent. The most obvious method would be the prohibition of a military machine through forbidding military training and the possession or acquisition of arms. Manifestly a Germany without soldiers and without weapons would be no menace to the peace of the world. Various kinds of intervention in German industry and commerce would likewise add further effective restraints.

With such latitude in the choice of measures afforded by the test of effectiveness, the crucial test is that of enforceability over a period of years or even decades.

There is involved in this second criterion the problem of devising controls which would be relatively inexpensive and simple in operation, particularly with respect to detecting German attempts at evasion. There is involved also the more dangerous problem of choosing a series of measures which the victor powers will be willing to maintain after war passions have cooled. Experience during the period between the two great wars suggests that the crucial issue is not so much the exact nature of the controls as the determination of the Allies to maintain them. Experience likewise indicates that once the process of giving up controls has begun, it is difficult to halt the disintegrating process short of war.

Since it believes that the more complex and the more numerous the controls the greater the danger of their being abandoned, the Department of State recommends that the controls over Germany should be as simple and as few in number as would be compatible with safety.

B. Political Reconstruction of Germany

1. The Ultimate Objective. - Germany's repudiation of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideologies will in the long-run

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long-run depend on the psychological disarmament of the German people, tolerable economic conditions, and the development of stable political conditions.

The most plausible hope for lasting political reconstruction and orderly development lies in the establishment of democratic government despite the fact that serious difficulties will beset such an attempt. The Department of State therefore recommends that it be made the aim of United States policy to prepare the German people for self-government as soon as self-government is possible in terms of internal conditions and security considerations.

The successful establishment of a democratic régime will depend in considerable measure not only on a tolerable standard of living but also on a moderation of the ultra-nationalistic mentality now dominant. A democratic experiment will labor under a heavy burden because of its necessary submission to the will of the victors and it must, if it is to survive, be able to offer some claim to the loyalty and to the patriotism of the German people. In order to encourage a constructive fresh start in political life, the Department of State recommends that there be offered to the Germans the assurance that a democratic Germany which demonstrates its intention and ability to live at peace can earn an honorable place in the society of nations. In order to avoid raising an issue similar to that which, after 1919, was exploited by the nationalists to discredit democracy and international cooperation, the Department of State opposes writing into the peace settlement a war-guilt clause directed against the German people as a whole.

2. Partition. - The Department of State recommends that this Government oppose the forcible partition of Germany.

An imposed dismemberment of Germany would not obviate the necessity for enforcing the same security controls that should be set up if Germany is left intact. Because of the high degree of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany, it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed but also maintained by force. The victor powers, by imposing partition, would take on themselves a burdensome and never-ending task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the partite states and of restraining the nationalistic determination to reunite which would, in all probability, be the response of the German people. The economic aspects of partition, finally, would create a serious dilemma. A political dismemberment which left the German economy substantially unified would have little significance as a security measure; the disruption of German economy, on the other hand, would carry with it an unnecessary decline of the European, as well as the German, standard of living.

3. Decentralization

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3. Decentralization - The Department of State recommends that encouragement be given to a return to federal decentralization, including the division of Prussia into several medium-sized states, but it would oppose the imposition of a decentralization more sweeping than that acceptable to moderate groups.

Such an action, like an imposed partition, would provide a ready-made program for nationalistic agitators. A decentralization extensive enough to make the central government of the Reich harmless would, in all probability, render it unable to cope adequately with the social and economic problems which must be resolved in the interest of internal stability.

A return to wide provincial autonomy might again offer to undesirable elements an advantageous means of capturing the various state governments, as happened prior to 1933, when the National Socialists gained control of several of the smaller states and carried on their terroristic agitation in complete immunity from Reich interference.

Decentralization, even if successfully imposed, is not necessary as a security measure and would not of itself be an insurmountable barrier to unified national action if at some future time the German people wanted to organize their forces for new aggression. The military effectiveness of Germany under the cumbersome Bismarckian constitution might illustrate this observation. It remains to be remarked that the traditional democratic groups in Germany have generally favored a greater unification of the Reich.

4. Steps in Political Reconstruction - While the character of developments in Germany cannot be foreseen, the Department of State believes it desirable to formulate a tentative and general policy toward the political reconstruction of Germany. It therefore recommends that the process be begun, when military necessities permit, by the establishment of democratic self-government in local communities rather than by the reconstitution of a national federal government. Decision as to when local governments could be joined into provincial units and when the provincial units could form a Reich government would, under this plan, depend on the success with which the Germans took the several steps in building sound institutions and developing reliable political leaders.

The Department of State believes that, in this process of positive reconstruction, external influence should be limited to the encouragement of popular self-government and should not be exerted to determine the precise form of government to be established. At the same time it is a dictate of security that the victor powers, and after them the international organization, should reserve the right, and be prepared to intervene in Germany to prevent the re-emergence of dangerous nationalistic activities

and to hold Germany to the observance of the obligations imposed by the peace settlement and by the post-war security system.

III. FRONTIER SETTLEMENTS

The Department of State believes that in establishing the post-war boundaries of Europe it should be the policy of this Government to seek a solution of each dispute based on the merits of the specific problem and on the relation of that problem to the whole settlement. The Department believes the chief criteria to be (1) the most reasonable prospect of general acceptance and stability and (2) the maximum contribution to the orderly development of general international order.

A. Recommendations

In the light of such considerations, the Department of State submits the following recommendations with respect to the frontiers of Germany:

1. That the Danish-German frontier should remain unchanged.
2. That the water-boundary between the Netherlands and Germany should be moved from the western shore of the Ems Estuary to the main channel and that subsequent consideration be given to any Netherlands claims on German territory as compensation for damage to Netherlands soil.
3. That the Belgian-German frontier should be returned to the 1920-1940 line.
4. That Alsace-Lorraine should be returned to France.
5. That the present administrative boundaries be maintained as the frontier between Austria and Germany.

This recommendation would restore the pre-1938 frontier except for a small area in the Sonthofen district which was transferred to Bavaria for administrative convenience and which should remain in Bavaria unless there is convincing evidence that the inhabitants wish to return to Austrian rule.
6. That the pre-Munich frontiers between Czechoslovakia and Germany be in principle restored, subject to any minor rectifications which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to propose.
7. That Poland acquire East Prussia (except for the Koenigsberg area), the former Free City of Danzig, German Upper Silesia, and the eastern portion of Pomerania possessing an area of approximately 6,812 square miles.

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The Department of State proposes this solution of an extremely difficult frontier problem as the one representing in the light of present circumstances the most equitable settlement and the one offering the best promise of international tranquillity in eastern Europe. It is realized, however, that there may well be strong pressure for the acquisition by Poland of a still larger portion of German territory. If this is the case it is not believed that it would be feasible for the United States to oppose such a proposal.

The solution just recommended would mean the addition for Poland of an area of about 21,000 square miles containing approximately 4,200,000 inhabitants. The Polish-German frontier north of Upper Silesia would be straightened and shortened by 130 miles. Poland's sea coast would be lengthened to some 200 miles with adequate port facilities in Gdynia and Danzig. The annexation of Upper Silesia would substantially strengthen Poland's industrial resources and would make possible a unified and rationalized operation of the greater Upper Silesian district.

Because of the importance of this question, a special study of it, prepared in the Department, is attached.

B. The Transfer of German Minorities

The cessions to Poland recommended above would bring under Polish sovereignty approximately 3,400,000 Germans in addition to more than 700,000 resident there before the present war. Both the Polish Government-in-exile and the Lublin Committee have expressed the desire to expel this German population. In addition the Government-in-exile of Czechoslovakia wishes to remove more than 1,500,000 Sudeten Germans.

During the final stages of war, and during the early post-war period, it is the belief of the Department of State that an indiscriminate expulsion of so many people would add enormously to the confusion likely to exist in that area, threatening the public health of much of Europe and jeopardizing the peace and good order of the continent. Nevertheless, it is not considered that it would be expedient for the United States to oppose such general transfers if they are insisted upon by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments having the support of the British and Soviet governments. The Department of State believes, however, that in so far as possible this government should endeavor to obtain agreement on selected transfer of those portions of the German minority from Poland and Czechoslovakia whose transfer would contribute to the improvement of relations between the countries concerned and to a greater stability in that part of Europe. The Department favors a policy whereby these transfers would be held to a minimum, would take place gradually in an orderly manner and under international auspices agreed upon by

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the Principal Allies on the one hand and Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other.

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ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD GERMANY

SUMMARY

1. Our eventual objectives with respect to economic treatment of Germany should be (1) abolition of German self-sufficiency, and (2) elimination of the instruments for German economic aggression.

For a prolonged period of control and surveillance, however, economic policies with respect to Germany will have to be largely based upon other objectives, namely, (1) reduction of Germany's economic war potential, and (2) assisting the economic reconstruction and development of the victorious countries.

2. The following policies recommended for adoption in discussion with British and Russians:

- a. We should advocate allied acceptance of large responsibilities for guidance and reorientation of German economic life, including prevention of an unmanageably chaotic economic situation in the initial period after defeat.
- b. Economic disarmament should include prohibition of the manufacture of land and naval armament and all types of aircraft; destruction of specialized facilities for their manufacture; establishment of controls to detect any forms of surreptitious preparation for war.
- c. Consideration should be given to selective prohibitions upon the manufacture of key industrial items and of broader restraints on exports within the field of metals, metal products and chemicals.
- d. During the early post-defeat period, the occupation authorities should take no steps to provide a higher living standard than is required for prevention of disease and disorder. Agreement should be sought on definition of this minimum and the measures to be taken, if necessary, to assure such a minimum.
- e. We should favor conversion of remainder of German industry to peacetime production, particularly

reparation

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reparation goods for rehabilitation of European countries.

- f. Payment for such current imports as are allowed by control authorities should be a first charge on German exports.
- g. We favor full restitution of identifiable looted property.
- h. We advocate establishment of machinery to assure inter-zonal essential goods.
- i. We should seek agreement with Britain and Russia regarding policies for control of large industrial firms and elimination of active Nazis from influential positions in industry and finance.

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ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD GERMANY

1. Need for Multilateral Determination of Policies

It is essential, in the economic as in other fields, that policies with respect to Germany be directed toward the central aim of keeping her disarmed through an effective international security organization. A substantial measure of agreement must be obtained in advance on economic policies toward Germany, and such policies must be so framed as to minimize the danger of new European rivalries from this source.

2. Policy Recommendations

In the Department's view, our eventual objectives with respect to economic treatment of Germany should be (1) abolition of German self-sufficiency, and (2) elimination of the instruments for German economic aggression. These two objectives conform to the general economic foreign policy of the United States. More important, however, it is only through the kind of orientation of the German economy which is envisaged in these objectives that the basis for international security organization can be permanently assured.

These two objectives are closely related. Abolition of self-sufficiency requires the removal of all protection and subsidies to high-cost domestic production. Elimination of the instruments for German economic aggression requires the prohibition of all discriminatory trade controls, clearing agreements and international cartel arrangements.

The eventual objectives imply the assimilation - on a basis of equality - of a reformed, peaceful and economically non-aggressive Germany into a liberal system of world trade. During the period of military government and over a control period of much longer duration, economic policies with respect to Germany will have to be largely based upon other objectives, namely, (1) reduction of Germany's economic war potential, and (2) assisting the economic reconstruction and development of the victorious countries. Although these latter objectives must be over-riding, it is important that development of the German economy should not be so drastically restricted as to prevent the maintenance of a basic livelihood for the German people.

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It is recommended that in discussion with the British and Russians we should adopt the policies given below as a basis for agreed action during the period of Allied control.

- a) We should go along with the British and Russians in accepting large responsibilities for the guidance and reorientation of German economic life. It is altogether unlikely that a "hands off" policy would be accepted and adhered to by all major powers. Consequently, we must be prepared to take all possible steps in the initial phases of occupation to prevent development of a chaotically unmanageable economic situation, since this is a prerequisite to the exercise of effective economic control.
- b) Economic disarmament should include prohibition of the manufacture of land and naval armament and all types of aircraft; destruction of specialized facilities used for the manufacture of these items; and establishment of permanent or semi-permanent controls to detect surreptitious preparation for rearmament, research on new weapons and stockpiling of key materials.
- c) In addition, consideration should be given to selective prohibitions during the control period upon the manufacture of a few key industrial items, such as synthetic gasoline, synthetic rubber and certain types of machine tools and precision apparatus, and general prohibitions or restrictions on certain categories of German exports, particularly in the field of metals, metal products and chemicals. Sweeping measures of economic impairment are unnecessary if effective security organization is maintained, and are unenforceable in the absence of such security organization. However, the heavy industry sector of the German economy could be substantially contracted during a control period in ways which will aid the recovery and industrial development of other European countries without crippling Germany's capacity to meet the basic needs of her population. Within a broad range, therefore, the problem is largely one of judging what measures will receive the support and contribute to the solidarity of the victors.

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- d) With respect to treatment of the German population, no steps should be taken by the occupation authorities for the purpose of providing a higher standard of living than is required for the prevention of disease and disorder. Agreement should be sought on a uniform quantitative definition of this standard and on the measures which the victorious powers might be prepared to take if necessary to assure such a minimum. This agreed minimum should not be raised until it is agreed that political tendencies within Germany justify some relaxation; the needs of liberated countries should, in any event, receive priority.
- e) We should favor the conversion of the remainder of German industry to peacetime production, including particularly the production of reparation goods required to effect an early contribution to the rehabilitation of European countries. The reparation program should be of short duration; and should consist predominantly of payments in kind, with, perhaps, some labor services. Its size must depend upon the scope of the measures undertaken under (c) above. Extensive restrictions on heavy industrial exports imply a comparatively small reparation program, with emphasis on transfer of existing German capital equipment rather than of current German output.
- f) Payment for such current imports as the control authorities allow to Germany, and other similar, current expenses should become a first charge on German exports, ranking above reparation payments. Unless this principle is accepted, we run the danger of being called upon to pay for Germany's imports while other countries are extracting reparation payments from Germany.
- g) We should favor full restitution of identifiable looted property. Restitution should be handled at an inter-governmental level and should be returned to the government having jurisdiction over the place from which the property was looted.

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- h) We should advocate the establishment of machinery to assure inter-zonal movement of foodstuffs, industrial materials and finished goods, in order to limit import requirements, foster production for reparation, and prevent large inter-zonal disparities in diet and employment.
- i) We should attempt to reach agreement with Britain and Russia regarding policies for the control of large industrial firms and the elimination of active Nazis from positions of influence. We should advocate a policy more drastic than the British now favor, but less drastic than Russia might be inclined to apply.

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REPARATION AND RESTITUTION POLICY TOWARD GERMANY

Summary

1. Nature of American Interest.

A mistaken reparation policy may not only have adverse effects on the future economic stability of Europe but may jeopardize the political and economic objectives of this country with respect to Germany. For this reason German reparation should be supported only to the extent that it does not conflict with more important objectives.

2. Policy Recommendations.

- a) Reparation should consist of the entire surplus above the output needed to maintain a minimum prescribed standard of living and to pay for relief, occupation costs and other prior charges. It should be made clear that the U. S. will not finance the transfer of reparation either directly or indirectly.
- b) To minimize interference with normal trade the reparation period should be short: if possible five years, and in any event not over ten.
- c) Reparation should be payable predominantly "in kind." Labor services within reasonable limits should not be opposed provided a distinction is made in the treatment accorded to formerly active Nazis and politically passive Germans, respectively.
- d) The principal basis of apportionment should be damage to non-military property exclusive of current output. A supplementary basis, admissible only at a lower weighting, should be occupation costs. The reparation settlement should be considered as clearing finally all claims against Germany arising out of the war.
- e) Germany should be obliged to restitute all identifiable stolen property. Gold and unique objects (but not other property) should be replaced with equivalents from German stocks if lost or destroyed.
- f) United Nations should have the option of retaining and disposing of German property within their territories, the proceeds to be applied against reparation claims.

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January 16, 1945.

Reparation and Restitution Policy toward Germany

1. Nature of American Interest

It is dangerous to assume, because the reparation claims of this country are likely to be very small, that we have little interest in the subject of reparation. Not only can an ill-conceived reparation policy give rise to mischievous consequences in itself but, what is even more important, it may jeopardize the achievement of the political and economic objectives of this country vis-a-vis Germany. For these reasons the reparation settlement with Germany is an issue of major importance to the United States.

Accordingly, the guiding principle of U. S. policy in regard to reparation should be that the reparation claims of our Allies should be supported only if, and to the extent that, such claims do not conflict with the other elements of the settlement with Germany. Reparation policies must conform and be subordinate to the security and economic measures adopted with respect to Germany; these measures should not be modified or weakened to enable Germany to pay more reparation.

Conceived thus as a "residual", the reparation program will be determined, in its main outlines, by prior decisions with regard to industrial controls, export restrictions, territorial adjustments, etc. which may be imposed on Germany. For example, if chief reliance for economic security is placed on selective prohibitions and controls, Germany may be able (barring extreme war damage) to deliver a large volume of reparation goods out of current production. If, on the other hand, large sections of German industry are to be permanently dismantled, the bulk of reparation payments would necessarily take the form of transfers of existing German capital equipment, rather than of current output, and the total volume of reparation deliveries is likely to be comparatively small. Similarly, restriction of exports for commercial reasons, or important transfers of territory, would likewise affect the amount and form of reparation.

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The following recommendations with regard to reparation are intended to be consistent with the proposals of the State Department for the economic treatment of Germany. 1/ They make no assumption with respect to territorial changes.

2. Reparation Policy Recommendations

The most important elements of the German reparation program will be (a) its "weight", (b) its duration, (c) its form, (d) the allocation of payments.

(a) In principle, the entire surplus above the output needed (1) to maintain a minimum prescribed standard of living, and (2) to pay for occupation costs, relief, and other prior charges, should be appropriated for reparation.

It would probably be desirable to make it clear to the other interested powers that the U.S. will not finance the transfer of reparation either directly by extending loans or credits to Germany, or indirectly by assuming the burden of supplying at its own expense essential goods or equipment to Germany.

In order to avoid difficulties with public opinion in the Allied countries, which is likely to regard any given amount of reparation as inadequate to compensate for the damage and suffering inflicted by Germany, as well as for other reasons, the statement of the reparation obligation in terms of a specific monetary amount should be avoided.

(b) It is essential for the early recovery of normal trade that the reparation program should be of relatively short duration. The uncompensated, one-way, transfers of reparation goods from Germany must necessarily interfere with the export trade of other countries. The longer reparation lasts, moreover, the more strongly

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1/ See Economic Policies Toward Germany, memorandum dated January 11, 1945.

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is Germany likely to become entrenched in the markets of the claimant states; the more difficult, also, will be the readjustment of both paying and receiving countries at the end of the reparation period. The interference with normal trade may be relatively slight in the first two or three years after the war when trading conditions are in any case apt to be highly abnormal and the overall supply of goods may fall short of reconstruction needs and deferred demands. Beyond that time, however, the interference with normal trade will become progressively greater. It is recommended, accordingly, that the reparation period should be limited, if possible, to five years, and in any event should not exceed ten years.

~(c) To avoid "transfer" difficulties, the reparation obligation should be payable preponderantly "in kind", i.e., in goods and services, rather than in foreign exchange. The goods should be such as Germany is able to deliver and the claimant countries are willing to receive, both conditions being necessary for "transferability".

United nations claiming reparation from Germany, in addition to being entitled to payments in kind, should have the option of retaining and disposing of all German property and rights within their territories and to apply the proceeds against their reparation claims.

The Soviet Government will probably demand, in satisfaction of part its reparation claim, the performance of labor services by German manpower in Russia. There is no compelling reason for the United States to oppose such claims within reasonable limits, provided that in the conscription of the labor force a distinction is made between formerly active Nazis and politically passive Germans, with minimum standards of treatment and a relatively short period of service for the latter.

(d) The principal basis for the apportionment of reparation among the claimant states should be the amount of damage to and loss of non-military property, exclusive of current output, caused by or incident to hostilities. As a supplementary basis of allocation, occupation costs (including for this purpose clearing

balances

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balances accrued in Germany during the occupation period) should also be allowed as an admissible claim, but at a lower weighting than property losses. The reparation settlement should be considered as clearing finally all outstanding claims against Germany arising out of the war.

3. Restitution:

The following policy recommendations are made:

(a) In principle there should be an unlimited obligation on Germany to restore identifiable stolen property. In practice, however, official efforts to locate such property will have to be confined to a limited number of categories such as art treasures, securities, machinery, rolling stock, et cetera.

(b) Looted property should be returned by a Restitution Commission to the Government having jurisdiction over the territory where the property had its situs and not to the former owners individually. The Commission should not be burdened with the task of deciding disputes with respect to ownership, liens, etc. Such questions, whether intra-national, or involving two or more countries, should be adjudicated in the place from which the property was taken.

(c) All property transferred to Germany during the period of German occupation should be presumed to have been transferred under duress and accordingly treated as looted property.

The British Government has been pressing in the European Advisory Commission for the early establishment of a Restitution Commission to cope with the complex problems of restitution which will arise as soon as enemy territory is occupied to any appreciable extent. This Government has indicated its general approval of the British proposal, subject to certain reservations.

The French have also introduced a proposal for restitution into the European Advisory Commission.

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Their concept of "restitution", however, apparently goes far beyond the mere restoration of identifiable objects and would include the replacement of lost or destroyed objects with similar or equivalent goods found in Germany at the time of surrender. It is believed that such a broad application of the principle of replacement is undesirable. Claims for lost or destroyed property should be embraced in the reparation settlement; "replacement" should be confined to unique objects such as art treasures, and possibly gold.

4. German Foreign Holdings

"German" property in neutral and satellite countries can be divided into three categories:

1. Looted Property: This is not properly German property, and the principle of restitution has already been indicated.
2. Flight Capital. This is property which is and has been leaving Germany for refuge from post-hostilities Allied control. Efforts are now being made to have the neutrals prevent ingress of such property, and to segregate and control that which has already left Germany.
3. German Foreign Investment. Control over this property is essential to the control of the German economic system. Cooperative U.S. and U.K. efforts are being made to conduct a census of such property, to have it segregated, and make it available for such disposition as may be agreed on among the Allies.

A coordinated effort, particularly directed at the neutrals, to control these classes of property is being made. The United States, United Kingdom, and USSR, among others of the United Nations, have cooperated in the issuance and endorsement of the following documents: Declaration of January 5, 1943, declaring a policy of refusal to recognize Axis acts of dispossession, in whatever form; Gold Declaration of February 22, 1944, declaring a policy of refusal to purchase gold from nations which have not ceased gold purchases, directly or indirectly, from the Axis; Bretton Woods Resolution VI, calling on neutrals to take appropriate action with respect to loot, flight capital, and German foreign investment.

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TREATMENT OF AUSTRIA - SUMMARY

I. The basic aim of American policy in Austria is its immediate separation from Germany and establishment of an independent Austrian state. This aim is expressed in the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943 (text attached in Appendix I), which promised Austria liberation from German domination and pledged the three powers to open the way for the Austrian people themselves to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for a lasting peace. Austria's strategic location in Central Europe makes both its future internal stability and its relations to neighboring states a matter of pressing concern to the international community and to the United States.

II. The United States favors restoration of the 1937 frontiers of Austria with the addition of the province of Bolzano from Italy and the exclusion of two small mountain communities in the Sonthofen area attached to Bavaria.

III. The aims of American policy, the Moscow Declaration, and the requirements of general security can best be achieved by the following steps:

A. Complete tripartite military occupation and government of Austria. (To assure us a full voice in Austria, the Department of State recommends that we occupy a zone equally with the British and Russians. It is clear that we cannot have an equal voice without equal participation in the actual occupation. The Department of State recommends that changes be made in the Soviet proposal for zonal occupation to enlarge the area of the City of Vienna to include the Gau of Vienna to extend tripartite division to the Innere Stadt of Vienna, and to include Ost-Tirol in the same occupation zone as the province of Kärnten).

B. Legal, administrative and economic separation from Germany, and denazification.

C. Treatment different from Germany, designed to foster:

1. Restoration

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1. Restoration of self-government at local and national levels as rapidly as military exigencies and internal political conditions permit;

2. Revival of a sound Austrian economy within the framework of European reconstruction;

3. Prompt establishment of an independent Austrian state.

IV. It is in the interest of the United States that Austria develop that type of political and economic structure which will not place it in the position of a special ward of the international community or of any single power. The Austrian people should be free to determine their own form of government and the adjustment of their political and economic relations with their neighbors with the proviso that the new regime be democratic and that it accept such international responsibilities and obligations as the tripartite powers may see fit to impose.

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APPENDIX I

MOSCOW DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA November 1, 1943

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938 as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see reestablished a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

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ECONOMIC TREATMENT OF AUSTRIA

SUMMARY

The United States is committed to the political objective of a free and independent Austria. Stable and prosperous economic conditions in Austria would provide a strong underpinning for political independence and encourage support from the Austrian people for a separate Austrian sovereignty.

From the moment of occupation it will be necessary to commence the reconstruction of the Austrian economy. The tripartite military government should at once undertake the eradication of German economic influence in that country as well as the denazification of economic life. It must provide some substitute for German economic administration and should sequester all Reich German properties in Austria and administer them on behalf of the eventual Austrian Government. It should take steps to establish financial autonomy, including an exchange of currency and probably the payment of interest on the public debt. Within its capabilities it should attempt to revive civilian production in order to avoid large-scale unemployment and to satisfy essential requirements. Finally it should encourage the revival of Austria's foreign trade and if necessary bring in relief supplies of foodstuffs and perhaps materials for the rehabilitation of Austrian industry.

Most of the longer-range economic problems in Austria can be dealt with effectively only when an acceptable indigenous government comes to power. In the settlement of occupation costs Austria should bear the cost of all expenditures incurred in the country by the occupying forces and should be charged for the value of the relief imports. On the other hand, it should be credited for the amount of troop pay spent in the country. It is recommended that Austria should neither pay nor receive reparation. Payments by Austria would threaten its economic viability, while Allied claims to German reparation will be so large that Austria cannot be allotted a share. By the same token, Austria should not obtain any compensation from Germany for German currency, public debt, etc., held in Austria. The Allied powers should assist the eventual Austrian Government in a long-range program of economic and financial reconstruction, in particular by helping it to obtain foreign markets and credits. Austria should be admitted eventually to any world economic organizations that may be formed (including the World Fund and Bank). In addition the major Allied powers may have to make loans to Austria justified on political rather than commercial grounds.

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SUMMARY

SUGGESTED UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING POLAND

With regard to Poland, we should continue to maintain our announced policy which has for its objective the eventual establishment by the Polish people of a truly democratic government of their own choice. In the attainment of this end, we should endeavor to prevent any interim regime from being established which would exclude any major element of the population and threaten to crystallize into a permanent government before the will of the population could become manifest. In pursuance of this policy, we should not recognize the Provisional Government of Lublin, at least until more conclusive evidence is received that it does in fact represent the basic wishes of the Polish people. With the same objective in view, we should use our full influence to see that the Polish Peasant Party, the largest in the country, and its leader, Mikolajczyk, are given an opportunity to take a leading role in any interim arrangements which may be made pending full liberation and free elections. In order that the eventual elections may achieve the objective we seek, we should sponsor United Nations arrangements for their supervision.

With respect to the Polish frontier, we should use our influence to obtain a solution of this problem which would minimize future points of friction, possible irredentism and the number of minority groups which would have to be transferred as a part of the settlement in order that the solution would contribute to the fullest possible extent to the peace and future tranquility of Europe. In pursuance of this objective, we should support a frontier settlement which in the east would take the Curzon Line as a basis but would, if possible, include the Province of Lwow in Poland in order that this predominantly Polish city and the economically important oil fields to the southwest would remain within the frontiers of the Polish state. In the north, Poland should receive the bulk of East Prussia and, in the west, the only changes in the 1939 frontier we should support should be the inclusion of a small strip of Pomerania west of the so-called Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia. We should resist the exaggerated claims now being advanced by the Provisional Government of Lublin for "compensation" from Germany which would include the cities of Stettin and Breslau in Poland and make necessary the transfer of from eight to ten million Germans. In connection with the frontier settlement, we should, in so far as practicable and in collaboration with the other United Nations, be prepared to assist in the orderly transfer of minority groups provided the Polish Government so desires.

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RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND AND THE BALKANS:
AMERICAN INTERESTS AND SOVIET ATTITUDE

Summary

1. United States economic interests in the reconstruction of Poland and the Balkan states are general, the early return of trade to a multilateral basis and the achievement of European economic stability and prosperity. Politically, while this Government probably would not oppose predominant Soviet influence in the area, neither would it wish American influence to be completely nullified.

2. All of the nations require assistance in improving present primitive agricultural methods. All will probably require reconstruction of their railways, replacement of rolling stock, and rehabilitation of roadbed and bridges. Whether Poland will require extensive industrial reconstruction will depend on the future course of the war and whether the Germans "scorch" the area.

3. The United States will share in such reconstruction by Export-Import Bank credits, by technical aid especially to agriculture, and by participation in loans by the proposed International Bank. However, the possibilities of credit assistance to Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria may be considerably limited by their reparations obligations.

4. The Soviet attitude towards United States participation in this area is uncertain. She may feel so strong that American financial aid will not be unwelcome, although she would probably prefer to act as the intermediary or to see the loans made by the International Bank.

Reconstruction of Poland and the Balkans: American Interests
and Soviet Attitude

1. Interests of the United States.

Economic:

a. Interest in the early return of trade to a multilateral basis under the freest possible conditions. The pattern of Europe's future commercial policy will be strongly influenced, if not largely determined, by policies and procedures established during the period of reconstruction. Whether post-war conditions lead back to bilateralism, restriction and autarchy, or are resolved in a manner which will permit the progressive growth and liberalization of trade and investment will depend in no small measure on the ability of the wartorn countries to obtain outside (i.e., mostly American) help in reconstruction.

b. Interest in general European economic stability. This stability depends on the maintenance of sound economic conditions and reasonable prosperity in all parts of the Continent.

Political: It now seems clear that the Soviet Union will exert predominant political influence over the areas in question. While this Government probably would not want to oppose itself to such a political configuration, neither would it desire to see American influence in this part of the world completely nullified.

In the situation which is likely to prevail in Poland and the Balkan states after the war, the United States can hope to make its influence felt only if some degree of equal opportunity in trade, investment, and access to sources of information is preserved. American aid in the reconstruction of these areas would not only gain the good-will of the populations involved, but would also help bring about conditions which would permit the adoption of relatively liberal policies of this nature.

2. Types

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2. Types of Reconstruction Needs.

The reconstruction needs of the areas under reference will, of course, vary from country to country. Poland is the only country that may require extensive industrial reconstruction. This will depend almost entirely on the future course of the war over Polish territory. If the extensive industrial installations in the west remain intact, Poland may be able to supply almost all of her reconstruction requirements from internal resources. Should these districts be "scorched", however, not only would the amount of damage be enormously increased, but there would also be destroyed, in whole or in great part, Poland's ability to repair the damage by herself.

All of the countries involved are likely to stand in need of reconstruction of their railway systems, owing to the large-scale, thoroughgoing looting of rolling stock by the retreating enemy, destruction of road-bed and bridges, etc.

The economies of both Poland and the Balkan states, particularly of the latter, are predominantly agricultural, and in the field of agriculture it is difficult to draw a sharp line between "reconstruction" and "development." Much of the agriculture in these countries is conducted by primitive methods, and improvement in this sector of the economy holds out the greatest hope for raising standards of living from their present very low level.

3. Possible Forms of American Participation.

The United States can share in the reconstruction of Poland and the Balkans in several different ways, prominent among which would be direct loans from the Export-Import Bank and participation in loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Private American investment is unlikely in this area for some years to come at least.

Probably one of the most useful and at the same time least expensive forms in which the United States can aid in the reconstruction of Poland and the Balkan states is

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by making available to them technical assistance, especially in the field of agriculture.

4. The Soviet Attitude toward United States Participation.

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward American participation in the reconstruction of Poland and the Balkans is uncertain. It seems clear that, for security reasons, the Soviet Government is seeking to make sure that these countries will be oriented to the East, both politically and economically.

However, in the case of one or another of the border countries, Poland for example, the Russians might have grounds to feel at an early date that an Eastern political orientation was more or less assured in any case and that foreign loans to such countries could have no decisive influence in this respect. Furthermore, the Soviet Union will have some interest in seeing that her neighbors prosper under her tutelage.

The Soviet Union probably would like most to borrow herself the money that might be available for the border countries, and to finance from the resources available to her their reconstruction and development needs. The Soviet Union might prefer, in any case, to have the reconstruction and development of the border countries financed through the International Bank rather than through direct loans from the United States.

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GENERAL BALKAN POLICY

It is the desire of this Government that the three principal Allies should consider the problems of South-eastern Europe in their relation to general European welfare and security. The distinctions between Allied and enemy states are gradually merging into a single problem as the "satellites" come under the administration of Allied Control Commissions, with some participation in the war against Germany in a status approaching co-belligerency.

An important aspect of this problem is the tendency of one or another of the principal Allies to exert a particular influence in a given country, or to come to an arrangement defining the regions where such influence would be admitted as paramount (See separate paper on American Policy toward Spheres of Influence). The mere dissociation of the United States from such arrangements does not constitute a policy unless an effort is made to impress upon the other principal Allies the need for restraint, if the several peoples are really to be left free to determine the kind of democratic institutions best suited to their needs.

In a recent consideration of these problems the Department agreed on certain basic principles by which the policy of this Government should be guided. They are:

1. The right of peoples to choose for themselves without outside interference the type of political, social, and economic systems they desire, so long as they conduct their affairs in such a way as not to menace the peace and security of others.
2. Equality of opportunity, as against the setting up of a policy of exclusion, in commerce, transit and trade; and freedom to negotiate, either through government agencies or private enterprise, irrespective of the type of economic system in operation.
3. The right of access to all countries on an equal and unrestricted basis of bona fide representatives of the recognized press and information agencies of other nations engaged in gathering news and other forms of public information for dissemination to the public in their own countries; and the right to transmit information gathered by them to points outside such territories without hindrance or discrimination.

4. Freedom for American philanthropic and educational organizations to carry on their activities in the respective countries on the basis of most favored-nation treatment.

5. General protection of American citizens and the protection and furtherance of legitimate American economic rights, existing or potential.

The United States should also be prepared to participate through recommendations in territorial settlements of questions involving general security.

Since each of the Balkan countries presents separate problems, the solution of which would carry forward the ideas expressed above, separate papers have been prepared discussing them.

There are two correlated questions which may shortly require attention, with reference to the whole Southern European region; namely, the project for a union of Bulgaria with Yugoslavia, and the agitation for an integral Macedonia. Both of these questions really involve consideration of the scheme for a Balkan federation. The British Government has just informed us that it would welcome such a grouping, to include both allied and enemy states, and possibly to include Turkey, but would not favor an exclusive union or federation involving only Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, since this would be unlikely to promote the larger grouping and would also isolate Greece and endanger her position. As regards Macedonia the British Government is willing to acquiesce in the formation of a Macedonian state as a federal unit in Yugoslavia provided only territories previously belonging to Yugoslavia are involved leaving the "Macedonia" parts of Bulgaria and Greece to these respective countries. The British have also communicated these views to the Soviet Government. The Department is now considering its reply to this communication. Our present thinking is generally in line with the British attitude.

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AMERICAN POSITION ON ALLIED CONTROL
COMMISSIONS IN RUMANIA, BULGARIA AND HUNGARY

The United States is represented on the Allied Control Commissions established to control the execution of the armistice agreements with Rumania and Bulgaria. The Commissions are organized on the same general pattern as the Allied Commission in Italy with Russia playing the leading role which Great Britain and the United States have in Italy. The Commission for Rumania operates under statutes drawn up by the Soviet Governments. So far as the Department is aware, no similar statutes govern the operations of the Commission for Bulgaria. The organization of the Commission for Hungary is now under discussion at Moscow.

The United States Government has not taken exception to the Soviet view that the actual operation of the Commissions should be in the hands of the Soviet military authorities, at least in the period before the surrender of Germany. The Department believes strongly, however, that policy directives should not be issued to the local Governments by the Soviet authorities in the name of the Commissions without prior consultation with the American and British representatives. Otherwise the United States is in the public mind associated with actions of which it has no official knowledge.

Following Germany's surrender the United States would like to see the Control Commissions become genuinely tripartite in character, with all three Allied Governments having equal participation.

In Rumania, the Soviet Chairman of the Commission has accepted the principle of prior consultation with the American delegation before the issuance of directives. Notwithstanding this apparent improvement there is now before us a new example of the Soviet unilateral method; namely, the orders issued to the Rumanian Government to prepare lists of racial Germans in Rumania for deportation to Soviet Russia for labor service. This matter is now being taken up in Bucharest, and representations will also be made in Moscow, both as to the substance of the order, and as to the unilateral procedure adopted.

In the case of Bulgaria the Department has been informed that prior consultation does not take place. In the case of Hungary we have proposed a protocol to the armistice

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clearly defining the rights of our representatives. At the present moment of negotiation it appears that our proposed text of this protocol may not be accepted, but the discussion now taking place at Moscow will doubtless result in more satisfactory provisions as regards our representation in Hungary, than had been proposed by the Soviet Government, and will probably serve also to remove some of the sources of complaint in Rumania and Bulgaria.

With respect to the second part of the armistice period the Department has taken no action regarding the Commission for Rumania. In the case of Bulgaria, on which our views were made clear during the discussion of armistice terms, the British and Soviet Governments have been informed that we reserve the right to reopen discussion of the matter at a later date. As for Hungary, we are seeking to have our equal participation stipulated in the armistice agreement period, failing which we shall make a similar reservation as in the case of Bulgaria.

In addition to its military representation on the Control Commissions, this Government has in Rumania and Bulgaria civilian "United States Representatives", who have the personal rank of Minister and who maintain informal relations with the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments, respectively. The United Kingdom has similar representatives in Rumania and Bulgaria, and, according to present plans, both the United States and the United Kingdom will be so represented in Hungary.

The United States Representatives have no connection with the work of the Allied Control Commissions except in so far as they may be consulted by the American representatives on those Commissions on matters of American foreign policy. Both delegations have of course instructions for close cooperation in the protection of American interests.

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Reparation Policy with reference to Rumania and Hungary

SUMMARY

I. The Armistice Terms for Rumania and Hungary fix the total reparations to be paid in each case at \$300,000,000, payable in kind over a period of six years.

II. In spite of American and British opposition, the Soviet Government has insisted that: 1. The amount of reparations be fixed in the Armistice Terms rather than left to future determination. 2. Reparations be valued on a 1938 basis rather than on the basis of prices prevailing at the time of delivery. 3. There be no restrictions on the right of reparation-receiving countries to re-export goods received on reparations account. 4. There be no special reparations section of the Allied Control Commission to supervise the execution of the reparations program.

III. In the Rumanian Armistice negotiations the discussion centered largely on point 1 and the United States signed the Armistice Agreement with an oral reservation that it did not consider that the reparations article established any precedent. In the Hungarian Armistice negotiations all four points have been discussed and the Soviet Government declined to recede on any of them. In view of the Soviet Government's unwillingness to agree to a reparations section of the Allied Control Commission which would supervise the execution of the Hungarian reparations program, Ambassador Harriman has been instructed to sign the Armistice Agreement only with a written reservation which may be made public.

IV. In spite of the fact that the Rumanian Armistice Terms contain no provision for labor services as reparations, the Soviet authorities in Rumania have announced and are understood to be implementing a program of drafting Rumanians of German descent for labor service in the Soviet Union. The Department is presently considering disassociating the United States Government from the Soviet action.

PRINCIPAL ALBANIAN PROBLEMS

Summary

The Albanian National Liberation Front (FNC) has formed a provisional "democratic government" to function until a constituent assembly can be elected to decide upon a permanent form of government. This authority appears to have established control over the entire country, which is now liberated. As a result of these developments, the problem of recognition by the principal Allies has now arisen. An American political mission, to be stationed temporarily in Italy, is now being organized. A British military mission, including political and economic experts, is only awaiting Foreign Office approval before entering Albania. It is desirable that the three Allied Governments should facilitate parallel and perhaps simultaneous action in the matter of recognition, by prior consultation regarding the qualifications of the existing Albanian provisional authority and the form of recognition to be granted. The United States Government, having affirmed, as have the British and Soviet Governments, the right of the Albanian people to choose their own form of government, should not favor the return of former King Zog to Albania, at least until an elected constituent assembly has decided upon a permanent government.

All practicable arrangements for expediting relief supplies for Albania should be supported, but our position in support of the principle of equitable distribution and against the use of relief supplies for political purposes should be maintained.

With reference to Southern Albania, a zone of potential Albanian-Greek conflict, this Government should favor the retention of the pre-war boundary, pending an objective examination of the respective claims.

This Government should uphold the principle of non-exclusion in Albanian economic affairs and be prepared to share in the extension of financial and technical assistance in order to lay the foundation for an independent and viable Albanian state.

PRINCIPAL BULGARIAN PROBLEMS

Allied Control Commission

Pursuant to Article 18 of the Armistice terms, an Allied Control Commission has been set up to govern Bulgaria pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace. The article by its terms gives the Soviet Union a large measure of control over Bulgaria during the period from the signing of the Armistice until the termination of hostilities against Germany. The Soviet Government expects such control to continue also after this period, but the United States has not accepted the Soviet position. We maintain, and have so advised the Soviet Government, that we wish to make the division of powers among the members of the Control Commission during the second period a matter of future discussion.

Thus far the Soviet rôle in the Control Commission has even exceeded the proportions assigned it by Article 18. Developments have reached a stage disquieting to ourselves and alarming to the British. The latter have communicated their grievances to Moscow in the form of a personal note from Mr. Eden to Mr. Molotov. Bearing in mind that the range of our complaints is not so wide as that of the British, we have taken a more moderate course, hoping to adjust some of the difficulties on the spot.

We are preparing an approach to Moscow designed principally to effect a modification of the present Soviet practice of making decisions and instituting measures in the name of the Allied Control Commission, without consultation with the American and British representatives. We also expect to effect the removal of restrictions on the movements of our representatives in Bulgaria, and better facilities for clearance of personnel and aircraft entering Bulgaria.

Conditions within Bulgaria

The country is ruled - aside from the Soviet Chairman of the Allied Control Commission - by a coalition government known as the "Fatherland Front", composed of representatives of the Communist Party and the Agrarian and Union-Zveno parties, in which it appears that the Communists are steadily gaining the ascendancy, aided covertly by Russian occupation authorities. Although the Agency ostensibly perpetuates the monarchical form of government, there have been reports that the safety of the Queen Mother, and perhaps the boy-King, Simeon II, may be endangered.

Bulgarian

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Bulgarian Relations with Greece and Yugoslavia

Bulgarian foreign relations are in effect under the supervision of the Control Commission, meaning, for practical purposes, the Soviet authorities. Thus far we have not learned much about these relations, but we consider certain public statements and other manifestations relating to Greece and Yugoslavia to be of great significance.

The Armistice and its accompanying Protocol provide for the delivery of reparation and restitution goods from Bulgaria to Greece, but no appreciable progress has been made as yet. Two Greek delegations arrived in Sofia, but neither of them could show proper credentials or authority, and a duly accredited official representative to the Allied Control Commission has not yet been sent to Sofia, due probably to the political difficulties in Greece. While the Soviet chairman of the Allied Control Commission has indicated a willingness to have a Greek representative at Sofia, there may well be opposition, on the part of the Russians, to deliveries from Bulgaria to Greece on any such scale as the Greeks demand. Bulgarian relations with Greece are further complicated by the reported incursions of Bulgarian irregular forces into Greek Thrace and Macedonia.

In marked contrast to her relations with Greece, Bulgarian relations with Tito's National Liberation Front in Yugoslavia are of a most friendly nature. Thus, Bulgarian atrocities in Serbia appear to have been forgiven by Tito and Bulgarian measures for Yugoslav relief have been announced, probably resulting from direct Yugoslav-Bulgarian negotiations sanctioned by the Soviet authorities in the name of the Allied Control Commission.

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PRINCIPAL HUNGARIAN PROBLEMS

Summary

The long-range interest of the United States in the maintenance of peace and stability in central Europe may be involved in the issues now arising in connection with terms of armistice for Hungary, with the control of Hungary during the armistice period, and with the territorial settlement. The two most pressing problems are (1) the share which the United States will have in the work of the Allied Control Commission, and (2) the payment of reparation by Hungary.

It is possible that Soviet and American policy may not be in harmony if the Soviet Union uses its position as the power in actual control of the execution of the armistice to intervene in Hungarian domestic affairs, to dominate Hungary, or to pursue a severe policy on the reparation question which would cripple Hungarian economy and thus delay the economic recovery of Europe and the restoration of normal economic relationships based on equal treatment for all nations.

While American and British interests are more or less the same in these questions, we prefer an independent approach to the Russians and should seek agreement on solutions and procedures which take account of the interests of all these and of the other United Nations. It would be desirable to secure the agreement of the British and Soviet Governments to the following principles:

1. Participation of the American and British Governments in the execution of the armistice to the maximum degree consistent with leaving to the Soviet High Command decisions connected with the conduct of military operations; after Germany's surrender all three Governments should have equal representation and responsibility;
2. An Allied economic policy toward Hungary which will reconcile legitimate claims of Allied nations to reparation with the general interest in promoting the rapid economic recovery of Europe;
3. The desirability of reaching a settlement of the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier dispute and of encouraging an eventual settlement between Hungary and Czechoslovakia and perhaps between Hungary and Yugoslavia, by friendly mutual negotiation, which would take into account the Hungarian ethnic claims.

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PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN PROBLEMS

Summary

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The long-range interest of the United States in the maintenance of peace and stability in eastern Europe may be involved in the issues now arising in connection with the control of Rumania during the armistice period and with the eventual peace settlement. The fundamental problem is the degree to which the United States will acquiesce in the exercise by the Soviet Union of a dominant or exclusive influence in Rumania. The British seem to fear that present Soviet policies threaten Rumania's existence as an independent state and may block the British plans to restore their pre-war political and economic position in Rumania. Prominent Rumanians have made direct appeals to American representatives in Bucharest for an indication of the policy of the United States on the matter of possible Soviet domination of Rumania.

Under the armistice agreement, to which all three principal Allied Governments were parties, the Allied Control Commission operates under the general direction of the Soviet High Command. The Soviet authorities have taken a number of unilateral decisions, such as those involving the property of American-owned petroleum companies, on matters which the Department believes should have been made the subject of consultation and agreement among the three Allied Governments.

It would be desirable to secure the agreement of the British and Soviet Governments to the following principles:

1. Respect for the Rumanian people's right to independence and to the choice of their own government;
2. An Allied economic policy toward Rumania, under the armistice and the peace settlement, which will reconcile the legitimate claims of Allied nations to reparation with the general interest in promoting the rapid economic recovery of Europe;
3. The desirability of finding a solution of the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier dispute which will give some satisfaction to Hungary's legitimate claims and promote peaceful relations between the two states.

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PRINCIPAL YUGOSLAV PROBLEMS

Summary

The Partisan organization appears in fact to be in effective control of the liberated parts of Yugoslavia. Its present armed strength, the presence of Soviet armies under a formal agreement with Marshal Tito, and the political support of the British and Soviet Governments, over a period of many months, have created a situation in which the Partisan leaders have taken advantage of their achievements in guerrilla warfare for the creation of a powerful political organization. Its active opponents, such as the Nationalist movement under such leaders as General Mihailovic, and the less coherent opposition groups such as the Croatian Peasant Party and the Slovenian clericals, for the time being are reduced to sullen impotence. All indications point to the intention of the Partisans to establish a thoroughly totalitarian regime, in order to maintain themselves in power.

The Tito-Subasic agreement, now awaiting the King's approval in London, would transfer the effective powers of government to the Tito organization, with just enough participation of the Government in exile to facilitate recognition by other governments. The Soviet and British Governments have firmly advocated an acceptance of this agreement. This Government has refused to exert influence on the King, and has pointed out that while the language of the agreement is in line with our ideas, the real test will be the good will of the new administration in its execution.

We have also placed on record our uncertainty as to what extent the proposed agreement, in the formulation of which both Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin seem to have had a part, may be related to the arrangements between the British and Soviet Governments defining their respective interests in Southeastern Europe.

If an effort is made to associate this Government with this Yugoslav arrangement, it is recommended: (1) that we should emphasize our complete independence of action in dealing with the Yugoslav situation, despite any commitments which may be or may have been made by the British and Soviet Governments; and (2) that we should make any endorsement of a new administration in

Yugoslavia

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Yugoslavia contingent on freedom of movement and access to public opinion in Yugoslavia for our observers to survey the situation.

We could say frankly that Marshal Tito and his subordinates have not shown a disposition toward cooperation or even common civility in recent weeks. His refusal to cooperate in military plans is beyond the scope of this paper, but the attitude on questions of relief negotiations, censorship restrictions, refusal to grant travel facilities for Allied observers, the Partisan territorial demands, and propaganda policies, all show that the Partisan leadership is not disposed to work in loyal cooperation toward the general aims of the United Nations.

NOTE: The above summary and attached statement were based on the situation existing before King Peter had given any public indication of his attitude with respect to the Tito-Subasic agreement. It has just been announced that the King has refused to accept the agreement in its present form because of (1) the suggested form of the regency and (2) the provision that the Partisan Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation would wield unrestricted legislative powers until the proposed constituent assembly had finished its work. The King feels that these provisions would transfer the power in Yugoslavia to a single political group, Marshal Tito's National Liberation Front.

At this writing we do not know whether negotiations on the agreement will continue (the King has indicated his approval of the agreement's basic proposals) or whether Marshal Tito will refuse to continue the conversations and request recognition of his organization as the de jure government of Yugoslavia.

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SUMMARY OF ITALIAN PAPER

United States policy toward Italy is, briefly, to encourage the development of Italy into a democratic and constructive force in the future Europe and to assist Italy to become politically independent and economically self-supporting as quickly as possible. The steps which this Government has taken to date to implement these policies are recounted.

19

Major questions of policy which might be taken up with the British and Soviet Governments and their concurrence obtained are:

(1) Supersession of the Italian instrument of surrender (long and short terms) by a convention to terminate the state of war between Italy and the United Nations;

(2) Italian request for the participation in United Nations international bodies and conferences as an associated nation;

(3) Italian participation, as an associated nation, in the German surrender instrument;

(4) Italian Committee of National Liberation as a basis for representative government during the interim period;

(5) Italian national elections, after the Germans have been expelled, to determine the form of government and constitution which the Italian people desire;

(6) Italian participation in the war against Japan.

Questions which the British or Soviet Governments may raise concerning Italy requiring this Government to take a position are as follows:

(1) Allied support of the House of Savoy during the interim period;

(2) Territorial dispositions and reparations;

(3) Progress of defascistization in Italy;

(4) Use of Allied forces to support the Italian Government in the event of civil war.

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FRANCE

Summary

1) Role in United Nations Councils

American interests require that every effort be made by this Government to assist France, morally as well as physically, to regain her strength and her influence, not only with a view toward increasing the French contribution to the war effort, but also with a view toward enabling the French to assume larger responsibilities in connection with the maintenance of peace. It is likewise in the interest of this Government to treat France in all respects on the basis of her potential power and influence rather than on the basis of her present strength.

2) Zone of Occupation in Germany

The President has already approved in principle five proposals forwarded by the French which are designed to place France on a footing of equality with the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union with regard to German affairs. It is not known what zone the French will ultimately ask for, but they have expressed continued interest in the Rhineland and there is every likelihood that they will favor an occupation of the Rhineland over so long a period that it may easily become permanent.

3) Control Machinery for Germany

One of the French proposals approved by the President in principle is that the French will have an equal part in the control machinery for Germany.

4) Attitude Toward Future German Economy

Indications are that the French do not wish to see Germany reduced to economic misery since they believe that this would inevitably breed trouble. They do, however, favor the elimination of all German war industries and near war industries. General de Gaulle is also known to favor an international administrative and economic regime for the Ruhr.

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MEMORANDUM

Subject: Rearming of French Forces.

Last August the British Embassy raised with the Department of State the question of equipping the armed forces of certain Western European Allies to enable them to maintain security in their own countries and to take part in the occupation of Germany. At that same time the British Chiefs of Staff placed the same proposal before the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. The British proposed that in view of the fact that French ground military units were presently furnished with American arms, that the United States should furnish arms and equipment to the French forces for the purposes indicated. The British, on the other hand, would furnish arms and equipment to the Belgians, Dutch, Norwegians and eventually the Danish. The British proposed that they furnish the French with air equipment. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Department of State that the British proposals, from a military point of view, were acceptable to them, but that the matter should be handled on a Government to Government level and not on a Combined Chiefs of Staff level.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also indicated their view that the Soviet Government should be informed of the proposed action. Two memoranda (copies attached) on the subject were submitted to the President for his approval. That approval has now been received. The armament involved in these proposals is for post-European war delivery and is not involved in the present arrangements now under execution for the equipping of eight additional French divisions. The manner in which the equipment involved in the British proposal is to be supplied to the French Government is one to be worked out with the War Department and not at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As soon as the mechanical arrangements can be made with the War Department it is proposed to discuss the matter first with the French authorities at a Government and at the same time to inform both the British and the Soviet authorities of the action we have taken.

The manner in which payment may be made by the French Government for the supplies thus envisaged is to be determined in discussion with the French authorities.

The British Embassy has informed the Department of State that the Departments of the French Government concerned in this matter are considering the complicated question of how far the mutual aid agreements between the
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United Kingdom Government and the countries in question are applicable to the equipment and training of Allied forces for the post-hostilities period. The British Embassy states that when final conclusions have been reached the Department of State will be informed. The equipping and training by the United Kingdom Government of Belgian, Norwegian and Dutch forces are at present governed by mutual aid agreements in force between the United Kingdom and the Governments in question.

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arming of French Forces.

In late August, the British Embassy approached the State Department, and the British Chiefs of Staff approached the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with reference to the adequate equipment of the forces of the Western European Allies, to enable them to maintain security in their own countries and to take part in occupying Germany. The question was asked whether the United States Government would be willing to re-equip a French Army for such purposes from American sources during the next few years, having in mind that present French land forces are provided with American munitions and materiel. British Chiefs of Staff suggested a continuance of British supply to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium.

The United States Chiefs of Staff, through Admiral Leahy, stated to the Department that there was no objection on military grounds to the division of responsibility proposed but that no commitments should be made that will be rigidly exclusive for the future.

The authority to deliver supplies for security or occupation forces is given by the Lend-Lease Act, and these munitions could be furnished on straight lend-lease or on credit under Section 3(c) of the Act. We could also furnish such supplies for cash, but cash purchases might use on dollars needed for civilian supply and reconstruction.

I recommend that we accept the British proposal, but suggest dealing directly with the French. Our present policy toward France is based on the belief that it is in the best interests of the United States that France resume her traditional position as a principal power capable of playing a part in the occupation of Germany and in maintaining peace in Europe. The recruiting and equipping of French land forces would be a natural corollary of this policy, and politically such a move could be portrayed as a further evidence of American friendship for France and a proof of our desire to see her as a strong nation. The furnishing of arms by the United States to France may provide this Government with a

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lever to exercise a certain measure of influence on French policy for a number of years. However, it must be borne in mind that France will make every effort to obtain arms from any source.

We are presently in the process of preparing a lend-lease agreement to be proposed to the French, and under that proposal these military supplies could be furnished on a straight lend-lease basis. However, unless the British are agreeable to furnishing comparable military supplies to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium on a similar basis, we may have to reconsider the implementation of our proposal in order to standardize the terms of our arrangements with the French and those made by the British with the other four countries in question.

I recommend further that the Soviet Government be informed of what the British and the American Governments propose to do, and that it be pointed out that the arming of the Western European Allies is on a non-restrictive basis.

(The foregoing proposal and recommendation are not of course related to the equipment and maintenance of French ground forces by General Eisenhower for utilization in the present campaign against Germany for which the General has full authority.)

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COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

December 27, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Desire of British Government to Assist in Re-equipping the French Air Force

A communication has been received from the British Embassy relative to the desire of the British Government to make an immediate offer to the French authorities to assist in re-equipping the French Air Force. A copy of the communication in question is attached herewith.

As indicated in the British aide memoire, the specific proposal now advanced was considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Leahy informed the Secretary of State that "from the military point of view there is no objection" to the British proposal whereby the British would undertake to equip certain French air units.

The "certain French air units" referred to in Admiral Leahy's letter are the same as those described in the attached aide memoire.

The British attach importance to proceeding with this matter as soon as possible and in view of the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is recommended that we notify the British that we approve.

The question of our supplying equipment for French land forces, which was the main subject of Admiral Leahy's letter under reference, is being dealt with in a separate memorandum.

Enclosure:
From British Embassy

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FRENCH VIEWS ON THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY

General Observations

A very considerable proportion of the French population - possibly a majority - still holds that some Germans are not beyond salvation and that a purged and chastened Germany must eventually regain an important position in Europe. The most consistent exponents of this viewpoint have been the Socialists. However, the Socialists have few illusions about the Germans and regard a European federation as primarily designed to keep Germany in check. During the past year the attitude of the Socialists has hardened on the German problem.

The Communists, while generally avoiding comment on the German problem, have shown some tendency to distinguish between "good" and "bad" Germans.

The elements commonly referred to as Christian Democrats are probably in accord with Foreign Minister Bidault, whose view has been that Germany should not be enslaved but should be rendered incapable of waging another war.

General de Gaulle recently declared that for France, the German problem is "the center of the universe" and the country may be said to be unanimous in demanding effective security measures. There is still considerable division regarding the method of achieving this objective. Dismemberment has considerable support in political Conservative circles, and possibly among the rank and file of Frenchmen as well. The majority of prominent Frenchmen, however, appear to consider dismemberment impractical.

Even those Frenchmen who outspokenly oppose dismemberment appear willing to see extensive territorial transfers carried out. For instance, it is reliably reported that General de Gaulle was disposed to approve the potential cessation of Trans-Oder region to Poland. The separation of Austria from Germany is also taken for granted and the Provisional Government is committed to the restoration of the Sudetan areas to Czechoslovakia. Some sentiment has been expressed for additional frontier rectification in favor of the Czechoslovakians.

The French agree that Germany, whether dismembered or not, must be subjected to a long military occupation, coupled with rigid economic controls. The exact nature of

these

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these controls remains a subject of discussion and has not been greatly clarified by the so-called "Massigli Plan". Foreign Minister Bidault believes that industrial controls might be modeled after those used by the Germans in France and believes that German industries and university laboratories should remain indefinitely under Allied supervision. The Communists have been fulminating against the trusts, but are apparently inclined to leave German industry in German hands. The French Communist line at present appears to harmonize with that followed by the Soviet-sponsored "Free Germany Committee", which holds out the hope that the Germans may continue to run their own affairs once they have repudiated the Hitler regime.

While both Right and Left in France demand direct security measures in Germany, the Socialists are the most inclined to persist in their old faith that collective security, organized on both a European and a world scale, will in the long run be of equal importance in curbing German aggression. They are particularly attracted to the idea of a European federation.

With regard to the Rhineland and the Ruhr, virtually every Frenchman who has expressed an opinion favors special measures of some sort in that area. These views range from outright annexation of all or part of the area to measures of international economic control which single out this region from the rest of Germany. Recently, there has been increasing evidence of a desire to sever the Rhineland from main German state.

General de Gaulle's statements on the Rhineland have been growing increasingly frank. Latest information indicates that he prefers outright French annexation rather than French control of an autonomous state. He is believed to favor the establishment of an international control for the Ruhr.

Those who favor international rather than French control of the Rhineland believe that such a policy would commit other nations to the maintenance of French security. They are therefore against annexation by France, either outright or disguised.

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Although a consistent French policy toward Germany is still in process of development, the following tentative conclusions seem justified:

1) The French will contend that their security requires, as a minimum, a long occupation and effective economic controls, the nature of which remains to be defined.

2) A general dismemberment of the Reich will not be advocated by the French, although they would not be likely to oppose such dismemberment if it were suggested by other powers. The French will not sponsor the destruction of German industry and the reduction of Germany to an agrarian state.

3) The French seem prepared to approve the transfer of German territory east of the Oder to Poland and the U.S.S.R. and the possible cession of border areas to Czechoslovakia. Extensive territorial transfers in the east would tend to strengthen potential French claims in the west, for the principle of German sovereignty over German populations would thus be partially abandoned, and the French could match any strategic arguments which might apply to cession of territory to the Poles.

4) The present French Government apparently aims to secure the annexation of the Rhineland to France. French policy may, however, remain flexible until the three major powers have clarified their positions as regards Germany. Adapting themselves to circumstances, the French may consider it advisable to propose disguised rather than open annexation. Such a proposal would probably involve the creation of a Rhenish state or "mandated area", separated from Germany by political and economic barriers, and occupied by the French. The latter program might be accompanied by a demand for outright annexation of the Saar and perhaps some adjoining territory. As for the Ruhr, it appears likely that a share in international economic control of the area will satisfy the French.

5) The spirit of French policy toward Germany will be influenced by the distribution of party strength within France. The Provisional Government as now constituted represents what might be described as a moderate-conservative attitude in respect to the German settlement.

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...the last extreme left (extreme left
Socialists) would probably result in a more moderate
French attitude, especially if an effective international
security system is established.

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Summary

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Czechoslovak Government's relations with the British and Soviet Governments are excellent, and present no problems. Czechoslovak-American relations (reviewed in Annex I) remain excellent, as they have been in the past.

The United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. all favor restoration of independent Czechoslovakia with substantially its 1937 frontiers. Although we favor restoring Ruthenia to Czechoslovakia we would not oppose its incorporation in the U.S.S.R. if the Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments should decide this in agreement. Czechoslovakia is not expected to present any problems for American post-war policies concerning it (detailed in Annex II).

We have no questions to raise about Czechoslovakia now; nor have Great Britain or the U.S.S.R., as far as we know.

The Czechoslovak Government itself however has raised one question which will require decision by the British, Soviet and American Governments: It has informed them of its desire to expel to Germany all undesirable Sudeten Germans (possibly two million) in the expectation that the three occupying powers will facilitate the resettlement of these persons within Germany, without any change in the Czech-German 1937 frontier. The State Department is preparing a note in reply expressing sympathy with the Czechoslovak concern about the Sudeten Germans, but opposing any unilateral action to move them until an orderly solution can be worked out in agreement between the Governments of Czechoslovakia and the occupying powers responsible for the maintenance of order for military security in Germany. The Big Three may wish to forestall precipitate action by reaching agreement along the lines of the separate memorandum on

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"Treatment of Germany", the last section of which deals with the broader question of the transfer of Germans from Poland, East Prussia and other areas as well as Czechoslovakia, who might altogether number near ten million.

Annex I: Review of United States Policy towards Czechoslovakia from 1933 to the Present.

Annex II: Post-war Policy Recommendations.

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The subjects treated in this memorandum - credits to Russia and the 3-C negotiations - have been merged because current developments have merged them. The present summary is all that can be prepared today as several proposals are under discussion and no policy decisions have been made. Early next week it will be possible to decide whether to give the President a general background with alternative suggestions or whether it will be possible to report that definitive instructions have been sent to Harriman with respect to 3-C and to make inter-agency agreed recommendations to the President on postwar credits.

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RUSSIAN REQUEST FOR FINANCING OF ACQUISITIONS
OF CAPITAL EQUIPMENT DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

Summary

1. The Russians have requested a \$6 billion credit at 2 1/4 % with amortization concluding in the thirtieth year to cover both immediate and true postwar acquisitions of industrial equipment.

2. The Department proposes to inform the Soviets through Ambassador Harriman that no long range industrial equipment can be put into production until agreement be reached on the terms of the lend-lease 3-C agreement which has been under discussion since May 1944, that we desire action on the 3-C agreement before signing the Fourth Protocol (but we should not stand too strongly on this point), and that consideration of postwar credits must be separated from the 3-C negotiations. The Department is now considering with Treasury and FEA proposed final terms.

3. With respect to true postwar credits the Department is considering with the Treasury the lending agency or authority under which such credits might be extended; the effect of extensions of credits to Russia on special terms upon general operations of the Export-Import Bank, the proposed Bretton Woods bank, and possible revival of private lending; the possibility of setting the Russian credit apart by some distinctive feature in order to avoid the establishment of restrictive precedents; and the amount of the credit.

4. The Department believes the U.S.S.R. will contract only such credits as it can service. Current Russian gold production of about \$200 million a year could service the \$6 billion credit on the terms proposed by the Soviets; about \$3 billion on usual Export-Import Bank credits.

5. Postwar credits to the U.S.S.R. can serve as a useful instrument in our overall relations with the U.S.S.R.

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THE NEEDS OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR FINANCIAL AID
DURING PHASE III

Summary

1. At the end of 1945 the British will have foreign liabilities of \$14 to 15 billion, largely in short-term sterling obligations to members of the British Commonwealth. Their long-term foreign investments will be about \$10 billion, and their net gold and dollars a little over \$2 billion.

2. It has been estimated that in the first three post-war transitional years the U.K. will incur an additional indebtedness of from \$2 to 5 billion to pay for essential imports.

3. This need would be met in part by a limited liquidation of foreign long-term investments, a small reduction in gold and dollar balances, and an increase in short-term sterling indebtedness. The International Monetary Fund and Bank would help some, especially indirectly by their effect on general international trade, investment, and economic activity.

4. It is recommended that the President, if the Prime Minister raises the issue:

a. Request a frank statement of British financial needs in Phase III.

b. Call attention to the possibilities of credit under a 3-C Lend Lease agreement, to cover supplies such as foodstuffs and raw materials on order under lend lease, but not yet exported at the close of hostilities. Other financial aid would be made possible by the adoption of our program of financial legislation.

Discussions Concerning Post-War Trade Policy
(Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreements)

Summary

In Article VII we and the British and the Russians pledged ourselves to early agreed action to reduce trade barriers as part of a broad program to maintain high levels of employment and expand the production, consumption and exchange of goods.

The pledge on trade barriers was put in Article VII because it is essential to all the rest: to carry out our own and Britain's full employment programs, to assure the success of the Monetary Fund and International Bank, to make possible eventual repayment of the large loans we will need to extend, directly and indirectly, to the rest of the world.

Unless we and the British get together urgently, while the political and trade situation is favorable, on adequate measures in the field of commercial policy (including cartels and commodity arrangements), there is grave danger that our whole foreign economic program may be undermined. While satisfactory exploratory talks on a commercial-policy plan were held with the British (on the technical level) in late 1943, the British have not appeared eager to resume discussions.

We are convinced that unless you bring your strong personal influence to bear on the Prime Minister and urge him to get these discussions started promptly, on the ministerial level and on a more definitive basis than those held earlier, the British cabinet will continue to postpone these matters indefinitely. This would be fatal to all our hopes.

To date, the Russians have not accepted any of our invitations to conduct exploratory Article VII conversations. We are prepared to hold such exploratory talks immediately and when we are ready to have formal discussions with the British we will be in a position to schedule formal discussions with the Russians and others.

Recommendations

It is strongly recommended (1) that you point out to Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin your personal interest in, and the critical importance and urgency of, commercial-policy measures to implement Article VII; and (2) that you urge them to facilitate the necessary intergovernmental discussions preparatory to a United Nations international trade conference.

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British Plan for a Western European Bloc

Summary

As a "hedge" against the possible failure of a World Security Organization the British are following the policy recommended by General Smuts of strengthening their position by drawing the nations of Western Europe into closer association with the Commonwealth. They have taken pains to affirm that such an arrangement would be within the framework of a World Security Organization, and to assure the Russians that the policy is not directed against them. They have also called attention to the fact that the Russians are following a similar line in Eastern Europe.

The Smuts idea was to offer France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark something in the nature of dominion status in the Commonwealth. It would involve such steps as the creation of a common foreign policy; coordination of military strategy; combined boards for finance, transport, production, supplies, resources, and raw materials; a customs union; currency agreements; and a joint approach to civil aviation and colonial problems.

The Russians are opposed to the plan, seeing in it primarily an attempt by Britain to strengthen her sphere of influence as against Russia. It is the British claim, and they have so informed the Russians, that it is directed against Germany. Russian opposition has led the British to "pull in their horns", but they will undoubtedly try to achieve as many as possible of the objectives of the plan by one means or another as additional security insurance.

Recommendations

The policy has been widely criticized as a return to power politics. It would tend to divide Europe into two camps when unity, rather than division, is imperative. It would accordingly militate against the chances of Dumbarton Oaks. Its economic features would run counter to the principles of free access to foreign markets and raw materials.

The paramount need is to promote understanding between Great Britain and Russia. It is recommended that no support be given to the plan at this time, or to any proposal which would encourage the division of Europe into regional blocs.

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British Plan for a Western European Bloc

On September 29, 1944, Eden informed the House of Commons that the Government had embarked on a policy of drawing the countries of Western Europe into a closer association with the British Commonwealth of Nations, thereby giving official approval to the ideas enunciated by General Smuts in 1943.

Eden emphasized that the plan was in no wise contrary to the principles of Dumbarton Oaks, that it was merely an "element in the general international system", and that it would be a buttress to strengthen the general world structure. He has also taken pains to assure the Russians that a Western Security bloc would not be directed against them but rather against a resurgent Germany, and through his Ambassador at Moscow has said that provided, in fact, regional arrangements are definitely made subordinate to a World Organization, he could not imagine that the Soviet Union would have any objection to their establishment either in the West or in the East of Europe.

Traditional British policy in Europe has been, of course, that of preventing any one state from dominating the continent. The weakness of Britain's geographical position has always been that some nation would unite the countries of Europe against her. To combat this danger, Britain has thrown her support first to one and then to another, thereby maintaining the balance of power necessary to her interests.

Heretofore there have always been several strong European powers providing the basic elements for this policy. At the end of the present war, however, this situation will have completely changed, in that Russia will be left as the sole great power on the continent -- a position unique in modern history. Britain accordingly fears that Russia will dominate the continent (including Germany) and she therefore finds herself in need of thoroughly revising her political thinking. There will

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no longer be power to balance.

Far from holding the key as being the determining influence in the picture, therefore, Britain perforce assumes a secondary role, and must look to her security in other ways. She hopes to find it first in a strong and effective international organization backed by force. As the weakest of the three major powers, and as one occupying an exposed position, she could not logically adopt any other course, even if she did not already possess the sincere desire to create an organization capable of maintaining peace. However, to her the effectiveness of post-war cooperation between the great powers and of an international body such as is envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals remains to be seen, and it is not a characteristic of European politics to place sole reliance on untried methods and means. Furthermore, Britain entertains grave doubts as to the intentions of the Russians in the whole scheme of things and questions the sincerity of their expression of willingness to settle European problems through agreement between the parties concerned. The British are afraid that the Russians may play a lone hand -- which they will be in a position to do if they so desire. Britain would prefer to cooperate, but realizes she may have to compete.

In view of the circumstances it is not to be unexpected that the British will "hedge" against a possible unsuccessful outcome of international collaboration, and will attempt at the same time to strengthen their position by the old power politics system. We can hardly blame them for seeking any additional means of making themselves secure -- they who through bitter personal experience know the grim realities of war and the ever-present danger of it -- and, as previously indicated, they are already working to this end.

Since there will no longer be power to balance in Europe, Britain would logically turn to the United States as the greatest potential source of support in developing an adequate counterpoise to Russia. Without the assured support of the United States, any combination of powers which Britain might be able to assemble would still leave Russia preponderantly strong. The British know that we

have

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have always regarded them as our first line of defense and that any threat to their security would most likely cause armed intervention on our part. However, they are also aware of our traditional antipathy to power politics, and naturally discount the possibility of getting from us an advance commitment to protect the security of the British Isles. In any event, she will at all times follow a policy of seeking such assistance as we will be willing to give.

The next best "hedge" would be to strengthen the bonds of the Commonwealth. Lord Halifax in his Toronto speech developed the thesis that the mother country and the Dominions should speak "with one voice" in international affairs. As desirable as this might be from the point of view of the mother country, there is but little chance of the Dominions' accepting the idea, judging from the reception which the speech had in the several capitals and the opposition expressed at the Prime Ministers' Conference last year. The interests of the Dominions are very often different from those of the mother country, and the inability of the mother country to defend them has been demonstrated. If anything, the political ties are becoming weaker rather than stronger. Here again, however, Britain will do what she can to strengthen herself in this way.

The policy of drawing the nations of Western Europe into close association with the British Commonwealth is in furtherance of this same end. General Smuts was the first prominent official to give expression to the idea, which he did in a speech before the Empire Parliamentary Association on November 25, 1943. Smuts recommended that the Western European nations align themselves with Britain -- for their own good as well as Britain's. The countries involved would be, at first, France, Belgium, Holland and, possibly, Norway and Denmark. The precise nature of the alignment has never been defined, and in fact most of the talk about it has been done in unofficial circles -- doubtless purposely so. It has nevertheless caused official repercussions in the countries concerned, as well as in Russia. Generally speaking, the idea appears to be to offer these countries something in the nature of dominion status in the British Commonwealth. It might properly be regarded as an extension of the Halifax thesis of "one

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voice being the unison of many" -- the intention being to get more voices in the "unison". One exponent of the plan has said:

"Complete coordination of foreign policies is perhaps too much to expect. But the British Government should cultivate the habit of consulting as regularly with Paris, Brussels, the Hague, Copenhagen and Oslo as it already does with Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington and Pretoria. And in the one case as in the other such consultation will almost always result in an agreed policy."

In addition to establishing a common foreign policy it has been pointed out by those favoring the plan that in the field of strategy the war has shown how many other different forms of collaboration it is possible to achieve without an official abatement of sovereignty. They cite the Combined Chiefs of Staff now linking the American and British Forces as an example, and state that something like it might be reproduced in a more permanent form to insure the strategic unity of Western Europe. They also note the Combined Boards -- each dealing jointly with a specific problem - finance, transport, supplies, production, resources, raw materials, etc. They point out too that types of weapons might be standardized, as could instruction in staff colleges -- thereby building up a "staff mind".

The possibilities of collaboration in the economic field are discussed in more vague terms -- most probably because considerable opposition would doubtless develop both at home and abroad. The potentialities, however, are great. A customs union is suggested -- presumably an extension of Imperial Preference -- and one author states:

"The creation of such a union - a unified market of 115,000,000 people not counting any of their colonial dependencies - would be an immense benefit to its members and to the world at large."

Currency agreements are spoken of, and civil aviation is cited as a field in which the countries have a community

of interest..

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of interest. Mention is also made of the fact that these powers have common colonial problems, which might be treated on a regional scale.

One British commentator states:

"Such suggestions may sound revolutionary. But the Lancaster bomber and the assault craft and the duck and the doodle are all revolutionary. The environment of peaceful living in Europe has changed drastically in the last twenty years, and unless the nations are prepared to alter their habits as drastically, they will go the way of all those who have failed to adapt themselves to their environment - they will not survive."

The plan has had a varied reception in the countries concerned. Belgium seems to be the most enthusiastic about it; Holland less so, but still not unfavorably disposed. France is more cool to the idea, but she will probably not be averse to making bilateral agreements with Britain and the low countries if they can be made in such a way as not to weaken the security organization or appear to be directed against the Soviet Union. The Russians are suspicious of the move and Clark Kerr reported that Molotov was obviously "relieved" by his statement to him on November 28 that the object of any so-called "Western European Bloc" would in no wise be to form a counterpoise to the Soviet Union. Clark Kerr also assured him that in accordance with the established policy of his Government the Russians would at all times be kept fully informed of any developments along these lines. It is deemed most likely that he attempted to convey to Molotov the idea that the motive which impelled the British to adopt this policy in Western Europe was the same which led the Russians to take an interest in Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, and Rumania. Subsequent to this conversation, however, the Russian Ambassador in Paris told Caffery that his Government was opposed to the formation of a Western European bloc but had no objection whatever to France's being the principle nation among a group of free and prosperous European nations. This was just after de Gaulle's visit to Moscow.

Recommendations:

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Recommendations:

The whole plan smacks of power politics, and would be widely interpreted as such. It would inevitably be regarded merely as an attempt by Britain to extend her sphere of influence. It would encounter strong opposition from Russia. It would tend to divide Europe into two camps -- at a time when we need unity rather than division. The clock would be turning backward instead of forward. The policy is indicative of a return to the old system of war and more war. It would accordingly militate against the success of a general security organization and would not further the tripartite collaboration so necessary to lasting peace. Furthermore, the economic features would place additional restrictions on trade and run counter to our announced principles of free access to foreign markets and raw materials.

The need of the moment is to promote understanding between Great Britain and Russia on all matters in dispute. We should do all we can in this connection, rather than assist in driving them apart. We should do nothing which might lessen the chances of Dumbarton Oaks. For these reasons it is recommended that no support be given to the plan at this time.

Attachments:

1. Paraphrase of communication given to Mr. Molotov on November 28, 1944; and of
2. Mr. Molotov's reaction.

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Paraphrase of communication given to M. Molotov

There seems to have been a great deal of discussion lately both in British and in foreign press on what is described as a "Western European bloc". A number of these articles seem to suggest that it is His Majesty's Government's desire and intention to organise some closely integrated Western European system both on political and on economic lines and some have been hinted that this should be with the object of forming a sort of counterpoise to the Soviet Union, His Majesty's Government and United States. Some articles do not even mention the World Organisation at all.

You can assure M. Molotov that this is largely fantasy so far as actual policy of His Majesty's Government is concerned. Whether it will be inadvisable to devise a system for the organisation in Western Europe of regional defence against Germany for the one and only purpose of holding Germany down is a question that will doubtless have to be considered. You may recall that during Dumbarton Oaks discussions Sir A. Cadogan frankly said that it was our intention if possible to make use of paragraph 8 c of proposals in this sense and that no objection was raised either by the Soviet or by American representatives. In this sense Marshal Stalin, himself, encouraged us in 1941 to believe that such a system would be agreeable to him. Provided, in fact, that regional arrangements are definitely made subordinate to a World Organisation, we cannot imagine that the Soviet Union would have any objection to their establishment either in the West or in the East of Europe.

It is quite true that we have at various times been approached by Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian Governments on such matters, and recently M. Spaak conveyed to us a memorandum which appeared to go rather further than regional organisation defence against Germany and referred to economic alternatives as well. His Majesty's Government have not yet considered M. Spaak's memorandum though they have agreed to grant various facilities for training of Belgians disbanded in the United Kingdom and have undertaken to make transference of the necessary arms and equipment for a limited number of Belgian

divisions

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divisions which may take part in eventual occupation of Germany. Nor have they given any final indication of their views to other Governments concerned. In particular they have not, as yet, even taken up the question of regional defence with the French Government.

To sum up, His Majesty's Government would put the establishment of a World Organisation first on their list of desiderata. It may prove in addition to be desirable to have some regional defence arrangement in West Europe for the purpose of elaborating a common defence policy against Germany and of deciding what the role of each state concerned is to be in the matter of armaments and disposition of forces. But all these matters will be discussed with the Soviet Government in detail if and when they arise in accordance with the settled policy of His Majesty's Government.

We are taking similar action with the Soviet Embassy here and are warning them against crediting exaggerated reports.

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Statement of M. Molotov's re-actions

I saw Mr. Molotov last night and spoke to him as instructed. I think that the statement was timely because it was clear that he had been watching the Press closely and I got the impression that he had been attaching more importance to it than it deserved.

He said that the question was one that could not but interest the Soviet Government. Judging by the newspapers talk about a bloc had been going on for some time, and judging by statements made by representatives of other governments, for instance Belgian and Norwegian, question had already been discussed. M. Spaak had spoken to M. Gusev about it. The French Government had been canvassing it also. He even recalled the speech made by General Smuts about a year ago. He was very grateful to you for the information I have given him. He hoped that you would keep him currently informed of any further developments.

He was obviously relieved by what I told him and he asked me to repeat the summing up in paragraph 5. I enquired if there was any specific point about which he felt any doubts. He replied that he would have to think the matter over a little and said that a recent message from the Prime Minister to M. Stalin had shown that Mr. Churchill had not yet considered it. Finally we agreed that it would probably be one for discussion at the next meeting of the three Heads of the Governments.

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